Galician battle. The “Great Retreat” of the Russian Army as a harbinger of future upheavals and chaos of the “red wheel” The main reason for the retreat of the Russian command
The Great Retreat of the Russian Army of 1915
At the end of the autumn of 1914, the German commander-in-chief in the East, Paul Hindenburg, and his chief of staff, Erich Ludendorff (a permanent tandem in which the role of the chief of staff cannot be underestimated) decided to repeat their success in East Prussia and began an operation to encircle the 2nd (newly formed) and 5th Russian Army in the Lodz area.
The Russian armies managed to fight back and retreated, leaving Lodz to the Germans. Then the Russians were saved from complete defeat not only by the valor of the soldiers, but largely by the stubborn reluctance of Erich Falkenhayn, the chief of the field general staff, to transfer troops from the West to the East. Falkenhayn then considered the Western theater of military operations to be a priority.
However, by the end of the first year of the war, Germany found itself in a stalemate: the “Schlieffen Plan”, and with it the plan for a “lightning war” in the West, failed, and the Russians survived after a heavy defeat in East Prussia and subsequent battles near Warsaw, Ivangorod and Lodz. Moreover, the successful Russian offensive in Galicia created the preconditions for the subsequent defeat and withdrawal of Austria-Hungary from the war. In the long term, the position of the Second Reich looked threatening. Under the conditions of the naval blockade by Britain, a food crisis had already begun to be felt: after all, before the war, Germany was one of the largest European importers of agricultural products. Germany was forced to switch to a rationing system for food distribution. The situation in the international arena was also unfavorable: neutral Italy’s entry into the war against Austria-Hungary was only a matter of time.
In this situation, Hindenburg and Ludendorff suggested that Falkenhayn, in the 1915 campaign, carry out a blitzkrieg on the Eastern Front and take Russia out of the war.
Hindenburg intended to encircle an entire front - four to six armies located in the Polish salient ("pocket") between East Prussia and the Carpathians. The plan was not new: the joint Austro-German command one way or another intended to follow it back in 1914. However, due to the lull on the Western Front and the deliberate decision to concentrate against Russia, the Germans for the first time had forces that they could use not only for defense, but also for offense.
At the same time, the Russian command planned its two offensives for the 1915 campaign, but in divergent directions: into East Prussia and the Carpathians...
The simultaneous offensive of the opponents turned at the first stage into a series of bloody oncoming battles. The campaign began with a grandiose counter-battle in the Carpathians in January-April. Neither side achieved its goals, but the Austro-Hungarian troops were so exhausted by the battles that the Germans were forced to patch up their front with their formations. The Russians managed to advance up to 20 km in some areas, but lost about a million killed, wounded and prisoners, while the Germans and Austro-Hungarians lost up to 800,000 people.
On the North-Western Russian Front, the German tandem almost managed to repeat its success at Tannenberg after the failed Russian operation at Lansdenen. This time the target of the new Cannes was to be the 10th Army. As a result of the August operation in February, the Germans, with almost one and a half superiority in infantry and complete superiority in artillery, especially heavy artillery, managed to achieve only partial success. In the Augustow Forests he was surrounded by the 20th Corps of the 10th Army, but at the cost of his death he prevented the Germans from breaking through to the rear of the North-Western Front.
South-west of Augustow and north of Warsaw in late February - early March, Hindenburg and Ludendorff tested the strength of the 1st and 12th Russian armies, but the Second Battle of Prasnysz ended in failure for the Germans. Russian troops managed to repel enemy attacks and themselves launched a counteroffensive.
At the same time, on the Austro-Hungarian front, after the Battle of the Carpathians, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians gradually concentrated large forces against the troops of the Southwestern Front.
Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for Military Affairs, warned the Russian Headquarters of the Supreme High Command a month in advance about the impending offensive in the area of the town of Gorlitsy. However, Russian generals did not attach importance to the concentration of German heavy artillery and troops in this area. At the start of the operation, the Germans managed to concentrate 2 times more infantry in the main breakthrough area, 2.5 times more machine guns, and 4.5 times more light artillery. 160 heavy guns were against 4 Russians, in addition, the Germans had 96 mortars. As a result, on May 2 (all dates are given in the new style), the Germans, after a 13-hour artillery preparation, razed the Russian trenches to the ground. However, they were unable to completely suppress the Russian fire system, and fighting at the Russian forward positions continued for three more days. The bloodless 3rd Army was unable to resist the enemy and began to gradually retreat. Neighboring armies were forced to retreat along with it - otherwise, as a result of the breakthrough, they would be in danger of encirclement in the Carpathians.
Throughout May and June, the troops of the Southwestern Front, snarling, slowly rolled back to the state border and beyond. By the end of June, the front line had moved 200 or even more kilometers to Ivangorod, Lublin, Kholm, Brody. The battle won with great difficulty in 1914-1915 was lost. Galicia and the Carpathians, the cities of Radom, Lviv and Przemysl.
The troops were drained of blood, largely because there was a catastrophic shortage of shells, cartridges and even rifles, wasted in the winter storming the Carpathians, and new reinforcements were no longer recruited from reservists, as in 1914, but from recruits. Their combat training, to put it mildly, left much to be desired: due to the shortage of rifles, many of them were not familiar with their design and did not even know how to load them. At the same time, veterans who recovered from their wounds were not returned to their regiments, but were sent to the first available units.
The Russian officer corps also suffered heavy losses: by the end of 1915, over 60% of the entire officer corps, mainly career officers and reserve officers, had been killed.
The success of the Gorlitsky breakthrough and the gradual retreat of Russian troops forced the German command in the East to think about a breakthrough on the German sector of the front. It was for this purpose that the Germans tried to impose the Third Battle of Prasnysh on the Russian troops, but the Russian troops did not accept it, and with heavy rearguard battles they began to withdraw from the “Polish Sack”.
July-August became months of constant, unceasing retreat, the Great Retreat of Russian troops throughout the Eastern European theater of military operations. This was not just a retreat from the enemy, it was a slow (there were no tanks yet, and the cavalry had shown its ineffectiveness), but skillful and assertive pushing by the enemy of the Russian defense, mainly with the help of artillery. And often not on prepared lines, but essentially in an open field. At the same time, the vacations of soldiers and officers were cancelled, and units did not have the opportunity to rotate. The enemy constantly broke through the front line, and the Headquarters threw its last reserves to eliminate the threat: divisions that turned into regiments, and then even into battalions and companies.
A.I. Denikin recalled this period as follows:
“The spring of 1915 will remain in my memory forever. The great tragedy of the Russian army is the retreat from Galicia. No cartridges, no shells. Day after day bloody battles, day after day difficult marches, endless fatigue - physical and moral; sometimes timid hopes, sometimes hopeless horror...”
It was in July-August that Hindenburg had the most favorable prerequisites for encircling and defeating Russian troops in Poland. However, his plan was thwarted, thanks to both the desperate valor of the Russian troops and the disagreements of the tandem of Hindenburg and Ludendorff with the same “sweet couple of Falkenhayn and Konrad von Götzendorff, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian field general staff. Falkenhayn insisted on a more moderate version of the encirclement and intended to catch the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Russian armies in the “Polish Sack”, while Hindenburg and Ludendorff hoped to “grab” more units of the 10th and 12th th armies. Von Gotzendorf was more concerned with the capture of Galicia and was eager to advance to the east rather than to the north. As a result, Kaiser Wilhelm decided to support all three points of view. It turned out that in the north, instead of one blow that was fatal for the Russian troops, the Germans delivered two simultaneously - sensitive, but not critical. While in the south the Austrians sent barely half of their divisions to support Hindenburg...
In addition, in 1915 there were significant personnel changes in the Russian generals, clearly for the better. So, instead of Nikolai Nikolaevich’s sick favorite, General N.V. Ruzsky, General M.V. became commander of the Northwestern Front in March. Alekseev. He insisted on canceling the order “Not a step back” and forced the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to allow the withdrawal of troops to lines with natural barriers, so as not to shed rivers of Russian blood in an open field.
Heavy battles continued until the end of September 1915. The last attempt to encircle was the Sventsyansky breakthrough of the North-Western Front by German cavalry. However, thanks to Alekseev’s skillful leadership, Russian troops were able to repulse the attack and patched up the breaches made in the front line. As a result, not a single Russian army was surrounded.
But Alekseev, alas, also made a number of miscalculations. For example, it is not clear why large garrisons were left in the fortresses of Novogeorgievsk and Kovno, although Russian generals knew very well the futility of such a use of troops using the example of Przemysl (then the Austrians “released” 120 thousand people into Russian captivity). In Novogeorgievsk, General N.P. Bobyr gave the order to surrender “to avoid bloodshed” while already in German captivity. After a ten-day siege, 83,000 people and over 1,100 guns fell prey to the enemy. The Kovno fortress held out one day longer, in which 20,000 people with 405 guns surrendered, demoralized by the flight of the commandant General V.N. Grigoriev, as he claimed, “for reinforcements.”
To be fair, one cannot help but cite examples of the selfless valor of the Russian troops. In the February August operation, the last man died surrounded by the Maloyaroslavsky regiment. The remaining 40 people, led by Colonel Vitsnuda, were surrounded by superior German forces, but refused to surrender and died in an unequal battle.
Several hundred wounded soldiers of the regiment, who could no longer move, shot all their cartridges and died in their positions, knowing that the Germans would still, at best, if they didn’t pin them, would leave them to die in the winter forest (this is what mostly happened with the wounded at Augustow by Russian soldiers).
In the same February 1915, for eleven days Colonel Barybin’s combined regiment defended the city of Prasnysh, which stormed an entire German corps. The last to enter hand-to-hand combat were the officers of the regiment headquarters...
During the Carpathian operation in Bukovina, the cavalry corps of the best cavalry generals distinguished themselves: the 2nd Kaledin (the famous “Wild” division and the 12th cavalry division) and the 3rd Count Keller (1st Don and Terek Cossacks, 10th cavalry divisions , as well as the Warsaw Guards Cavalry Brigade).
During the battles of the 1915 campaign, many curious events happened - on both sides. So, on Easter, March 26, the Germans concluded a temporary truce with our troops at the notorious height 992 near Koziuvka. However, the truce was needed only as a diversion: after waiting for the Russians to celebrate Easter, the Germans captured the heights with a swift blow.
A similar story happened with the Tyrolean 14th Corps of the Austro-Hungarians. Celebrating the appointed redeployment to the Italian front (it seemed to them not as terrible as the Russian one), the enemy soldiers did not imagine that the Russians would attack at dawn, right before the departure, and take 7,000 people prisoner...
In May, on the eve of the Gorlitsky offensive, during the liquidation of breakthroughs, the 4th “Iron” Infantry Brigade (later division) of A.I. Denikin became famous, not for the first time rescuing Brusilov’s 8th Army.
At the same time, the Ussuri cavalry brigade of General A. M. Krymov, who became better known in Russian history for the events of 1917 (the rebellion of L. G. Kornilov), skillfully operated in Lithuania. In the battle near Popelany in June 1915, Krymov, personally commanding the Primorsky Dragoon Regiment, successively defeated five enemy cavalry regiments in a decisive attack.
Meanwhile, Kornilov himself was captured in May along with the advance detachment of the 48th division, trying to cover its withdrawal. A year and three months later, in the summer of 1916, he managed to escape from captivity.
In July, the famous Siberian divisions (2nd and 11th) showed their excellent fighting qualities near Narev, holding back the onslaught of eight Germans under hurricane artillery fire on the first day of the Third Battle of Prasnysh. A few days later, however, the Germans broke through the Russian front. Then a critical moment arose when it seemed that the 1st Army was doomed to be surrounded. The Mitavian hussars distinguished themselves in containing the enemy breakthrough. They were helped by the Don Cossacks of the 14th regiment. When the German cavalry tried to repeat their feat, it was pierced by bayonets of the 21st Turkestan Regiment and retreated.
Despite the valor of the Russian troops and local successes, the tormented and essentially deprived of artillery Russian army was forced to retreat. At the beginning of August, the already mentioned fortresses of Novogeorgievsk and Kovno, Grodno, as well as the famous Osovets, were lost almost simultaneously, and the then ineffective and abandoned fortress of Brest-Litovsk was abandoned.
The Kingdom of Poland was conquered by the enemy, the Russians lost Western Belarus and all of Lithuania. By September, Russian troops had retreated in some areas to a distance of up to 400 kilometers.
The front line came close to Riga, Molodechno, Baranovichi, Pinsk, Rivne. The only area where the Austro-Hungarians failed to achieve significant success was Bukovina, bordering Romania.
It is not surprising that at the end of summer the change of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich was inevitable. True, no one expected that the emperor himself would become the new Supreme.
By that time, on the initiative of the Grand Duke, a campaign of spy mania had already begun. To whitewash himself in the eyes of the public, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich blamed his defeats on the notorious German spies. Even Minister of War (!) V.A. was removed from office on charges of treason. Sukhomlinov. Some suspected even the august family of treason...
The Headquarters also did not foresee the consequences of using the “scorched earth” tactics, aimed at preventing the Germans from having excess food supplies in the abandoned territory. More than four million embittered, impoverished refugees have accumulated in the central regions of Russia - these people will take an active part in the Civil War. In addition, the orders of the Headquarters instilled in the troops the habit of robbery and violence against civilians, thereby anticipating the horrors of a fratricidal war.
War-weary soldiers of the warring sides were increasingly inclined to distrust officers, especially their governments...
The return of corporal punishment in the Russian army in the summer of 1915 also contributed to the embitterment of the soldiers. Many no longer believed in the very possibility of winning this war.
Not everything was smooth on the diplomatic front either: both the Entente countries and Russia were mutually disappointed. Russian military leaders reproached the Allies for stubbornly sitting out trench warfare on the Western Front and placing the entire burden of the war on Russian shoulders. After all, throughout 1915, the Allies undertook only three major operations. Two of them failed in the spring and autumn in Champagne and Artois (300,000 people killed and wounded among the Allies). The Germans used chemical weapons (phosgene) at the Battle of Ypres, but it was a battle that had no particular consequences for the front line. Winston Churchill's Dardanelles adventure, aimed at capturing Istanbul and withdrawing Turkey from the war, also failed (150,000 killed and wounded). The main thing is that the operations on the Western Front and in the Dardanelles did not distract the German forces: not a single division was removed from the Eastern Front.
The entry of Italy into the war on May 23, 1915, did little to help the Allies. Four battles on the Isonzo River showed the complete inability of the Italians to conduct offensive operations. The Austro-Hungarians, however, stopped the offensive in Galicia for two weeks, fearing to waste the troops needed against the “macaroni” on the Russian front. But the accession of Bulgaria to the Central Powers in September 1915 led to the fall of Serbia by the end of autumn.
Nevertheless, Hindenburg’s grandiose plan was thwarted, although the Russian troops suffered horrific heavy losses in killed, wounded and prisoners. The main goal of German strategists—the complete defeat of the Russian Front and the withdrawal of Russia from the war—was not achieved. The plan for a “lightning” war in the East failed - as a result, Germany began to lose the initiative in favor of the Entente...
The Allies were still very far from victory, and they, having failed to help Russia, only prolonged the war themselves (there were “meat grinders” ahead at the Somme and Verdun).
Nevertheless, from a strategic perspective, Germany’s position worsened, because prolonging the war benefited only the Entente, and not the Central Powers. Moreover, after the destruction of the Lusitania in May 1915, the United States began to prepare for entry into the war on the side of the Entente...
For Russia, unfortunately, the colossal sacrifices made in the Great Retreat due to revolutions and the Civil War ultimately turned out to be in vain...
Special for the Centenary
The retreat of the Russian army in 1915, which lasted almost six months - from May to September, almost immediately went down in history as the “Great”. Almost everything in the events of those days was truly great. And the scale of the military operation (generally successful) for the coordinated maneuvering of millions of armies. And the country’s territorial losses are 15% as payment for saving those same armies. And the work of evacuating a huge number of enterprises and institutions (in terms of volume and organization, carried out much better than by the Bolsheviks during the Soviet-German war). And the heroism of tens and hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers, who at the cost of their lives saved most of the retreating army from encirclement and defeat. This heroism will very soon be privatized by the Bolsheviks, and the exploits of the Great War and the Great Retreat will simply be erased by the Bolsheviks from official history.
"Two hard blows are better than one fatal"
The unconditional success of the Gorlitsky breakthrough - a breakthrough in May 1915 of the Russian Front in the area of the Polish city of Gorlice, the surrender without a fight of the largest fortress in Galicia Przemysl and the subsequent surrender of Lvov by the Russians in June - showed the German command firsthand the logistical and technical problems of the Russian army.
The Chief of the German Field General Staff, General Erich von Falkenhayn, who was, in principle, extremely wary of the idea of a strategic offensive deep into the Russian Empire, against the backdrop of the obvious “cartridge and shell” hunger of the Russians, began to gradually change his position. The most important meeting of senior officers of Germany and their Austrian allies, held at the Silesian castle of Ples on June 3, 1915, finally approved the strategic plan of the commander-in-chief of the German Eastern Front, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, for the upcoming summer-autumn campaign of 1915.
The Hindenburg plan provided for the destruction of the main body of Russian armed forces on the territory of the Kingdom of Poland in the so-called Polish sack. This bag was to be created by a two-sided concentric strike by the military group of General August von Mackensen from the south and a strike by the 10th Army of General Hermann von Eichhorn, deployed from Tilsit to Insterburg, from the north.
Mackensen's army group was supposed to strike from Lvov to the north, bypassing east of Warsaw, and Eichhorn's 10th Army - to the southeast, bypassing the Russian fortress of Kovno to Vilna and Minsk. The chief of staff of the German Eastern Front, General Erich von Ludendorff, was confident that the Russians, relying on their fortresses in Novogeorgievsk, Kovno, Grodno, Osovets and Brest, would try to hold their “Polish salient” for as long as possible, which would ultimately allow the German army to make a strategic encirclement of all Russian armies in Poland.
The Chief of the German General Staff, Falkenhayn, who was more skeptical about the possibility of encircling all Russian armies in the “Polish salient” (as it later turned out, was completely realistic), proposed making the operation to create a Russian “Polish bag” more local. He urged not to try to “embrace the immensity” - that is, four full Russian armies at once (2nd, 4th, 10th and 12th) and the military remnants of two more (1st and 3rd). The general convinced Hindenburg to reduce the expected coverage of the Russian armies by half, so that the Russian 2nd and 4th armies, as well as the remnants of the already defeated 1st and 3rd armies, would be encircled.
To achieve this goal, Falkenhayn proposed gathering all available German forces in the north into a single fist (based on the army group of General Max von Gallwitz) and carrying out a massive attack in the area of the Mazovian town of Prasnysz, followed by a rapid crossing of the Narew River. Having united in the area of Polish Sedlec, the army groups of Mackensen and Galwitz with a very high degree of probability would be able to encircle the 2nd and 4th Russian armies.
But Hindenburg, with the inherent rigidity of a true Prussian, categorically rejected Falkenhayn's strategic amendment.
However, the intellectual "weight" of General Falkenhayn, as a military strategist, was significantly inferior in the eyes of Kaiser Wilhelm II to the strategic reputation of Hindenburg - the "savior of East Prussia." At the same time, the German emperor did not want to injure the pride of his extremely selfless Chief of the General Staff. As a result of the conciliatory position of the Kaiser, the German General Staff approved a strategic plan that was very uncharacteristic of German military thought: to deliver two “main blows” simultaneously on the Russian front: with the 10th Army of Eichhorn - on Kovno-Vilno-Minsk and by the army group of General Galwitz - on Pultusk-Siedlce towards Mackensen's "phalanx".
This decision of Wilhelm II ultimately led the Germans to a strategic fiasco. The Russian Headquarters of the Supreme High Command could not miss such a “gift”. “The enemy scattered his efforts,” writes the greatest historian of the Great War, Anton Kersnovsky, “the Russian armies received two strong blows, but it was better than receiving one fatal blow.”
Ticks that couldn't be closed
On June 26, 1915, the commander of the southern group of German-Austrian armies, August von Mackensen, launched an offensive against Russian positions on the Tanev-Rava-Russkaya river section. This is how the first part of the plan to create a “Polish bag” for the Russian armies began to be implemented.
Mackensen directed the main attack on the left flank of the significantly drained 3rd Army in the zone of responsibility of the Russian 24th Corps. The Germans created a significant advantage in manpower in this section of the offensive: ten Russian divisions, with a total number of 40 thousand bayonets, held back the onslaught of 8 full-strength German divisions, numbering more than 60 thousand bayonets. The predominance of German artillery was absolute.
The defensive position along the Tanev River was well fortified, and most importantly, convenient for maneuvering, and as a result, Russian troops acted there proactively. From the reserve of the North-Western Front, the 31st Army Corps and the 48th “Kornilov” Cavalry Division were urgently moved to the forward positions, which were able to effectively counterattack Mackensen’s advancing units.
The German general suspended the offensive and regrouped his forces. On July 4, Mackensen tried to break through the Russian positions on the right flank of the 3rd Army with the forces of the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army, but was repulsed at all points of the proposed breakthrough with heavy losses. In the four-day Battle of Tanev (from July 4 to July 7), all the advancing Austrian divisions were defeated, and the Russians captured 297 officers, 22,463 soldiers and 60 guns as trophies.
This was an impressive success, especially important against the background of the chronic “cartridge and shell” shortage among the Russians. The 2nd and 6th Siberian Corps, as well as the Guards Corps, transferred from the reserve to strengthen the 3rd Army, did not leave Mackensen's hopes for a rapid breakthrough of the positions of this army formation, which seemed to be completely defeated during the Gorlitsky breakthrough.
On July 5, 1915, a meeting of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and front commanders was held in Siedlce, Poland. The main report at the meeting was made by the commander of the Northwestern Front, General M.V. Alekseev. He bluntly informed the high assembly that any day now he was expecting a powerful attack from the northern group of German troops in the direction of the Narew River - towards Mackensen, who was rushing to the north. To counter this threat, the reserve of the Northwestern Front and Headquarters had 17 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions.
The central idea of General Alekseev’s report was the statement of the impossibility of holding the “Polish salient” of the front with the stock of cartridges and shells available in the troops and in warehouses. The general specifically emphasized that the existing pace of production and delivery of the main ammunition to the front does not allow us to expect that the combat readiness of the Russian armies will change for the better before the spring of 1916. “Therefore, we now have the opportunity to choose,” the general concluded, “which is preferable for the Russian Headquarters: an attempt to hold Poland - with the likely prospect of disaster for the army, or an attempt to preserve the army - with the inevitable, in this case, withdrawal of all our troops from the Kingdom of Poland.” .
We must pay tribute to the personal courage of the Russian Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich - he took full responsibility for the retreat of the Russian armies from Poland. As a result, the Meeting supported General Alekseev’s plan to preserve the potential of the Russian Army in a long retreat inland. The commander of the Northwestern Front received permission to evacuate troops from Warsaw, as well as from those fortresses of the Kingdom of Poland that would be in a dangerous situation.
The prudent strategic line outlined at the meeting in Sedlec largely ensured the success of the Russian defense in 1915.
When just a week later, on July 13, the army group of General von Gallwitz, under hurricane artillery escort from 1,400 guns, attacked the positions of the Russian 1st Army, the headquarters of the North-Western Front already had a good idea of how, why and in what sequence the Russian troops would act.
On this day, according to leading military historians, the Germans fired 2 million shells at the positions of the 2nd and 11th Siberian divisions holding the first line of defense. The return Russian artillery fire barely managed to reach the figure of 50 thousand rounds. However, despite such overwhelming firepower of the Germans, the 2nd Siberian Division managed to repel the offensive of the 13th Württemberg Guards Corps. The Siberian 11th Division generally managed to accomplish the impossible: waves of attack from six divisions of the German 17th and 11th Infantry Corps crashed against its position.
This amazing resilience inevitably led to colossal losses in the Russian regiments: by the end of the day on June 30, only 150 people remained alive in the 5th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Siberian Division. Of the 7 battalions of the 11th Siberian Division on this day, the Germans destroyed 6 battalions, based on the total number of personnel. However, these seven Russian battalions, who died in their positions but did not retreat a single step, and were armed with only 46 guns, managed to push back 33 German battalions with 256 field guns to their original positions.
Thanks to the resilience of Russian soldiers and timely directives from the headquarters of the Northwestern Front, German efforts to create a colossal “Polish bag” for the Russian armies were in vain. A significant role in the failure of the German strategic plan was played by a delay of almost 10 days in the provision of additional forces to the army group of General von Gallwitz. Having finally broken through the line of Russian defensive positions on the Narew River with enormous effort, General Galwitz did not receive a single regiment from Hindenburg to develop success into strategic depth. When, 10 days later, the necessary reserves of the 12th German Army were provided, it was already too late: Russian troops, snapping short counterattacks, retreated in an organized manner along the entire line of the “Polish salient.”
The retreat of the Russian armies from the western part of the “Polish ledge” continued throughout July. The withdrawal from Poland to the east was organized at the highest level: not a single large army unit was bypassed by the Germans, not a single division was surrounded. With heavy fighting, Russian troops initially retreated to the Ivangorod-Lublin-Holm line. Here the Germans were somewhat delayed by frontal counterattacks, providing the necessary time for the removal of material assets from Warsaw.
Results of the Great Retreat
On August 22, Russian troops abandoned the Osovets fortress. On August 26, Brest-Litovsk and Olita were evacuated, and on September 2, Grodno was left fighting. The front has stabilized along the line Riga - Dvinsk - Baranovichi - Pinsk - Dubno - Tarnopol. Russia lost 15% of its territory, 30% of its industry and about 10% of its railways.
The fall of Novogeorgievsk had a number of consequences both for the situation at the front and for the state as a whole. The German command released 3 divisions, which strengthened the 10th Army. The Russian High Command, dejected by the fall of Novogeorgievsk and Kovno, decided to evacuate Brest-Litovsk. Although, according to its commandant V.A. Laming, with reasonable expenditure of food, the fortress was capable of defending itself from six months to 8 months. As a result, a string of military disasters occurred - the fall and surrender of the strongest fortresses of Kovno, Grodno, Brest-Litovsk, and the capture of many tens of thousands of Russian soldiers. If in June 1915 the Russian army suffered losses as a result of fierce and stubborn battles, then in August - as a result of mass surrenders.
The Russian Headquarters was at a loss. General Alekseev, who came to Headquarters in September 1915, was “struck by the disorder, confusion and despondency reigning there. Both Nikolai Nikolaevich and Yanushkevich were confused by the failures of the North-Western Front and did not know what to do.” The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, failed in his task. In such conditions, Emperor Nicholas II decided to remove the Grand Duke and himself stand at the head of the army. As Kersnovsky wrote: “This was the only way out of the critical situation that had created. Every hour of delay threatened death. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and his staff could no longer cope with the situation - they had to be urgently replaced. And due to the absence of a commander in Russia, only the Sovereign could replace the Supreme Commander.”
It is worth noting that during the same period, the Headquarters’ plan to “revive the atmosphere of the nationwide war of 1812” failed. The decision of the Supreme High Command to organize the evacuation of the population of the western regions deep into Russia sharply worsened the already unfavorable socio-economic and national situation in Russia. All the roads of Lithuania and Belarusian Polesie were instantly filled with endless lines of carts and crowds of refugees. They mixed with the retreating troops, greatly hindering their movement. A huge wave of impoverished and embittered refugees swept through the central provinces of Russia. The total number of refugees to Central Russia reached 10 million people by the end of 1915. The partisan movement in the rear of the German army according to the model of 1812 did not work out. But Russia received a huge migration wave, which would become one of the prerequisites for the state disaster of 1917.
“The headquarters did not realize,” noted historian Anton Kersnovsky, “that, having raised this entire four-million mass of women, children and old people, it had to take care of their food. ... Many half-starved people, especially children, died from cholera and typhoid. The survivors, transformed into a poor, declassed proletariat, were taken deep into Russia. One of the sources of replenishment for the future Red Guard was ready.”
“Of all the grave consequences of the war,” said the chief manager of agriculture, Alexander Krivoshein (one of P. Stolypin’s associates), at a government meeting on August 12, 1915, “spurring the evacuation of the population is the most unexpected, the most formidable and the most irreparable phenomenon. And what’s most terrible of all is that it was not caused by real necessity or a popular impulse, but was invented by wise strategists to intimidate the enemy. Good way to fight! Curses, illnesses, grief and poverty are spreading throughout Russia. Hungry and ragged crowds are spreading panic everywhere, and the last remnants of the excitement of the first months of the war are being extinguished. They march in a solid wall, trample the grain, spoil the meadows - the peasantry begins to grumble more and more loudly. ... I think that the Germans are not without pleasure observing this “repetition of 1812.”
The heavy defeats of the Russian army caused delight in the German press and society. German burghers organized solemn demonstrations and processions with banners, posters and chanted cries: “Russland Kaput!” The Russian defeat was wildly rejoiced in Turkey. However, in reality, German victories did not lead to a strategic turning point in the war. During the summer of 1915, the Russian army abandoned Galicia, Lithuania and Poland, that is, it not only lost all the acquisitions of the 1914 campaign, but also lost its own lands. But the strategic plan to defeat the Russian army failed. Russia continued to fight. The Russian army avoided large-scale encirclement and responded with a series of counterattacks in the fall of 1915. The position of Germany and its allies worsened every month. The resources of the Central Powers were scarcer than those of the Entente, and a protracted war inevitably led Berlin, Vienna and Istanbul to defeat.
The German army was unable to achieve a decisive victory and stopped the offensive in September 1915. Several factors played a role: 1) fierce resistance from the Russian army, which led to heavy losses of German and Austro-Hungarian troops. The Germans and Austrians paid for their victories on the Eastern Front at a very high price. For example, in the summer of 1915 alone, the Prussian Guards Corps suffered losses of 175% of personnel on the Eastern Front, that is, it was actually destroyed almost twice. The German troops were tired and could not build on their success.
2) The obvious reluctance of part of the German generals to advance further into Russia. Many were afraid to repeat the experience of Napoleon and Charles XII. The German army could get stuck in the colossal expanses of Russia and be defeated on the Western Front.
3) The ever-increasing length of communications to supply the German army, the deterioration of the road network in the depths of Russia and the approach of the autumn rainy season and winter, which sharply worsened the ability to move and conduct active combat operations. With each week of the offensive, German infantry officers assessed the Russian positions as increasingly difficult to attack and required longer and longer artillery preparation.
4) It became clear that the strategic plan to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Russian army was a failure.
A new plan was needed.
N. Lysenko
A. Samsonov
“It pains and shames me that the cause is the cowardice of the troops.”
By 4 p.m. it was all over. (825) “Crushed” by the fire of French artillery (as one of the studies on the history of foot rangers says), the troops of the Russian left flank and center retreated: the Minsk, Moscow infantry, Borodino ranger regiments. This made it possible for the British to finish their game. (826)
This is not to say that success was easy for the allies. Many soldiers collapsed from fatigue, aggravated by thirst. The surviving officers congratulated each other on their victory. Lord Raglan rode up to Brigadier Colin Campbell and greeted him warmly. The commander of the Scottish brigade asked the commander-in-chief, as a sign of appreciation of the contribution of the Scottish infantry to the success of the battle, the right from now on in battle to wear the traditional headdress of the Scottish infantry instead of the statutory general's hat with feathers, which he was graciously allowed to do.
Four companies of the 2nd battalion of the Rifle Brigade received orders to pursue the retreating Russians. They left everything unnecessary in place and prepared for a long march along the path of the retreating Russian army. The companies had not gone even a mile before they were recalled. (827)
The reason was the hysteria that occurred in Raglan, caused by the fact that English military leaders at all times caused hysteria - initiative. The inactive cavalrymen of the Light Brigade, without a command, moved around the right flank of the Russian position, while the 8th Hussars captured 60–70 Russian soldiers (probably from among the stragglers from the Suzdal regiment, possibly riflemen or skirmishers) prisoners, but in a fit of joyful emotion, the British officers allowed them to leave.
According to the memoirs of Captain Shakespeare, the movement of the cavalrymen once again caused the incredible anger of Lord Raglan, who in the most categorical form ordered, through one of his adjutants, to immediately return the Light Brigade to its place. By the way, the fact of captivity and liberation is not fiction. General Bogdanovich mentions this.
“The Allied troops, approaching the position occupied by our rearguard, stopped and stopped pursuing. Lord Cardigan's cavalry was first advanced and captured several prisoners; but Raglan, wanting to preserve his small cavalry, ordered it to turn back and cover the foot batteries. Having received this order, Lord Lucan withdrew to the artillery, releasing all the prisoners he had captured.” (828)
Along the way, the commander-in-chief stopped Lawrence and his riflemen out of harm's way - what if they wanted to take Sevastopol alone?
The withdrawal of the most affected Russian regiments, which had honestly fulfilled their duty, took place in an organized manner, although they continued to be under artillery fire all this time. The disorder began already during the retreat of the Russian army from the line of the Kacha River.
“...Prince Menshikov, seeing that the key to his positions is in the hands of the French army, orders the beginning of a retreat, and the huge mass of infantry and cavalry located at this point of the battlefield maneuvers in order, and the artillery covers the territory to the right and left with fire. towers." (829) The retreat of the bulk of the Russian troops, and most military researchers are inclined to believe this, was poorly organized and carried out “in a disorderly manner.” (830)
It's hard for me to say this, but anyone with a reasonable military education will tell you that there is no such thing as a "poorly managed retreat." A poorly organized offensive means heaps of corpses in front of enemy trenches. A poorly organized retreat implies a single concept - flight. And these are not necessarily people running in different directions. Most often these are poorly organized units, sometimes without commanders, sometimes with them, abandoned property, lack of a plan, etc.
Let's not pretend this time either - that's how it was. There is nothing extraordinary about this. Four decades before Alma, at Austerlitz, the Russian linear infantry fled, but the Guards infantry and Guards cavalry saved the honor of both the Guard and the Russian army.
So it was in the Battle of Alma - if some fled, others saved their honor. There was the Uglitsky regiment, which fled with music and songs and had negligible overall losses in some battalions of 200 people without officers, but there was the Vladimir regiment - torn to pieces, but snarling, showing its back, but preserving the honor of the Russian infantry. There was a Tarutinsky regiment that fled in one direction, and its commander fled in another. But there was a Minsky regiment that did not lose order for a minute.
The hussar brigade of General Khaletsky, continuing to remain a spectator, instead of covering the retreat of the infantry, did not budge. For this type of troops, the Crimean War both began and ended, despite the large number of cavalry, with an “insignificant and unfamous” role. (831) Although Kangil still had more than a year before the battle, his ghost was already looming over the Almin Heights.
The three (832) least damaged batteries, by order of General Kishinsky, took up positions on the heights, ensuring a retreat: 24 guns of the horse-light battery No. 12, light batteries No. 3 and No. 4 of the 14th artillery brigade.
This measure turned out to be timely. Although the Allies initially refused to pursue the Russian army, they clearly decided to "gut" its tail with gunfire - and the French artillery moved forward with all its batteries. (833) At the heights behind the former left Russian flank, reserve batteries deployed and one of them, captain Boussiniere, immediately opened fire, covering the Volyn infantry regiment with the first shots. The British cavalry battery also continued to fire, but unable to withstand the competition with the Russian 12-pounder guns, it soon ceased fire. (834)
The Volyn regiment, which was in reserve, let past the retreating regiments, the last of which was Minsky, withdrew from its position and began a retreat to the Kache River to the village of Efendi-Koy. Colonel Khrushchev, having received the command to begin the general withdrawal of the army to Kacha, transmitted to him by the adjutant Isakov, first of all took, as was prescribed to the main reserve during the retreat, measures to cover other regiments and artillery batteries leaving the battle.
“During the general retreat, the Volyn regiment began to gradually move back to the Ulukkul road, where Colonel Khrushchev, letting units of the 16th division pass by, took with him two batteries of the 14th brigade and took up the position established by the chief of artillery, Major General Kishinsky, on the heights behind the Ulukkul road." (835)
Historians say little about Khrushchev and his Volynites, this is unfair. There is no doubt that solely the actions of the Volyn regiment and artillery forced the allies, in this case the French, to stop their battalions and limit themselves to artillery shelling. It was from this fire that the Volyn infantry regiment suffered its losses, although small compared to others.
“My regiment, being in reserve, did not engage in battle, although it was under severe fire for some time; I have up to 25 people killed and wounded,” the commander of the Volyn Infantry Regiment wrote in his letter to his brother on September 10 (22), 1854. By this time, the Volyn residents had camped at Kamysheva Bay, in the same place from where they advanced to Alma. (836)
The very first cannonball flew into the ranks of the first battalion and, whistling past the regiment commander, killed and wounded several people from the banner ranks.
“Do not bow and stand still,” Colonel Khrushchev said loudly and calmly. And from that moment on, the Volynians never greeted enemy shells with bows.” (837)
You can have different attitudes to these words from the “Collection of Memoirs of Sevastopol Residents...”. For some, they may seem like a military epic, a toast to the commander, for others - an unsubstantiated episode of the battle, quoted in order to somehow sweeten the bitter pill of defeat. No difference. The fact remains: the French officers, who saw the last deployed battalion columns of the Volyn Regiment withdrawing, called the retreat of the Russian army “beautiful” (belle retraite) for a reason. Thus, the inevitable disorder of the retreat was covered. (838) The batteries of the 14th brigade, longer-range than the French, quickly drowned out the enemy fire - and no one else stopped the Russian army from retreating to the Kachin position.
By the end of the day, “... when all the retreating units moved towards the Kache River, then Colonel Khrushchev and his detachment began to slowly retreat, being ready to meet the enemy every minute if he began to pursue us. It was already dusk when our detachment descended into the valley of the Kachi River near the village of Efendi-Koy.” (839)
As the captain of the Uglitsky regiment Yenisherlov recalled: “... The convoys were not allowed to know about the retreat of the detachment, and therefore, when they saw the retreating (primarily, of course, dressing carts and the wounded), they raised a terrible commotion. Not subordinate to one person, the convoys of all regiments, and especially the officers’ carts, hastily harnessed their horses and rushed to the river crossing, without observing order or queue.” (840)
The “terrible disorder” that reigned during the retreat is also described by the commander of the Volyn regiment, Colonel Khrushchev, who can be trusted if only because his regiment, covering the retreat of the Russian army, was the last to leave the Alma position. General A.N. also calls the organization of the army’s retreat from Alma “disorderly.” Kuropatkin, in his study of the Russo-Japanese War, drew parallels between the events of these two campaigns. (841)
Lieutenant Commander D.V. Ilyinsky mentions in his notes the chaos that reigned during the withdrawal from the Alma position.
“It is difficult to imagine anything similar to our retreat after our loss of an insignificant avant-garde case at Alma. As we moved away from the enemy and dusk set in, the remnants of the center and right flank regiments that survived in disarray became more and more mixed up and, without receiving any orders, remaining in complete ignorance of where to go and what to do, formed groups of various uniforms and came up to us to inquire. , where we are going and in what direction are the headquarters of such and such regiments so that it is possible to join them. We replied that we had received orders from the commander-in-chief, having crossed the Kacha River, to spend the night on the heights of Kacha, but we knew nothing about the regiments. With the onset of darkness and continued general uncertainty, panic spread through the troops: approaching groups of soldiers reported that the enemy had warned us, dropped troops and occupied the heights of the mountains along the Kacha River, that we were cut off from Sevastopol and tomorrow at dawn we would have to storm the fortified positions on Kacha. In a word, if a small detachment of the enemy appeared, armed not with guns, but simply with sticks, they would drive everyone away like a herd of sheep. At the bridge over the river. The crowding of all kinds of weapons, the crush, haste and jostling reached complete disgrace. As darkness fell, curses were heard, and at times groans from the crowded wounded. Everything was covered with the general roar of the horse drivers and the clatter of the carriage wheels.
Having appointed a place for a general assembly point on the opposite bank of the river, we, without any formation, one by one, crossed the bridge as best we could, checking our ranks, moved to the top of the hill closest to the road, lit fires and settled down for the night, and all around, under the supervision of one officer , pickets were set up for safety. We took with us enough bread for dinner; but the poor soldiers, not knowing the locations of their regiments, were left hand to mouth; We did not refuse our help only to the slightly wounded.” (842)
Not only Ilyinsky was upset by the disorder during the retreat of most of the rear units of the Russian troops. This was seen by the soldiers of the infantry regiments passing by.
“...we retreated in order all the way to the Kachi River. And above the river there is a Tatar village called Efendi-Koy; Opposite it is a bridge across the river and a shallow place, a ford. We approach the village, and there is such turmoil that God forbid; the convoy of all the regiments crowded together: vans, hospital wagons, officer carts, several batteries of artillery clearing their way; and everyone is trying to get to the bridge, but the street leading to it is narrow. Scream, noise..." (843)
Soon, the remnants of the Vladimir Infantry Regiment, which had previously stayed together, scattered without any order throughout the surrounding area and, having slipped through Kacha, were able to gather together only the next day when they reached Sevastopol.
“It was already evening, and we were moving forward and forward, without a road, not knowing either the path or the purpose of our movement: we followed the tracks of corpses, fragments of weapons and ammunition that came along the road for luck, and the next morning we reached Sevastopol. At night on the way we came across a bunch of people in the dark; Having spoken to them, we learned that they were fellows from our own regiment. Considering me killed, my riding horse, as they saw, was racing without a rider, the good soldiers were very happy to see me unharmed.” (844)
What reached Sevastopol was only a pitiful ghost, a shadow of an infantry regiment that had recently reached full strength. Some of his units wandered around the area for several days, not knowing where to go or what to do. Lieutenant Winter arrived only on the third day with the remnants of his company, numbering 15 people. (845)
For almost a day there was no order at the only ford across the Kacha. The convoys mixed together and the approaching artillery practically blocked it. One can only imagine the horror of this picture, based only on knowledge of the consequences that appeared before the eyes of the allies who came to Kacha a few days later.
The turmoil (or rather, panic) was such that their advanced units discovered a large amount of provisions, ammunition and, most shamefully, ammunition abandoned at the crossing.
The wounded soldiers were mostly left to their fate, although three regiments (Uglitsky, Volynsky and Tarutinsky), which were almost never under fire, could take on this task. But no one gave them this very task.
“The second crippled army was trailing behind the retreating ones - a huge crowd of wounded. Their situation was completely bleak. Scattered over a huge area between Simferopol, Bakhchisarai and Sevastopol and not knowing where the army had retreated, the shell-shocked and wounded wandered to their luck, not knowing where they would find shelter and relief for their suffering. Some managed to get to Simferopol, others came to Bakhchisarai, and finally, others, moving towards Sevastopol, reached Kacha and were greeted by the care of their surviving comrades. The entire path from the Alma River right up to Kachi itself was covered with wounded. The sanitary unit was in the worst condition; there were almost no supplies. There was a significant shortage of lint and bandages; their small supply in the hospital wagons was worth its weight in gold, and the soldiers had to tear their own shirts to bandage them... Until September 14, the entire road from Belbek to the northern fortification of Sevastopol was littered with the wounded.” (846)
There was not enough basic equipment to care for the wounded. “...There was a terrible shortage of bandages for dressings, despite the fact that at that time all the warehouses of the Simferopol post office were bursting with them, sent from all over Russia. Bandages were only found in hospital carts and were considered precious. No one among the soldiers had them...” (847) This led to the most unfortunate consequences. A wounded soldier from Vladimir experienced this himself: “... while they found the ford, while I was dragging along, the blood kept flowing and flowing from my hand, and it began to darken in my eyes. Again, thank you, the soldier helped me somehow bandage my hand - I had a paper handkerchief with me, yes, unfortunately, it was worn out; Then it turned out that it was not at all good for the wound.” (848) As a result of infection, the soldier eventually lost his arm, of which only a piece above the elbow remained, called a “lanyard” in soldier’s jargon.
“My sinful hand, which under Alma annoyed me, I see - again hangs like a whip. And it hung and dangled until, after the doctor’s brief deliberation, they cut it off completely. Farewell, service!..” (849)
I feel sorry for the fighter, and I also feel sorry for his hand, but he was lucky. Others, less fortunate, suffered a more tragic fate.
“...The whole path from Alma to Kachi was strewn with corpses. No one thought about helping them (the wounded),” the author of “The History of the Moscow Regiment” described the army’s retreat.
The physical pain was intensified by the mental pain. The soldiers and officers of Prince Menshikov's army were in an extremely difficult moral and psychological state. They were not demoralized, but the picture of the troops in the bivouac was grim. “No talking or noise could be heard anywhere; the camp fires were not turned on at all. Gloomy faces and hidden anger testified to a recently lost battle...” (850) Even the soldiers saw how heavy the echo of defeat was in the souls of their comrades.
“In our company, too, they have already woken up; some are fussing about their knapsack, some are talking, and most of them silently stared at one point...” (851)
What happened in the battalions and described by Pogossky from the words of the soldiers is nothing more than classic sketches from life of what modern military doctors call BPT - combat psychotrauma.
“...I see the captain standing and saying something to himself, very loudly; in front of him lies a soldier on the ground under an overcoat, his face is covered with a scarf, and a naked cleaver is placed on the overcoat.
“What kind of parable?” - I ask my friend. - Who is this?". And he answers me: “It’s Selishchev lying dead, and the captain keeps saying unknown words over him - he’s shell-shocked in the head and doesn’t remember what he’s saying.” - “Lord, your will!”
...I look around, and Ermolaich - his face is darker than Mother Earth - the kettle is heating and grumbling, but he just keeps looking like a wolf at someone... and the captain keeps talking and talking, and there is no end to his speeches”... (852)
The retreat continued throughout the next day. The Volyn regiment, “preserving complete order during the retreat,” (853) with two batteries continued to move in the rearguard of the army, but the enemy did not try to disturb it. Entering Sevastopol, General Khrushchev received orders to take his former position at Kamysheva Bay. Everyone was worried about the question: whether the enemy had cut the road to Simferopol. (854)
Within a day, wounded soldiers of the Russian army who had lagged behind their units appeared on the streets of Sevastopol: “...Sevastopol was in great trouble.” (855)
The Allies followed the path of the retreating Russian army to the Kachi River, after which they stopped any attempts to pursue it.
The last success of the French artillery was the capture of the carriage of the Russian commander-in-chief, in which they discovered a briefcase with documents of Prince A.S. Menshikov.
This is how Bazancourt describes what was happening: “The Russian army was retreating. Our two reserve batteries, standing on the ridge of the hill on the side from which the British attacked the Russian right flank, moved forward in order to counter the likely attacks of the cavalry covering the retreat of the Russian troops. The battery commander, Businier, saw a carriage appear at a distance of 600 meters from him, led by three horses, rushing at full speed towards the battery. As soon as the Russians noticed the French gunners, the crew changed direction, but Businier, along with a servant of 20 people, began pursuit. He managed to overtake the crew 100 meters from the positions of the Russian squadrons. The gunners delivered five people and the contents of the crew to the main headquarters. The crew belonged to Prince Menshikov and contained important documents.” (856)
1. As a result of joining the continental blockade, Russia accepted the obligation
1) patronize the Orthodox peoples of the Balkan Peninsula
2) participate in the military actions of the IV anti-Napoleonic coalition
3) prevent the appearance of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea
4) break off trade relations with England
2. In 1812, Russian troops prevented Napoleon’s army from breaking through to Kaluga and forced them to retreat along the devastated Smolensk road as a result of the battle
1) near Borodino
2) near Berezina
3) near Maloyaroslavets
4) near Smolensk
3. The Battle of Borodino took place
4. The Peace of Tilsit was concluded in 1807 between the heads of the Russian Empire and
1) Kingdom of Prussia
2) Austrian Empire
3) Great Britain
4) French Empire
5. During the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian army was able to replenish food supplies and weapons as a result
1) battles near the Berezina River
2) Tarutino march maneuver
3) battles at Lesnaya
4) capture of Plevna
6. The foreign campaign of the Russian army ended in
7. The territory of Finland became part of the Russian Empire in
1) mid-18th century.
2) the beginning of the 19th century.
3) mid-19th century.
4) the end of the 19th century.
8. What was one of the reasons for the retreat of the Russian army at the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812?
1) adverse weather conditions
2) the hope of the commander-in-chief for the support of the army by the partisan movement
3) the desire to avoid a general battle, to preserve the army
4) hope for the support of the troops of the anti-Napoleonic coalition
9. What was one of the results of Russia’s victory in the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Foreign Campaign of the Russian Army of 1813–1814?
1) Russia’s conquest of access to the Sea of Azov
2) the entry into the Russian Empire of part of the Crimean Peninsula
3) Russia’s conquest of access to the Baltic Sea
4) entry into the Russian Empire of the Kingdom of Poland
10. In 1805, a battle took place between the armies near Austerlitz
1) Russian-Austrian and French
2) Russian-French and English
3) Russian-Swedish and English
4) Russian-French and Austrian
11. The Peace of Tilsit was concluded by Napoleon and
1) Catherine II
2) Alexander I
3) Alexander III
4) Nicholas II
12. What decision did M.I. make? Kutuzov in 1812 at a military council in the village of Fili?
1) withdraw Russian troops from Moscow without a fight
2) give battle at the Berezina River
3) conclude a peace agreement with Napoleon
4) give the battle of Borodino
13. Who took part in the military council in the village of Fili in 1812?
1) M.I. Kutuzov, A.P. Ermolov
2) P.S. Nakhimov, V.A. Kornilov
3) A.V. Suvorov, P.A. Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky
4) M.D. Skobelev, I.V. Gurko
14. Read an excerpt from the notes of a contemporary and indicate the dates of the war, as a result of which the territories mentioned in the excerpt became part of the Russian Empire.
“Everyone asked each other... Is most of Finland really going to Russia? No, all of Finland joins it... Really, and the Åland Islands? And the Aland Islands... The Russians saw in their new conquest only lawless... violence... From the very Peace of Tilsit (Russia) looked at its acquisitions with disgust, like Napoleon’s handouts.”
1) 1700 – 1721
2) 1808 – 1809
3) 1853 – 1856
4) 1877 – 1878
15. What were the names of the participants in the fighting in the rear of Napoleonic troops in 1812, who destroyed foragers and attacked individual enemy detachments?
1) partisans
2) vigilantes
3) guardsmen
4) Sagittarius
1) for Smolensk
2) near the Berezina River
3) near Borodino
4) under Tarutino
17. What was the name of the alliance concluded by Russia, Austria, Prussia and other countries in Paris in 1815 in order to ensure the inviolability of the decisions of the Congress of Vienna?
1) Holy Alliance
2) Alliance of the Three Emperors
3) Northern Union
4) Entente
18. One of the reasons for the outbreak of the Patriotic War of 1812 was Napoleon’s dissatisfaction with Russia’s violation of the conditions
1) "Holy Alliance"
2) Northern Union
3) Continental blockade
19. The foreign campaign of the Russian army took place in
1) 1811 – 1812
2) 1813 – 1814
3) 1853 – 1856
4) 1857 – 1864
20. What was one of the reasons for the retreat of the French army from Moscow in the fall of 1812?
1) mass uprisings in European countries against the power of Napoleon
2) joint actions of the allied armies of Prussia, Austria and Russia
3) Napoleon’s decision to send part of his troops from Russia to Spain
4) the impossibility of Napoleon providing the army with ammunition and fodder
21. One of the reasons for the outbreak of the Patriotic War of 1812 was Napoleon’s dissatisfaction with Russia’s violation of the conditions
1) Entente
2) Berlin Treaty
3) Continental blockade
4) Treaty of San Stefano
22. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of an officer of the enemy army and indicate the date of the events in question.
“It was decided that we would have to move forward and launch an attack on Moscow, from which we were separated by a distance of twenty days of marching. Among<французов>, who especially vehemently opposed an immediate march to Moscow, the names of General Caulaincourt and General Mouton were mentioned..., Chief Marshal of the Court Duroc repeatedly tried to dissuade<Наполеона>from the implementation of this project. But all his attempts, having encountered the will of the emperor, turned out to be useless.
We walked towards Smolensk. The Russians had just evacuated it... We entered the city in the light of the fires, but they were nothing compared to what awaited us in Moscow.”
23. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of a contemporary and indicate the years of the events in question.
“Ulm and Austerlitz decided the fate of Europe in favor of Napoleon. The Prussian campaign... had nothing like it in history... The Russians did not manage to arrive in time, but when they encountered Napoleon, they let him know their courage and steadfastness at Eylau. And he finally took his toll. With his victory at Friedland, he proved that it was too early for us to fight him. England helped us sluggishly. Austria was cunning and fraudulent, as always. Alexander saw himself in the need to bow to peace, and he was imprisoned in Tilsit.”
1) 1768 – 1774
2) 1787 – 1791
3) 1805 – 1807
4) 1814 – 1815
24. The three-day battle of Leipzig took place during
1) Seven Years' War 1756 - 1763.
2) foreign campaign of the Russian army in 1813 - 1814.
3) Polish campaign of 1830 – 1831.
4) Hungarian campaign of 1849
25. In what year did the battle of Maloyaroslavets take place?
26. Russian troops as part of the allied forces won the battle of Leipzig in
27. As a result of the retreat of Russian troops in the first months of the Patriotic War of 1812
1) Napoleon defeated the 1st and 2nd Russian armies separately
2) the French army approached St. Petersburg
3) The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Russian armies suffered irreparable losses
4) Russian armies managed to unite near Smolensk
28. Created in 1815, the “Holy Alliance” provided, in particular, for the need
1) restoration of Napoleon's power in France
2) Russian conquest of the Black Sea coast
3) support for legitimate monarchies
4) Russia joining the Continental blockade
29. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of a contemporary and indicate the date of the event in question.
“The sudden appearance of this great city before their eyes seemed strange and impressive to the French soldiers... A very high price was paid for the conquest of this city, but<французский император>He reassured himself that it was here that he would be able to dictate the terms of the world.
Murat was the first to enter Moscow, sending a message to the emperor that the city seemed extinct and that no one had met the French army, neither civilians or military personnel, nor representatives of the local nobility, nor church ministers.
The Emperor was informed that fires had broken out in the city.”
30. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of a contemporary and indicate the date of the war, the events of which are discussed.
“My sister, who stayed with her husband in Moscow, came to us and brought the news that ... all Russian authorities from<Москвы>already got out. Then our departure was decided; and on the day of entry<французов>We left for Moscow from the Moscow region and headed to the city of Kolomna.
We could not stay in Kolomna, both because there was nowhere to live, and because the French marauders were already showing up between Bronnitsy and Kolomna. Upon receiving news of the Moscow fires, my father decided to go to Tambov.”
31. Which of the listed events related to the Patriotic War of 1812?
A) performance of the Chernigov regiment
B) Battle of Borodino
C) abandonment of Moscow by the Russian army
D) the establishment of military settlements
D) Tarutino march maneuver
E) Battle of Gross-Jägersdorf
32. Arrange the events of the second half of the 18th–19th centuries. in chronological order. Write down the letters that represent the events in the correct sequence in the table.
A) the entry of Eastern Georgia into the Russian Empire
B) sale of Alaska to the USA
B) the establishment of Finnish autonomy by Alexander I
D) the first section of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
33. Which of the following happened during the Patriotic War of 1812?
A) the battle of the Berezina River
B) Battle of Sinop
B) Moscow fire
D) Brusilovsky breakthrough
D) Tarutino march maneuver
E) battles for Shipka-Sheinovo
34. Establish a correspondence between events and the centuries when they occurred.
1) Russia’s conquest of access to the Baltic Sea
2) annexation of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates to Russia
3) the beginning of Russian development of Eastern Siberia
4) accession of Finland to Russia
35. Read an excerpt from the poem by A.S. Pushkin and write the name of the Russian emperor in question.
"He is a human! They are ruled by the moment.
He is a slave to rumor, doubt and passions.
Let us forgive him his wrongful persecution:
He took Paris, he founded the Lyceum."
36. Read an excerpt from the historian’s work and write the name of the emperor during whose reign the events described occurred.
“Military successes in the previous reign allowed Russia to count on strengthening its position in Europe. The emperor was full of ambitious aspirations. Having accepted the title of Grand Master of the Johannite Order offered to him, he intended, under the banner of defending Christianity, to lead the fight against “atheistic France.” The great Suvorov was sent to Northern Italy. He won impressive victories over the best commanders in France. The Russian fleet under the command of Admiral Ushakov liberated the Ionian Islands and approached the shores of Italy.”
37. Establish a correspondence between the names of the sovereigns and the events of foreign policy related to their reign.
2) Elizaveta Petrovna
3) Catherine II
A) Italian campaign A.V. Suvorov
B) annexation of Crimea to Russia
B) Seven Years' War
D) Northern War
D) Livonian War
38. Read an excerpt from N.M.’s letter. Karamzina P.A. Vyazemsky and write the name of the war the events of which are being discussed.
“Congratulations on the liberation of Moscow: yesterday we learned that Napoleon emerged from it, having earned the curse of centuries. Something will happen! Now work for the sword... I was going to go from here with the militia to Moscow to participate in its supposed liberation, but the matter was done without the historiographical sword.”
From the memories of contemporaries.
“...Russian troops, being located along the vast borders and provinces of their state, had to retreat non-stop to unite their units. Their small numbers against the large numbers of the enemy did not allow them to think about entering into an open battle on the borders of the empire...
At the end of July, the Russians reached the city of Smolensk, and here a successful connection ensued between the 1st Army and the Second under the command of the infantry general Prince Bagration...
The Russians, having crossed the Dnieper River, stood on an elevated place in front of the city, from which the picture of Smolensk was extremely touching, sad and striking; the enemy opened a strong cannonade of many batteries throughout the city, a fire spread through almost all the streets...
On the 7th of August, Russian troops retreated from the ruins and ashes of the city of Smolensk and continued to walk along the road leading to the ancient capital of Moscow, and for the enemy, every step behind them was difficult and cost blood.”
“The soldier grumbled about the continuous retreat and hopes to find an end to it in battle; Commander-in-Chief<М.Б. Барклаем де Толли>was<солдат>dissatisfied and blamed him mainly for the fact that he is not Russian.”
39. Indicate the name and date of the war in question. Name the commander whose armies invaded Russian territory.
40. What was the mood of the Russian soldiers in the first month of the war? What were the reasons for this mood of the soldiers in the first month of the war? Indicate at least two provisions in total.
41. Consider the historical situation and answer the questions.
At the beginning of his reign, Alexander I saw his main task in the field of foreign policy in the fight against Napoleonic France. On this issue the king was principled and firm. However, in 1807, Alexander I was forced to sign a peace treaty with Napoleon in Tilsit.
What was the attitude of the nobility and merchants to the signing and terms of the Tilsit Peace Treaty? How did their attitude towards Alexander I change? (Indicate at least two provisions in total).
What explained this attitude of the nobility and merchants towards the signing and terms of the Tilsit Peace Treaty? (Indicate at least two reasons in total).
Do you remember: the army followed the army...
A.S. Pushkin
From Neman to Smolensk.
And so, in three groups of corps, the “Great Army” rushed from the Neman to the east. The main group - the road to Vilna against the army of M.B. Barclay de Tolly - was led by Napoleon himself. “They destroy everything, they turn everything into dust...” - This is what A.S. wrote about those days. Pushkin.
The Russian armies did not immediately respond. On June 27, Alexander I ordered Bagration to retreat to Minsk. Literally an hour after the Russian rearguard left Vilna, the French vanguard entered the city. On June 28, Napoleon could already sum up the results of the Vilna operation. In 3 days he advanced 100 km. On June 29, Napoleon sent forward cavalry corps under the command of Murat, infantry corps and two divisions from Davout's corps. These troops were supposed to overtake Barclay's army and fetter its actions with their activity until Napoleon's main forces arrived. At the same time, Davout with three infantry divisions and the cavalry corps of E. Grushi received an order to march on Minsk, blocking Bagration’s path from the north to join Barclay, and Jerome Bonaparte with the corps of Y. Poniatovsky, J.-L. Rainier and D. Vandam were supposed to attack Bagration from the south and thus take his army in a pincer movement.
On July 11, the Russian 1st Army concentrated in the Dris camp. Troubles emerged in its leadership. The king behaved ambivalently:
“introduced Barclay as commander-in-chief, entrusting him to “make all orders on his own behalf,” but in cases of “urgency,” he gave orders himself. On July 14, the 1st Army left Drissa and in a very timely manner. Napoleon was preparing to approach her left flank from Polotsk and force her to fight with an inverted front, but did not have time to carry out this maneuver.
In Drissa, with the participation of Barclay, the pressing issue of how to escort Alexander I out of the army (of course, delicately and loyal subjects) was actually resolved. A letter was written to him, the meaning of which was that the tsar would be more useful to the fatherland as a ruler in the capital than as military leader on a campaign. From Polotsk the tsar went to Moscow, and Barclay led the 1st Army to Vitebsk to unite with Bagration. Meanwhile, Bagration found himself in a critical situation. On July 7, he received the tsar’s order: to go through Minsk to Vitebsk.
But already on July 8, Marshal Davout took Minsk and cut off Bagration’s path to the north. From the south, crossing Bagration was Jerome Bonaparte, who was supposed to close the encirclement ring around the 2nd Army near the city of Nesvizh. The Westphalian king Jerome Bonaparte was “the most mediocre of all Napoleon’s mediocre brothers.” As a result, Jerome, although he had an advantage over Bagration on the way to Nesvizh in two marches, was late to close the French pincers around the Russian army. Bagration left. Napoleon was furious. Out of annoyance, he subordinated King Jerome to Marshal Davout, who was “only a duke.” Jerome, offended by this, stopped his troops and left for Westphalia on July 16. The position of the 2nd Army still remained dangerous. It marched through Nesvizha and Bobruisk to Mogilev. Latour-Maubourg's 4th Cavalry Corps persistently pursued it from the rear, but the main danger to the 2nd Army came from Davout, on the left flank.
Bagration, having learned from his Cossack scouts that not the entire Davout corps was in Mogilev, but only some part of it, decided to make a breakthrough. On the morning of July 23, N.N.’s 7th Corps launched an attack. Raevsky. Davout took a position 11 km away. south of Mogilev, near the village of Saltykovka. So far he had 20 thousand bayonets and sabers and 60 guns against Raevsky’s 16.5 thousand soldiers and 108 guns. But his intelligence informed him that Bagration’s entire army, numbering 50 thousand people, was marching towards Mogilev, and Davout was already pulling all his forces towards him (41.T.2. p.107). There has not been such a fierce battle as at Saltykovka since the beginning of the war. Russian soldiers rushed forward without fear or doubt. The officers did not step on them in heroism.
Davout repulsed all of Raevsky’s attacks and continued to pull the troops of his corps towards him. On July 24, the main forces of the 2nd Army and the convoy crossed the Dnieper and moved towards Smolensk. On July 25, Ranevsky’s corps left behind him. From now on it could be considered that the 2nd Army was saved.
After the tsar’s departure, Barclay de Tolly “remained the sole controller of the fate of the 1st Army. Despite all the difficulties, he satisfactorily ensured its food supply. Barclay tried to maintain iron discipline in the army. Barclay de Tolly did not succeed in everything.
He was unable, in particular, to put the medical support of the troops on par with the food supply, although he was helped by the most authoritative military doctor in Russia at that time, J. V. Willie. Be that as it may, all of Barclay’s concerns were subordinated to one main task - to ensure the army’s retreat in the greatest order and with the least losses. Nevertheless, with every day of forced retreat, discontent against Barclay de Tolly grew in his own army, as well as in Bagration’s army and throughout the country. Its primary source was the unfavorable course of the war for Russia, which hurt national pride. In such a situation, Barclay de Tolly withdrew the 1st Army from Polotsk to Vitebsk. He understood that if he retreated to Moscow, Napoleon would follow him, and not to St. Petersburg. But just in case, on July 17, Barclay allocated an entire corps from his army (1st, under the command of Lieutenant General P.H. Wittgenstein) to protect the St. Petersburg direction. On July 23, the 1st Army, having covered 118 km in three days, approached Vitebsk. In order to delay the French until the 2nd Army arrived, Barclay de Tolly on the night of July 24-25 advanced the 4th Infantry Corps of A.I. to Beshenkovichi. Osterman-Tolstoy, who took the battle with the 1st Cavalry Corps of General E.-M. Nansouty (20 km from Vitebsk). The battle at Ostrovno was even bloodier than Saltykovka. For several hours, Nansouty's cavalry units unsuccessfully attacked Ostermann's infantry squares. In the middle of the day on July 25, Murat arrived at the battlefield and personally led the attacks of Nansouty’s corps. He also received reinforcements - the division of A. Delzon from the Beauharnais corps, which gave him an almost double superiority in strength. Murat shot the Russian squares with cannons, and then alternately threw cavalry and infantry into the attack against them. When Osterman was informed that the corps was suffering enormous losses and they inquired what they would be ordered to do. Osterman replied: “Do nothing, stand there and die!” By the morning of July 26, reinforcements from Barclay arrived at Osterman - the 3rd exemplary
Konovnitsyn's division. She fought all day on the 26th as heroically as Osterman's corps had done the day before. The Russians lost only 376,448 “lower ranks” in Ostrovno, but detained the French for two days. On the morning of July 27, Barclay learned that Bagration had failed to break through Mogilev and that he had learned about the movement of Davout's troops towards Smolensk. Now the situation has changed dramatically. Barclay could no longer count on Bagration at Vitebsk. Napoleon, barely approaching
to Vitebsk, I immediately realized that Barclay had decided on a general battle.
But Barclay quietly led his army to Smolensk at night in three columns. Napoleon was simply disappointed. For the first time since the beginning of the war, he doubted that he could win it without going deep into Russia.
Here in Vitebsk, Napoleon summed up the results of the first month of the war and thought: isn’t it time for him to stop? During this month, he encountered such difficulties that he had never encountered anywhere else, and others he could not have foreseen, no matter how much he prepared for the invasion. From the first day of the war, the Grand Army, pursuing the Russians, was forced to make unusually large marches. The hardships of the endless marches were aggravated by the worse Russian roads, worse than which the French had never seen. The worst misfortune for the French was that they felt a hostile environment around them every day. True, they began to encounter widespread popular resistance mainly after Smolensk, when they entered the original Russian lands. But even before Vitebsk they had to suffer due to the fact that Russian troops destroyed local food supplies behind them, if they did not have time to withdraw them. The population - Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lithuanian peasants and townspeople - resisted the invaders.
As the French approached, masses of people left their homes, taking with them all living things. The richest warehouses that Napoleon had prepared for the start of the war could not keep up with the “Great Army” in its unprecedentedly large marches along unprecedentedly bad roads. Everything that is said here led to an increase in diseases that decimated the ranks of the “Great Army” more than all types of enemy battles. A.N. Popov calculated that from the Neman to Vitebsk, Napoleon lost more than 150 thousand people. The combat effectiveness of the French army decreased with each new move into the depths of the “country of which there is no end.” Suffering from hunger and thirst, and annoyed by the disobedience of the local population, the soldiers of the “Great Army” (mainly non-French units) committed robbery and violence, and looted.
Barclay de Tolly's war plan gradually brought results. But
Napoleonic army was still a formidable force. She was approaching Smolensk, a city that was called “the key to Russia.”
BATTLE OF SMOLENSK.
On July 22, the 1st and 2nd Russian armies united. The soldiers of the Russian army enthusiastically greeted Barclay and Bagration. Everyone was convinced that the war should now go differently, that the retreat would end. Under the pressure of such sentiments, even the cautious Barclay, contrary to his own convictions, admitted the possibility of more decisive actions. Russian soldiers considered it their duty to protect Smolensk. Napoleon knew this and therefore also expected the battle of Smolensk.
Barclay soon realized that it was impossible to organize a battle now. Napoleon had 250 thousand people concentrated near Smolensk, while in both Russian armies there were only 120 thousand soldiers. Napoleon decided to quickly approach Smolensk and occupy it and thus cut off the Russian troops' retreat to Moscow.
And indeed, the French managed to get ahead of the regiments of Bagration and Barclay for some time. The road to Smolensk was covered by the 27th Infantry Division of Dmitry Petrovich Neverovsky (1771 - 1813), which consisted mainly of recruits. It seemed that this obstacle would be easily overcome by the “Grand Army,” especially since in its vanguard was the famous cavalry of Marshal Murat, which could cope with a more serious enemy. Murat managed to dislodge Neverovsky's 27th Division from the position it occupied. But the Russian soldiers did not flee. They retreated in perfect order to the Smolensk road and settled down in the forest. The trees made the actions of the enemy cavalry extremely difficult. Unfired recruits, yesterday's peasants, led by General Neverovsky, who skillfully led the defense, repelled one after another the fierce attacks of Murat's three corps.
But even now Smolensk was in danger. He was defended by about 15 thousand soldiers of Raevsky. And the main forces of Napoleon's army were getting closer.
An experienced military leader, Raevsky understood that Smolensk, if turned
It is a fortress in the city; it can be defended for a long time even with small forces. The city was fortified with a powerful stone wall, in front of which the inhabitants dug ditches. The corps of the most successful French Marshal Ney was sent to storm Smolensk. At the same time, French artillery began heavy shelling of urban
fortifications However, Raevsky held out all day. At night, the main forces of the Russian army approached Smolensk. The advanced positions in the city were occupied by the corps of General Dmitry Sergeevich Dokhturov (1756 - 1816). The artillery operated brilliantly under the command of 28-year-old General Alexander Ivanovich Kutaisov (1784 - 1812). The artillerymen stood until the last. Russian artillery inflicted significant damage on the enemy.
The next day Smolensk was surrounded by the strongest enemy
corps of Marshals Davout, Ney and Murat. The French began a general assault. The city was burning, its inhabitants were leaving. Despite the fact that this assault was repulsed, Barclay de Tolly, after some hesitation, ordered the Russian army to begin a retreat to Moscow. He reasoned as follows: firstly, the French have a significant numerical advantage, and the Russian army is not sufficiently prepared for a decisive battle, and secondly, Napoleon can bypass Smolensk from the east and block the Russian troops. Then they will find themselves in a burning city, as if trapped, and will be destroyed. Historians still debate whether Barclay was right to order a retreat. But I think it was justified.
The troops retreated in perfect order. General Konovnitsyn, who was covering their retreat, ordered the soldiers to burn the bridge across the Dnieper, which made it difficult for the enemy to advance.
Napoleon entered the burning Smolensk. In this battle he lost about 20 thousand soldiers (the Russian army was almost half that size) and did not achieve a decisive victory. Russian troops were not defeated. They continued to retreat to Moscow, replenished with fresh forces. The “Great Army” was melting before our eyes. Many close associates advised Napoleon to stop further offensive to the east, retreat to Belarus and take up winter quarters there. But Napoleon needed victory in the “general battle” and the defeat of the Russian army at all costs. Therefore, he ordered the troops to move on to Moscow.
The position of the Russian army was difficult. She retreated from the western borders of Russia. Moscow is just over 200 miles away. The murmur grew louder: how long will the retreat continue? The soldiers were eager to fight. Many unfairly blamed Barclay for what was happening, who had neither connections at court nor sufficient popularity among the troops. The differences between the cautious Barclay de Tolly and the decisive Bagration, who insisted on an immediate transition to hostilities, intensified again.
And then only Alexander I, who was following the unfolding of events from St. Petersburg, realized that the situation required the appointment of another commander in chief.
He must have the necessary experience in leading large-scale military operations and enjoy great authority among the people and the army. Only Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov could be such a commander. On August 17, 67-year-old General Kutuzov arrived at the location of Russian troops. The soldiers enthusiastically greeted the new commander-in-chief, glorified in many battles and campaigns.
