Defense on the Kursk Bulge. Battle of Kursk: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Battle of Kursk. Chronology of FAME.
If the Battle of Moscow was an example of heroism and dedication, when there was really nowhere to retreat, and Battle of Stalingrad forced Berlin to plunge into mournful tones for the first time, she finally announced to the world that now the German soldier would only retreat. Not a single piece of native land will be given to the enemy again! It is not for nothing that all historians, both civilian and military, agree on the same opinion - Battle of Kursk finally predetermined the outcome of the Great Patriotic War, and with it the outcome of the Second World War. There is no doubt that the significance of the Battle of Kursk was correctly understood by the entire world community.
Before approaching this heroic page of our Motherland, let’s make a small footnote. Today, and not only today, Western historians attribute victory in World War II to the Americans, Montgomery, Eisenhower, but not to the heroes Soviet army. We must remember and know our history, and we must be proud that we belong to the peoples who saved the world from a terrible disease - fascism!
1943. The war is moving into a new phase, the strategic initiative is already in the hands of the Soviet army. Everyone understands this, including the German staff officers, who, nevertheless, are developing a new offensive. The last offensive of the German army. In Germany itself, things are no longer as rosy as they were at the beginning of the war. The Allies land in Italy, the Greek and Yugoslav forces are gaining strength, and all positions in North Africa are lost. And the vaunted German army itself has already undergone changes. Now everyone is being herded under arms. The notorious Aryan type of the German soldier is diluted by all nationalities. Eastern front - horrible dream any German. And only the possessed Goebbels continues to preach about the invincibility of German weapons. But does anyone except himself and the Fuhrer believe in this?
The Battle of Kursk is a prelude.
It can be said that Battle of Kursk in brief characterized a new round in the distribution of forces on the eastern front. The Wehrmacht needed a victory, it needed a new offensive. And it was planned in the Kursk direction. The German offensive was codenamed Operation Citadel. It was planned to launch two strikes on Kursk from Orel and Kharkov, encircle the Soviet units, defeat them and launch a further offensive to the south. It is characteristic that the German generals still continued to plan the defeat and encirclement of Soviet units, although quite recently they themselves were surrounded and completely destroyed at Stalingrad. The eyes of the staff officers became blurred, or the directives from the Fuhrer became something akin to the orders of the Almighty.
Photos of German tanks and soldiers before the start of the Battle of Kursk
The Germans gathered for the offensive enormous forces. About 900 thousand soldiers, more than 2 thousand tanks, 10 thousand guns and 2 thousand aircraft.
However, the situation in the first days of the war was no longer possible. The Wehrmacht had no numerical, no technical, and most importantly, no strategic advantage. From the Soviet side in Battle of Kursk More than one million soldiers, 2 thousand aircraft, almost 19 thousand guns and about 2 thousand tanks were ready to join. And, most importantly, the strategic and psychological superiority of the Soviet army was no longer in doubt.
The plan to counter the Wehrmacht was simple and at the same time absolutely brilliant. The plan was to bleed the German army dry in heavy defensive battles and then launch a counteroffensive. The plan worked brilliantly, as she showed herself .
Reconnaissance and the Battle of Kursk.
Admiral Canaris, head of the Abwehr - German military intelligence, never suffered so many professional defeats as during the war on the eastern front. Well-trained agents, saboteurs and spies of the Abwehr, and on the Kursk Bulge they went astray. Having learned nothing about the plans of the Soviet command or the disposition of troops, the Abwehr became an involuntary witness to another triumph Soviet intelligence. The fact is that the plan for the German offensive was already on the table of the commanders of the Soviet troops in advance. Day, start time of the offensive, all Operation Citadel were known. Now all that remained was to position the mousetrap and slam the trap shut. A game of cat and mouse began. And how can one not resist saying that our troops were now the cat?!
The Battle of Kursk is the beginning.
And so it all began! The morning of July 5, 1943, the silence over the steppes is living out the last moments, someone is praying, someone is writing the last lines of a letter to their beloved, someone is simply enjoying another moment of life. A few hours before the German offensive, a wall of lead and fire collapsed on the Wehrmacht positions. Operation Citadel received the first hole. An artillery strike was carried out along the entire front line on German positions. The essence of this warning strike was not so much in causing damage to the enemy, but in psychology. Psychologically broken German troops went on the attack. The original plan was no longer working. In a day of stubborn fighting, the Germans were able to advance 5-6 kilometers! And these are unsurpassed tacticians and strategists, whose savvy boots were trampled European soil! Five kilometers! Every meter, every centimeter of Soviet land was given to the aggressor with incredible losses, with inhuman labor.
The main blow of the German troops fell in the direction of Maloarkhangelsk - Olkhovatka - Gnilets. The German command sought to get to Kursk along the shortest route. However, it was not possible to break the 13th Soviet Army. The Germans threw up to 500 tanks into battle, including a new development, the Tiger heavy tank. It was not possible to disorient the Soviet troops with a wide offensive front. The retreat was well organized, the lessons of the first months of the war were taken into account, and besides, the German command was unable to offer anything new in offensive operations. And it was no longer possible to count on the high morale of the Nazis. Soviet soldiers defended their country, and the warrior-heroes were simply invincible. How can we not remember the Prussian king Frederick II, who was the first to say that a Russian soldier can be killed, but impossible to defeat! Maybe if the Germans had listened to their great ancestor, this catastrophe called the World War would not have happened.
Photo of the Battle of Kursk (on the left, Soviet soldiers are fighting from a German trench, on the right, the attack of Russian soldiers)
First day of the Battle of Kursk was coming to an end. It was already clear that the Wehrmacht had lost the initiative. The General Staff demanded that the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Kluge, introduce reserves and second echelons! But this is only one day!
At the same time, the forces of the Soviet 13th Army were replenished with reserves, and the command of the central front decided to launch a retaliatory counterattack on the morning of July 6th.
The Battle of Kursk is a confrontation.
The Russian commanders responded with dignity to the German staff officers. And if one German mind was already left in the cauldron at Stalingrad, then Kursk Bulge German generals were opposed by equally talented military leaders.
German Operation Citadel was supervised by two most talented generals, this cannot be taken away from them, Field Marshal von Kluge and General Erich von Manstein. The coordination of the Soviet fronts was carried out by Marshals G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevsky. The fronts were directly commanded by: Rokossovsky - Central Front, N. Vatutin - Voronezh Front, and I. Konev - Steppe Front.
Lasted only six days Operation Citadel, for six days the German units tried to move forward, and all these six days the steadfastness and courage of an ordinary Soviet soldier thwarted all the enemy’s plans.
On July 12, she found a new, full-fledged owner. Troops of two Soviet fronts, Bryansk and Western, began an offensive operation against German positions. This date can be taken as the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. From that day until the end of the war, German weapons no longer knew the joy of victory. Now the Soviet army was fighting an offensive war, a war of liberation. During the offensive, the cities were liberated: Orel, Belgorod, Kharkov. German attempts to counterattack had no success. It was no longer the strength of weapons that determined the outcome of the war, but its spirituality, its purpose. Soviet heroes liberated their land, and nothing could stop this force; it seemed that the land itself was helping the soldiers, going and going, liberating city after city, village after village.
It went on for 49 days and nights fierce battle on the Kursk Bulge, and at this time the future of each of us was completely determined.
Kursk Bulge. Photo of Russian infantrymen going into battle under the cover of a tank
Battle of Kursk. Photos of the greatest tank battle
Battle of Kursk. Photo of Russian infantrymen against the background of a destroyed German Tiger tank
Battle of Kursk. Photo of a Russian tank against the background of a destroyed "tiger"
The Battle of Kursk is the greatest tank battle.
Neither before nor after, the world has known such a battle. More than 1,500 tanks on both sides throughout the entire day of July 12, 1943, fought the hardest battles on a narrow patch of land near the village of Prokhorovka. Initially, inferior to the Germans in the quality of tanks and in quantity, Soviet tankers covered their names with endless glory! People burned in tanks, were blown up by mines, the armor could not withstand German shells, but the battle continued. At that moment nothing else existed, neither tomorrow nor yesterday! The dedication of the Soviet soldier, who once again surprised the world, did not allow the Germans to either win the battle itself or strategically improve their positions.
Battle of Kursk. Photos of destroyed German self-propelled guns
Battle of Kursk! Photo of a destroyed German tank. Ilyin's work (inscription)
Battle of Kursk. Photo of a destroyed German tank
Battle of Kursk. In the photo, Russian soldiers inspect a damaged German self-propelled gun
Battle of Kursk. In the photo, Russian tank officers inspect the holes in the "tiger"
Battle of Kursk. I'm happy with the work! The face of a hero!
Battle of Kursk - Results
Operation Citadel showed the world that Hitler's Germany was no longer capable of aggression. The turning point of the Second World War, according to absolutely all historians and military experts, came precisely at Kursk Bulge. Underestimate meaning of Kursk battles are difficult.
While German troops suffered huge losses on the eastern front, they had to be replenished by transferring reserves from other parts of conquered Europe. It is not surprising that the Anglo-American landing in Italy coincided with Battle of Kursk. Now the war has come to Western Europe.
The German army itself was completely and irrevocably broken psychologically. Talk about the superiority of the Aryan race came to naught, and the representatives of this very race themselves were no longer demigods. Many remained lying in the endless steppes near Kursk, and those who survived no longer believed that the war would be won. The time has come to think about protecting our own “Fatherland”. So, all of us who are now living can proudly say that Battle of Kursk in brief and definitely proved once again that strength does not lie in anger and the desire for aggression, strength lies in love for the Motherland!
Battle of Kursk. Photo of a shot down "tiger"
Battle of Kursk. The photo shows a damaged self-propelled gun from a direct hit from a bomb dropped from an airplane
Battle of Kursk. Photo of a killed German soldier
Kursk Bulge! In the photo, a killed crew member of a German self-propelled gun
Battle of Kursk - fighting during the Great Patriotic War in the area of the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. It was a key element of the summer 1943 campaign of the Red Army, during which the radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War, which began with the victory at Stalingrad, was completed.
Chronological framework
In domestic historiography, there is an established point of view that the Battle of Kursk took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943. It distinguishes two periods: the defensive stage and the counter-offensive of the Red Army.
At the first stage, the Kursk strategic defensive operation was carried out by the forces of two fronts, Central (July 5-12, 1943) and Voronezh (July 5-23, 1943), with the involvement of strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command Headquarters (Steppe Front), the purpose of which was to disrupt the Citadel plan "
Background and plans of the parties
After the defeat at Stalingrad, the German leadership faced two key problems: how to hold the eastern front under the increasing blows of the growing power of the Red Army, and how to keep the allies in their orbit, who had already begun to look for ways out of the war. Hitler believed that an offensive without such a deep breakthrough as was the case in 1942 should have helped not only to solve these problems, but also to raise the morale of the troops.
In April, the Operation Citadel plan was developed, according to which two groups strike in converging directions and encircle the Central and Voronezh fronts in the Kursk ledge. According to Berlin's calculations, their defeat made it possible to inflict huge losses on the Soviet side, reduce the front line to 245 km, and form reserves from the released forces. Two armies and one army group were allocated for the operation. South of Orel, Army Group (GA) “Center” deployed the 9th Army (A) of Colonel General V. Model. After several modifications to the plan, she received the task: breaking through the defenses of the Central Front and, having traveled about 75 km, connecting in the Kursk area with the troops of the GA "Yu" - the 4th Tank Army (TA) of Colonel General G. Hoth. The latter was concentrated north of Belgorod and was considered the main force of the offensive. After breaking through the Voronezh Front line, she had to travel more than 140 km to the meeting place. The external front of the encirclement was to be created by 23 AK 9A and the army group (AG) “Kempf” from the GA “South”. Active combat operations were planned to take place over an area of about 150 km.
For the "Citadel" GA "Center" allocated to V. Model, whom Berlin appointed responsible for the operation, 3 tank (41,46 and 47) and one army (23) corps, a total of 14 divisions, of which 6 were tank, and GA "South" - 4 TA and AG "Kempf" 5 corps - three tank (3, 48 and 2 SS Tank Corps) and two army (52 AK and AK "Raus"), consisting of 17 divisions, including 9 tank and motorized.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) received the first information about Berlin's planning of a major offensive operation near Kursk in mid-March 1943. And on April 12, 1943, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin, a preliminary decision was already made on the transition to strategic defense. Central Front of Army General K.K. Rokossovsky was given the task of defending the northern part of the Kursk Bulge, repelling a possible attack, and then, together with the Western and Bryansk fronts, launching a counteroffensive and defeating the German group in the Orel area.
The Voronezh Front of Army General N.F. Vatutin was supposed to defend the southern part of the Kursk ledge, bleed the enemy in the upcoming defensive battles, and then launch a counteroffensive and, in cooperation with the Southwestern Front and the Steppe Fronts, complete its defeat in the Bel region -city and Kharkov.
The Kursk defensive operation was considered as essential element throughout the summer campaign of 1943. It was planned that after the expected enemy offensive in the Central and Voronezh fronts was stopped, conditions would arise to complete its defeat and launch a general offensive from Smolensk to Taganrog. The Bryansk and Western Fronts will immediately begin the Oryol offensive operation, which will help the Central Front to completely thwart the enemy’s plans. In parallel with it, the Steppe Front should approach the south of the Kursk ledge, and after its concentration it was planned to launch the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, which was to be carried out in parallel with the Donbass offensive operation of the Southern Fronts and the Southwestern Front.
On July 1, 1943, the Central Front had 711,575 people, including 467,179 combat personnel, 10,725 guns and mortars, 1,607 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the Voronezh Front had 625,590 military personnel, of which 417,451 combat personnel, 8,583 guns and mortars, 1,700 units armored vehicles.
Kursk defensive operation. Fighting in the north of the Kursk Bulge July 5-12, 1943
During April - June, the start of the Citadel was postponed several times. The last date was determined to be dawn on July 5, 1943. On the Central Front, fierce battles took place over an area of 40 km. 9 A attacked in three directions at short intervals. The main blow was delivered to the 13A of Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov by the forces of 47 Tank Tank - on Olkhovatka, the second, auxiliary, 41 Tank Tank and 23 AK - to Malo-Arkhangelsk, on the right wing of 13 A and the left 48A of Lieutenant General P.L. .Romanenko and the third - 46 tk - on Gnilets on the right flank of 70A Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin. Heavy and bloody battles ensued.
In the Olkhovat-Ponyrovsk direction, Model launched more than 500 armored units into the attack at once, and groups of bombers were in the air in waves, but a powerful defense system did not allow the enemy to break the lines on the move Soviet troops.
In the second half of July 5, N.P. Pukhov moved part of the mobile reserves to the main zone, and K.K. Rokossovsky sent howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Counterattacks by tanks and infantry, supported by artillery, stopped the enemy's offensive. By the end of the day, a small “dent” had formed in the center of 13A, but the defense had not been broken anywhere. Troops 48A and the left flank 13A completely held their positions. At the cost of heavy losses, the 47th and 46th Tank Corps managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction, and the 70A troops retreated only 5 km.
To restore the lost position at the junction of 13 and 70A, K.K. Rokossovsky, in the second half of July 5, decided to carry out a counterattack on the morning of July 6 by the 2nd TA of Lieutenant General A.G. Rodin and 19th Tank Tank in cooperation with the second echelon of 13A - 17th Guards . Rifle Corps (RK). He was unable to fully solve the problems. After two days of fruitless attempts to implement the Citadel plan, 9A was stuck in the defense of the Central Front. From July 7 to July 11, the epicenter of the fighting in zones 13 and 70A was the Ponyri station and the area of the villages of Olkhovatka - Samodurovka - Gnilets, where two powerful resistance centers were created that blocked the path to Kursk. By the end of July 9, the offensive of the main forces of 9A was stopped, and on July 11, it made the last unsuccessful attempt to break through the defenses of the Central Front.
On July 12, 1943, a turning point occurred in the fighting in this area. The Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. V. Model, appointed responsible for the defense of the entire Oryol arc, began hastily transferring troops near Oryol aimed at Kursk. And on July 13, Hitler officially stopped the Citadel. The depth of advance of 9A was 12-15 km at a front of up to 40 km. No operational, let alone strategic, results were achieved. Moreover, she did not retain the positions already taken. On July 15, the Central Front launched a counteroffensive and two days later it basically restored its position until July 5, 1943.
At dawn on July 5, 1943, the troops of the GA "South" went on the offensive. The main blow was delivered in the 6th Guards zone. And Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov in the direction of Oboyan by forces of 4TA. More than 1,168 armored units were deployed here by the German side. In the auxiliary, Korochan direction (east and northeast of Belgorod) positions of the 7th Guards. And Lieutenant General M.S. Shumilov was attacked by 3 tanks and "Raus" AG "Kempf", which had 419 tanks and assault guns. However, thanks to the tenacity of the soldiers and commanders of the 6th Guards. And, already in the first two days, the offensive schedule of the GA “South” was disrupted, and its divisions suffered great damage. And most importantly, the strike force of the Civil Aviation Unit "South" was split. 4TA and AG "Kempf" failed to create a continuous breakthrough front, because AG Kempf was unable to cover the right wing of 4TA and their troops began to move in diverging directions. Therefore, 4TA was forced to weaken the strike wedge and direct greater forces to strengthen the right wing. However, a wider offensive front than in the north of the Kursk Bulge (up to 130 km) and more significant forces allowed the enemy to break through the Voronezh Front line in a strip of up to 100 km and enter the defense in the main direction up to 28 km by the end of the fifth day, while 66% of the armored vehicles in its corps failed.
On July 10, the second stage of the Kursk defensive operation of the Voronezh Front began, the epicenter of the fighting shifted to Prokhorovka station. The battle for this resistance center lasted from July 10 to July 16, 1943. On July 12, a frontal counterattack was carried out. For 10-12 hours in the area of the station, about 1,100 armored units of the warring parties operated at different times in a 40 km area. However, it did not bring the expected results. Although the troops of the GA "South" were able to be kept in the army defense system, all formations of the 4th TA and AG "Kempf" retained their combat effectiveness. In the next four days, the most intense battles took place south of the station in the area between the Seversky and Lipovy Donets rivers, which was convenient for striking both the deep right flank of 4TA and the left wing of AG Kempf. However, it was not possible to defend this area. On the night of July 15, 1943, 2 SS Tank and 3 Tank surrounded four 69A divisions south of the station, but they managed to escape from the “ring”, although with heavy losses
On the night of July 16-17, the troops of the GA "South" began to retreat in the direction of Belgorod, and by the end of July 23, 1943, the Voronezh Front had pushed the GA "South" back approximately to the positions from which it had launched the offensive. The goal set for the Soviet troops during the Kursk defensive operation was fully achieved.
Oryol offensive operation
After two weeks of bloody battles, the Wehrmacht’s last strategic offensive was stopped, but this was only part of the Soviet command’s plan for the summer campaign of 1943. Now, it was important to finally take the initiative into our own hands and turn the tide of the war.
The plan for the destruction of German troops in the Orel area, codenamed Operation Kutuzov, was developed before the Battle of Kursk. The troops of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, bordering the Oryol arc, were supposed to strike in the general direction of Orel, cut 2 TA and 9A GA "Center" into three separate groups, encircle them in the areas of Bolkhov, Mtsensk, Orel and destroy them.
To carry out the operation, part of the forces of the Western Front (commander Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky), the entire Bryansk Front (Colonel General M.M. Popov) and the Central Front were involved. Breaking through enemy defenses was planned in five areas. The Western Front was supposed to deliver the main blow with the troops of the left wing - the 11th Guards A, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan - on Khotynets and the auxiliary one - on Zhizdra, and the Bryansk Front - on Orel (main attack) and Bolkhov (auxiliary). The Central Front, after completely stopping the 9A offensive, had to concentrate the main efforts of 70.13, 48A and 2 TA in the Krom direction. The start of the offensive was strictly linked to the moment when it became clear that strike group 9A was exhausted and tied up in battles on the borders of the Central Front. According to Headquarters, such a moment came on July 12, 1943.
A day before the offensive, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan conducted reconnaissance in force on the left flank of the 2nd TA. As a result, not only was the outline of the enemy’s front line and its fire system clarified, but in some areas the German infantry was driven out of the first trench. THEIR. Bagramyan gave the order for the immediate start of a general offensive. The 1 tk introduced on July 13 completed the breakthrough of the second band. After which 5 Tank Corps began to develop an offensive bypassing Bolkhov, and 1 Tank Corps - towards Khotynets.
The first day of the offensive on the Bryansk Front did not bring tangible results. Operating on the main, Oryol direction, 3A of Lieutenant General A.V. Gorbatov and 63A of Lieutenant General V.Ya. By the end of July 13, Kolpakchi had broken through 14 km, and 61A of Lieutenant General P.A. Belova, in the Bolkhov direction, penetrated the enemy’s defenses only 7 km. The offensive of the Central Front, which began on July 15, did not change the situation. By the end of July 17, his troops had pushed back 9A only to the positions it occupied at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk.
However, already on July 19, the threat of encirclement loomed over the Bolkhov group, because 11th Guards A broke through 70 km in a southern direction, stubbornly moving towards Bolkhov and 61A. This city was the “key” to Orel, so the warring parties began to build up their forces here. On July 19, the 3rd Guards TA of Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko advanced in the direction of the main attack of the Bryansk Front. Having repelled enemy counterattacks, by the end of the day it had broken through the second line of defense on the Oleshnya River. The grouping of the Western Front was also hastily strengthened. The significant superiority of forces, although not quickly, bore fruit. August 5, 1943 one of the largest regional centers In the European part of the USSR, the city of Orel was liberated by the troops of the Bryansk Front.
After the destruction of the group in the area of Bolkhov and Orel, the most intense fighting took place on the Khotynets - Kromy front, and on final stage During Operation Kutuzov, the heaviest fighting broke out for the city of Karachev, which covered the approaches to Bryansk, which was liberated on August 15, 1943.
On August 18, 1943, Soviet troops reached the German defensive line "Hagen", east of Bryansk. This concluded Operation Kutuzov. In 37 days, the Red Army advanced 150 km, a fortified bridgehead and a large enemy group were eliminated in a strategically important direction, and favorable conditions were created for an attack on Bryansk and further to Belarus.
Belgorod - Kharkov offensive operation
It received the code name “Commander Rumyantsev”, was carried out from August 3 to 23, 1943 by the Voronezh (Army General N.F. Vatutin) and Steppe (Colonel General I.S. Konev) fronts and was the final stage of the Battle of Kursk. The operation was supposed to be carried out in two stages: in the first, to defeat the troops of the left wing of the State Guard "South" in the area of Belgorod and Tomarovka, and then to liberate Kharkov. The Steppe Front was supposed to liberate Belgorod and Kharkov, and the Voronezh Front was to bypass them from the north-west and develop its success towards Poltava. The main blow was planned to be delivered by the armies of the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts from the area north-west of Belgorod in the direction of Bogodukhov and Valki, at the junction of 4 TA and AG "Kempf", to fragment them and cut off their path to retreat to the west and south-west. Launch an auxiliary attack on Akhtyrka with forces of 27 and 40A to block the movement of reserves to Kharkov. At the same time, the city was to be bypassed from the south by 57A of the Southwestern Front. The operation was planned on a front of 200 km and a depth of up to 120 km.
On August 3, 1943, after a powerful artillery barrage, the first echelon of the Voronezh Front - 6th Guards A under Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov and 5th Guards A under Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov crossed the Vorskla River, made a 5 km gap on the front between Belgorod and Tomarovka, through which the main forces entered - 1TA Lieutenant General M.E. Katukov and 5th Guards TA Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov. Having passed the breakthrough “corridor” and deployed into battle formation, their troops dealt a strong blow to Zolochev. By the end of the day, the 5th Guards TA, having gone 26 km deep into the enemy’s defenses, cut off the Belgorod group from the Tomarov group and reached the line with. Good Will, and in the morning next day broke through to Bessonovka and Orlovka. And the 6th Guards. And on the evening of August 3rd they broke through to Tomarovka. 4TA offered stubborn resistance. From August 4, 5th Guards. The TA was pinned down by enemy counterattacks for two days, although according to the calculations of the Soviet side, already on August 5, its brigades were supposed to leave west of Kharkov and capture the city of Lyubotin. This delay changed the plan of the entire operation to quickly split the enemy group.
After two days of heavy fighting on the outskirts of Belgorod, on August 5, 1943, the 69th and 7th Guards A of the Steppe Front pushed the troops of AG Kempf to the outskirts and began an assault on it, which by evening ended with clearing the main part of it from the invaders. On the evening of August 5, 1943, in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, fireworks were given in Moscow for the first time during the war years.
On this day, a turning point came and in the Voronezh Front zone, in the auxiliary direction, the 40A of Lieutenant General K.S. went on the offensive. Moskalenko, in the direction of Boromlya and 27A Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko, who by the end of August 7 liberated Grayvoron and advanced to Akhtyrka.
After the liberation of Belgorod, the pressure on the Steppe Front also intensified. On August 8, 57A of Lieutenant General N.A. was transferred to him. Hagen. Trying to prevent the encirclement of his troops, E. von Manstein on August 11 launched counterattacks on the 1TA and 6th Guards A south of Bogodukhov with the forces of the 3rd Tank AG Kempf, which slowed down the pace of the advance of not only the Voronezh, but also the Steppe Front. Despite the stubborn resistance of AG Kempf, Konev’s troops continued to persistently advance towards Kharkov. On August 17, they started fighting on its outskirts.
On August 18, GA "South" made a second attempt to stop the advance of the two fronts with a counterattack, now on the extended right flank of 27A. To repel it, N.F. Vatutin brought into battle the 4th Guards A, Lieutenant General G.I. Kulik. But it was not possible to quickly turn the situation around. The destruction of the Akhtyrka group dragged on until August 25.
On August 18, the offensive of 57A was resumed, which, bypassing Kharkov from the southeast, moved towards Merefa. In this situation, the capture of a resistance center in the forest northeast of Kharkov on August 20 by units 53A of Lieutenant General I.M. Managarov was important. Using this success, 69 A of Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin began to bypass the city from the north-west and west. During August 21, the 5th Guards TA corps concentrated in zone 53A, which significantly strengthened the right wing of the Steppe Front. A day later, the Kharkov-Zolochev, Kharkov-Lyubotin-Poltava and Kharkov-Lyubotin highways were cut, and on August 22, 57A reached the area south of Kharkov in the area of the villages of Bezlyudovka and Konstantinovka. Thus, most of the enemy’s retreat routes were cut off, so the German command was forced to begin a hasty withdrawal of all troops from the city.
On August 23, 1943, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov. This event marked the victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk by the Red Army.
Results, significance
In the battle of Kursk, which lasted 49 days, about 4,000,000 people, over 69,000 guns and mortars, more than 13,000 tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns, and up to 12,000 aircraft took part on both sides. It became one of the most large-scale events of the Great Patriotic War, its significance goes far beyond the Soviet-German front. “The major defeat at Kursk was the beginning of a mortal crisis for the German army,” wrote the outstanding commander Marshal Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. - Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk became three important stages in the fight against the enemy, three historical milestones on the path to victory over Nazi Germany. The initiative for action on the Soviet-German front - the main and decisive front of the entire Second World War - was firmly secured in the hands of the Red Army."
Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all)
Non-refundable - 70 330
Sanitary - 107 517
Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front
Non-refundable - 112 529
Sanitary - 317 361
Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front
Non-refundable - 71 611
Sanitary - 183 955
General in the battle for the Kursk ledge:
Non-refundable - 189 652
Sanitary - 406 743
In the Battle of Kursk in general
~ 254 470
killed, captured, missing
608 833
wounded, sick
153 thousand units of small arms
6064
tanks and self-propelled guns
5245
guns and mortars
1626
combat aircraft
1000
tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet data
less 1696
airplanes
| The Great Patriotic War |
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| Invasion of the USSR Karelia Arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkiv Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikie Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomir Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians Baltics Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague |
The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, launching counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.
In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as differences in the methods of recording and classifying military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is related to the inclusion or exclusion of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1,500 tanks) from the calculations. The following table contains some estimates:
| Source | Personnel (thousands) | Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns | Guns and (sometimes) mortars | Aircraft | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USSR | Germany | USSR | Germany | USSR | Germany | USSR | Germany | |
| RF Ministry of Defense | 1336 | over 900 | 3444 | 2733 | 19100 | about 10000 | 2172 2900 (including Po-2 and long range) |
2050 |
| Krivosheev 2001 | 1272 | |||||||
| Glanz, House | 1910 | 780 | 5040 | 2696 or 2928 | ||||
| Müller-Gill. | 2540 or 2758 | |||||||
| Zett., Frankson | 1910 | 777 | 5128 +2688 “reserve rates” in total more than 8000 |
2451 | 31415 | 7417 | 3549 | 1830 |
| KOSAVE | 1337 | 900 | 3306 | 2700 | 20220 | 10000 | 2650 | 2500 |
The role of intelligence
However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from intelligence agencies of the Kursk fronts, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge:
...I believe that the enemy will launch the main offensive operations against these three fronts in order to, having defeated our troops in this direction, gain freedom of maneuver to bypass Moscow in the shortest direction.
2. Apparently, at the first stage, the enemy, having gathered the maximum of his forces, including up to 13-15 tank divisions, with the support of a large number of aircraft, will strike with his Oryol-Krom grouping bypassing Kursk from the northeast and by the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping bypassing Kursk from the southeast.
Thus, although the exact text of the “Citadel” fell on Stalin’s desk three days before Hitler signed it, four days before that the German plan became obvious to the highest Soviet military command.
Kursk defensive operation
The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation, at 3 a.m. (the German army fought on Berlin time - translated to Moscow 5 a.m.), 30-40 minutes before the start of the operation, artillery and aviation counter-preparation was carried out.
Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 a.m. our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern front was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Without achieving success, the Germans moved their attack in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they were unable to break through the Soviet defense. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of its tanks, the 9th German Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main German attacks were directed towards the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.
July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkasy.
To complete the assigned task, units of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive (Day “X”) needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoe and make a breakthrough with armored units in direction of the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th Tank Corps determined that the village of Cherkasskoe was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, units of the 48th Tank. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.
However, as a result of the actions of Soviet units and formations, their courage and fortitude, as well as their advance preparation of defensive lines, the Wehrmacht’s plans in this direction were “significantly adjusted” - 48 Tank Tank did not reach Oboyan at all.
The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advance of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the area by Soviet units (from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the entire defense to radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of attack aircraft against those accumulated in front of engineering barriers to enemy tanks, competent placement of anti-tank strong points (No. 6 south of Korovin in the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the battle formations of the 196th Guards Battalions .sp (Colonel V.I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassy, timely maneuver by the divisional (245 detachment, 1440 gap) and army (493 iptap, as well as the 27th brigade of Colonel N.D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of the 3rd TD and 11th TD with the involvement of forces of 245 detachment (Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 tanks) and 1440 sap (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the military outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199th Guards Regiment, Captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of workers’ barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of the 11th Tank Division and 332nd Infantry Division by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of “X-1”, but the resistance of the combat outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5th). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their progress during the offensive itself.
A machine gun crew fires at advancing German units
Also, the pace of the corps' advance was affected by the German command's shortcomings in planning the operation and poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units. In particular, the “Greater Germany” division (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and the 10 armored brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 Pz.V command tanks) in the current conditions The battle turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (it was especially difficult to overcome the swampy anti-tank ditch south of Cherkasy), and came under a combined attack from Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33 detachment (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially among officers), and was unable to deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the line Korovino - Cherkasskoe for a further attack in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that had overcome anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusilier Regiment, which was at the forefront of the attack of the VG division, at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division was actually unable to bring them into battle for a long time.
The resulting congestion on the advance routes also resulted in the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Tank Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.
It should be noted that the commander of the 48th Tank Tank became hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of his superiors. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative impact - all divisions of the corps were brought into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.
The development of the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps on the day of July 5th was greatly facilitated by: active actions of engineer-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the proactive actions of units of the 11th TD (I. Mikl) and 911th department. division of assault guns (overcoming a strip of engineering obstacles and reaching the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy with a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).
An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units was revealed when fighting both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet anti-tank tanks were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective firing range of the latter; heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6th Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).
Only after the bulk of the tanks had overcome the anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11th Panzer Division were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov gave the order to withdraw units of the 196th Guards Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassy, as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards Regiment retreated, minefields were laid. At about 21:20, a combat group of grenadiers from the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the village of Yarki (north of Cherkassy). A little later, the 3rd Wehrmacht TD managed to capture the village of Krasny Pochinok (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Tank Tank of the Wehrmacht was a wedge into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the backdrop of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating to the east parallel to the 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.
Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5. However, German units were able to establish complete control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.
Thus, the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD, not possessing large tank formations (they had at their disposal only 39 American tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245th detachment and 1440 glanders) held in the area of the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoe five for about a day enemy divisions (three of them are tank divisions). In the battle of July 5 in the Cherkassy region, the soldiers and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards particularly distinguished themselves. rifle regiments of the 67th Guards. divisions. Competent and truly heroic actions of the soldiers and commanders of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up army reserves to the place where units of the 48th Tank Corps are wedged at the junction of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this area in the subsequent days of the defensive operation.
As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoe virtually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts: “it was a lunar landscape”).
The heroic defense of the village of Cherkassk on July 5 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.
July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.
By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA had penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive sector of 48 TK (in the area of the village of Cherkasskoe) and at 12-13 km in the section of 2 TK SS (in the Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the entire depth of the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards SD (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the front 5-6 km directly to the second line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), entering into battle with its advanced units.
However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Tank Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to July 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Death's Head infantry division, to cover his right flank against the 375th Infantry Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units performed brilliantly in the battles of July 5 .
Nevertheless, the success achieved by the Leibstandarte divisions and especially Das Reich forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of not complete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakova about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin with his order transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad Tank (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV “Churchill”) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34 and 17 are Mk.IV Churchill) subordinate to the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves of his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards SD with the forces of the 5th Guards. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 tk SS forces of 2 guards. Ttk (directly through the battle formations of the 375th Infantry Division). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I.M. Chistyakov assigned the commander of the 5th Guards. CT to Major General A. G. Kravchenko the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strong points) the main part of the corps (two of three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte MD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture of the village. Lucky tanks from the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrest and execution, they were forced to begin implementing it. The attack by the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.
Sufficient own artillery assets of the 5th Guards. The Stk did not have it, and the order did not leave time for coordinating the actions of the corps with its neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on flat terrain and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich MD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After this, having brought up anti-tank artillery and organized flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich MD between 17 and 19 hours managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenaps (Major Savchenko) and 464 Guards Artillery, which had withdrawn from the village of Luchki. .division and 460 Guards. mortar battalion 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich MD actually managed to encircle most of the 5th Guards. Stk between the village. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on the success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Belenikhino crossing. However, thanks to the proactive actions of the commander and battalion commanders, the 20th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) remaining outside the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various corps units that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of the Das Reich MD, and even forced the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without contact with corps headquarters, on the night of July 7, surrounded units of the 5th Guards. The Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and linked up with units of the 20th Tank Brigade. During July 6, parts of the 5th Guards. Stk 119 tanks were irretrievably lost for combat reasons, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unknown reasons, and 19 were sent for repairs. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 even exceeded the losses of 29 tanks during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky storage farm).
After being surrounded by 5th Guards. Stk, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment MD "Das Reich", taking advantage of the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of the army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) , near the village of Teterevino, and for a short time wedged itself into the defense of the 285th infantry regiment of the 183rd infantry division, but due to the obvious insufficient strength, having lost several tanks, it was forced to retreat. The entry of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.
Battle of Prokhorovka
Belfry in memory of those killed on the Prokhorovsky field
Results of the defensive phase of the battle
The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy - Model’s 9th Army - lost 20,720 people during the same period. which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses between the Soviet and German sides is 4.95:1.
During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.
The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was due to the smaller massing of forces and assets in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.
On the southern front, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at approximately 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.
After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as the “Watch on the Rhine” () or the operation at Lake Balaton () were also unsuccessful.
The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5, 1943 to August 23, 1943, is a turning point in the central event of the Great Patriotic War and a gigantic historical tank battle. The Battle of Kursk lasted 49 days.
Hitler had great hopes for this major offensive battle called “Citadel”; he needed a victory to raise the morale of the army after a series of failures. August 1943 became fatal for Hitler, as the countdown in the war began, the Soviet army confidently marched towards victory.
Intelligence service
Intelligence played an important role in the outcome of the battle. In the winter of 1943, intercepted encrypted information constantly mentioned the Citadel. Anastas Mikoyan (member of the CPSU Politburo) claims that Stalin received information about the Citadel project as early as April 12.
Back in 1942, British intelligence managed to crack the Lorenz code, which encrypted messages from the 3rd Reich. As a result, the summer offensive project was intercepted, and information about in general terms"Citadel", location and structure of forces. This information was immediately transferred to the leadership of the USSR.
Thanks to the work of the Dora reconnaissance group, the Soviet command became aware of the deployment of German troops along the Eastern Front, and the work of other intelligence agencies provided information on other directions of the fronts.
Confrontation
The Soviet command was aware of the exact time of the start of the German operation. Therefore, the necessary counter-preparations were carried out. The Nazis began the assault on the Kursk Bulge on July 5 - this is the date the battle began. The main offensive attack of the Germans was in the direction of Olkhovatka, Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets.
The command of the German troops sought to get to Kursk by the shortest path. However, the Russian commanders: N. Vatutin - Voronezh direction, K. Rokossovsky - Central direction, I. Konev - Steppe direction of the front, responded to the German offensive with dignity.
The Kursk Bulge was supervised by talented generals from the enemy - General Erich von Manstein and Field Marshal von Kluge. Having received a repulse at Olkhovatka, the Nazis tried to break through at Ponyry with the help of the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But here, too, they were unable to break through the defensive power of the Red Army.
From July 11, a fierce battle raged near Prokhorovka. The Germans suffered significant losses of equipment and people. It was near Prokhorovka that a turning point in the war occurred, and July 12 became a turning point in this battle for the 3rd Reich. The Germans struck immediately from the southern and western fronts.
One of the global tank battles took place. Hitler's army brought 300 tanks into the battle from the south, and 4 tank and 1 infantry divisions from the west. According to other sources, the tank battle consisted of about 1,200 tanks on both sides. The Germans were defeated by the end of the day, the movement of the SS corps was suspended, and their tactics turned defensive.
During the Battle of Prokhorovka, according to Soviet data, on July 11-12, the German army lost more than 3,500 people and 400 tanks. The Germans themselves estimated the losses of the Soviet army at 244 tanks. Operation Citadel lasted only 6 days, in which the Germans tried to advance.
Equipment used
Soviet medium tanks T-34 (about 70%), heavy - KV-1S, KV-1, light - T-70, self-propelled artillery units, nicknamed "St. John's wort" by soldiers - SU-152, as well as SU-76 and SU-122, met in confrontation with German tanks Panther, Tiger, Pz.I, Pz.II, Pz.III, Pz.IV, which were supported by self-propelled guns "Elephant" (we have "Ferdinand").
Soviet guns were practically unable to penetrate the 200 mm frontal armor of the Ferdinands; they were destroyed with the help of mines and aircraft.
Also the Germans' assault guns were the StuG III and JagdPz IV tank destroyers. Hitler relied heavily on new equipment in the battle, so the Germans postponed the offensive for 2 months in order to release 240 Panthers to the Citadel.
During the battle, Soviet troops received captured German Panthers and Tigers, abandoned by the crew or broken. After the breakdowns were repaired, the tanks fought on the side of the Soviet army.
List of forces of the USSR Army (according to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation):
- 3444 tanks;
- 2172 aircraft;
- 1.3 million people;
- 19,100 mortars and guns.
As a reserve force there was the Steppe Front, numbering: 1.5 thousand tanks, 580 thousand people, 700 aircraft, 7.4 thousand mortars and guns.
List of enemy forces:
- 2733 tanks;
- 2500 aircraft;
- 900 thousand people;
- 10,000 mortars and guns.
The Red Army had numerical superiority at the beginning Battle of Kursk. However, the military potential was on the side of the Nazis, not in quantity, but in the technical level of military equipment.
Offensive
On July 13, the German army went on the defensive. The Red Army attacked, pushing the Germans further and further, and by July 14 the front line had moved up to 25 km. Having battered the German defensive capabilities, on July 18 the Soviet army launched a counterattack with the goal of defeating the Kharkov-Belgorod German group. Soviet front offensive operations exceeded 600 km. On July 23, they reached the line of the German positions occupied before the offensive.
By August 3, the Soviet army consisted of: 50 rifle divisions, 2.4 thousand tanks, more than 12 thousand guns. On August 5 at 18:00 Belgorod was liberated from the Germans. From the beginning of August, a battle was waged for the city of Orel; on August 6 it was liberated. On August 10, soldiers of the Soviet army cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway road during the offensive Belgorod-Kharkov operation. On August 11, the Germans attacked in the vicinity of Bogodukhov, weakening the tempo of fighting on both fronts.
Heavy fighting lasted until August 14. On August 17, Soviet troops approached Kharkov, starting a battle on its outskirts. German troops carried out the final offensive in Akhtyrka, but this breakthrough did not affect the outcome of the battle. On August 23, an intense assault on Kharkov began.
This day itself is considered the day of the liberation of Kharkov and the end of the Battle of Kursk. Despite the actual fights with the remnants of the German resistance, which lasted until August 30.
Losses
According to different historical reports, losses in the Battle of Kursk vary. Academician Samsonov A.M. states that losses in the Battle of Kursk: more than 500 thousand wounded, killed and prisoners, 3.7 thousand aircraft and 1.5 thousand tanks.
Losses in the difficult battle on the Kursk Bulge, according to information from the research of G.F. Krivosheev, in the Red Army were:
- Killed, disappeared, captured - 254,470 people,
- Injured - 608,833 people.
Those. In total, human losses amounted to 863,303 people, with an average daily loss of 32,843 people.
Losses of military equipment:
- Tanks – 6064 units;
- Aircraft – 1626 pcs.,
- Mortars and guns - 5244 pcs.
The German historian Overmans Rüdiger claims that the losses of the German army were 130,429 killed. The losses of military equipment were: tanks - 1500 units; aircraft – 1696 pcs. According to Soviet information, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, more than 420 thousand Germans were killed, as well as 38.6 thousand prisoners.
Bottom line
Irritated, Hitler laid the blame for the failure in the Battle of Kursk on the generals and field marshals, whom he demoted, replacing them with more capable ones. However, later major offensives “Watch on the Rhine” in 1944 and the Balaton operation in 1945 also failed. After the defeat in the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the Nazis did not achieve a single victory in the war.
After the Battle of Stalingrad, which ended in disaster for Germany, the Wehrmacht attempted revenge the following year, 1943. This attempt went down in history as the Battle of Kursk and became the final turning point in the Great Patriotic War and World War II.
Background to the Battle of Kursk
During the counteroffensive from November 1942 to February 1943, the Red Army managed to defeat a large group of Germans, encircle and force the 6th Wehrmacht Army to surrender at Stalingrad, and liberate very large territories. Thus, in January-February, Soviet troops managed to capture Kursk and Kharkov and thereby cut through the German defenses. The gap reached approximately 200 kilometers in width and 100-150 in depth.
Realizing that a further Soviet offensive could lead to the collapse of the entire Eastern Front, the Nazi command in early March 1943 took a series of energetic actions in the Kharkov area. Very quickly, a strike force was created, which by March 15 again captured Kharkov and attempted to cut off the ledge in the Kursk area. However, here the German advance was stopped.
As of April 1943, the line of the Soviet-German front was practically flat along its entire length, and only in the Kursk area did it bend, forming a large ledge jutting into the German side. The configuration of the front made it clear where the main battles would unfold in the summer campaign of 1943.
Plans and forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk
In the spring, heated debate broke out among the German leadership regarding the fate of the summer 1943 campaign. Some of the German generals (for example, G. Guderian) generally proposed to refrain from an offensive in order to accumulate forces for a large-scale offensive campaign in 1944. However, most German military leaders were strongly in favor of the offensive already in 1943. This offensive was supposed to be a kind of revenge for the humiliating defeat at Stalingrad, as well as the final turning point of the war in favor of Germany and its allies.
Thus, in the summer of 1943, the Nazi command again planned an offensive campaign. However, it is worth noting that from 1941 to 1943 the scale of these campaigns steadily decreased. So, if in 1941 the Wehrmacht led an offensive along the entire front, then in 1943 it was only small area Soviet-German front.
The meaning of the operation, called “Citadel,” was the offensive of large Wehrmacht forces at the base of the Kursk Bulge and their attack in the general direction of Kursk. The Soviet troops located in the bulge would inevitably be surrounded and destroyed. After this, it was planned to launch an offensive into the gap created in the Soviet defense and reach Moscow from the southwest. This plan, if it had been successfully implemented, would have become a real disaster for the Red Army, because there were a very large number of troops in the Kursk ledge.
The Soviet leadership learned important lessons in the spring of 1942 and 1943. Thus, by March 1943, the Red Army was thoroughly exhausted by offensive battles, which led to defeat near Kharkov. After this, it was decided not to begin the summer campaign with an offensive, since it was obvious that the Germans were also planning to attack. Also, the Soviet leadership had no doubt that the Wehrmacht would advance precisely on the Kursk Bulge, where the configuration of the front line contributed most to this.
That is why, after weighing all the circumstances, the Soviet command decided to exhaust the German troops, inflict serious losses on them and then go on the offensive, finally securing the turning point in the war in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.
To attack Kursk, the German leadership concentrated a very large group, numbering 50 divisions. Of these 50 divisions, 18 were tank and motorized. From the sky, the German group was covered by aircraft of the 4th and 6th Luftwaffe air fleets. Thus, the total number of German troops at the beginning of the battle of Kursk was approximately 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and 2,000 aircraft. Due to the fact that the northern and southern Wehrmacht groupings on the Kursk Bulge were part of different army groups (“Center” and “South”), leadership was exercised by the commanders of these army groups - Field Marshals Kluge and Manstein.
The Soviet group on the Kursk Bulge was represented by three fronts. The northern face of the ledge was defended by troops of the Central Front under the command of Army General Rokossovsky, the southern by troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Vatutin. Also in the Kursk ledge were the troops of the Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General Konev. The general leadership of the troops in the Kursk salient was carried out by Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov. The number of Soviet troops was approximately 1 million 350 thousand people, 5000 tanks and about 2900 aircraft.
Beginning of the Battle of Kursk (5 – 12 July 1943)
On the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops launched an offensive on Kursk. However, the Soviet leadership knew about the exact time of the start of this offensive, thanks to which it was able to take a number of countermeasures. One of the most significant measures was the organization of artillery counter-training, which made it possible to inflict serious losses in the first minutes and hours of the battle and significantly reduce the offensive capabilities of the German troops.
However, the German offensive began and achieved some successes in the early days. The first line of Soviet defense was broken through, but the Germans failed to achieve serious success. On the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, the Wehrmacht struck in the direction of Olkhovatka, but, having failed to break through the Soviet defense, they turned away settlement Ponyri. However, here too the Soviet defense was able to withstand the onslaught of German troops. As a result of the battles on July 5-10, 1943, the German 9th Army suffered terrible losses in tanks: about two-thirds of the vehicles were out of action. On July 10, army units went on the defensive.
The situation unfolded more dramatically in the south. Here, in the first days, the German army managed to wedge itself into the Soviet defenses, but never broke through it. The offensive was carried out in the direction of the settlement of Oboyan, which was held by Soviet troops, who also inflicted significant damage on the Wehrmacht.
After several days of fighting, the German leadership decided to shift the direction of the attack to Prokhorovka. Implementing this decision would make it possible to cover a larger area than planned. However, here units of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army stood in the way of the German tank wedges.
On July 12, one of the largest tank battles in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. On the German side, approximately 700 tanks took part in it, while on the Soviet side - about 800. Soviet troops launched a counterattack on Wehrmacht units in order to eliminate the enemy’s penetration into the Soviet defense. However, this counterattack did not achieve significant results. The Red Army only managed to stop the advance of the Wehrmacht in the south of the Kursk Bulge, but it was possible to restore the situation at the beginning of the German offensive only two weeks later.
By July 15, having suffered huge losses as a result of continuous violent attacks, the Wehrmacht had practically exhausted its offensive capabilities and was forced to go on the defensive along the entire length of the front. By July 17, the withdrawal of German troops to their original lines began. Taking into account the developing situation, as well as pursuing the goal of inflicting a serious defeat on the enemy, the Supreme High Command Headquarters already on July 18, 1943 authorized the transition of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge to a counteroffensive.
Now the German troops were forced to defend themselves in order to avoid a military catastrophe. However, Wehrmacht units, seriously exhausted in offensive battles, could not offer serious resistance. The Soviet troops, reinforced with reserves, were full of power and readiness to crush the enemy.
To defeat the German troops covering the Kursk Bulge, two operations were developed and carried out: “Kutuzov” (to defeat the Oryol group of the Wehrmacht) and “Rumyantsev” (to defeat the Belgorod-Kharkov group).
As a result of the Soviet offensive, the Oryol and Belgorod groups of German troops were defeated. On August 5, 1943, Orel and Belgorod were liberated by Soviet troops, and the Kursk Bulge practically ceased to exist. On the same day, Moscow saluted for the first time the Soviet troops who liberated the cities from the enemy.
The last battle of the Battle of Kursk was the liberation of the city of Kharkov by Soviet troops. The battles for this city became very fierce, but thanks to the decisive onslaught of the Red Army, the city was liberated by the end of August 23. It is the capture of Kharkov that is considered the logical conclusion of the Battle of Kursk.
Losses of the parties
Estimates of the losses of the Red Army, as well as the Wehrmacht troops, have different estimates. Even more unclear are the large differences between the estimates of the parties' losses in different sources.
Thus, Soviet sources indicate that during the Battle of Kursk the Red Army lost about 250 thousand people killed and about 600 thousand wounded. Moreover, some Wehrmacht data indicate 300 thousand killed and 700 thousand wounded. Armored vehicle losses range from 1,000 to 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns. Soviet aviation losses are estimated at 1,600 aircraft.
However, regarding the assessment of Wehrmacht losses, the data differ even more. According to German data, the losses of German troops ranged from 83 to 135 thousand people killed. But at the same time, Soviet data indicate the number of dead Wehrmacht soldiers at approximately 420 thousand. The losses of German armored vehicles range from 1,000 tanks (according to German data) to 3,000. Aviation losses amount to approximately 1,700 aircraft.
Results and significance of the Battle of Kursk
Immediately after the Battle of Kursk and directly during it, the Red Army began a series of large-scale operations with the aim of liberating Soviet lands from German occupation. Among these operations: “Suvorov” (operation to liberate Smolensk, Donbass and Chernigov-Poltava.
Thus, the victory at Kursk opened up vast operational scope for action for the Soviet troops. German troops, bloodless and defeated as a result of the summer battles, ceased to be a serious threat until December 1943. However, this does not mean at all that the Wehrmacht was not strong at that time. On the contrary, snapping furiously, the German troops sought to hold at least the Dnieper line.
For the Allied command, which landed troops on the island of Sicily in July 1943, the battle of Kursk became a kind of “help”, since the Wehrmacht was no longer able to transfer reserves to the island - the Eastern Front was a higher priority. Even after the defeat at Kursk, the Wehrmacht command was forced to transfer fresh forces from Italy to the east, and in their place send units battered in battles with the Red Army.
For the German command, the battle of Kursk became the moment when plans to defeat the Red Army and defeat the USSR finally became an illusion. It became clear that for quite a long time the Wehrmacht would be forced to refrain from conducting active operations.
The Battle of Kursk marked the completion of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. After this battle, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Red Army, thanks to which, by the end of 1943, vast territories of the Soviet Union were liberated, including such big cities, like Kyiv and Smolensk.
Internationally, the victory in the Battle of Kursk became the moment when the peoples of Europe enslaved by the Nazis took heart. The people's liberation movement in European countries began to grow even faster. Its culmination came in 1944, when the decline of the Third Reich became very clear.
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