Rare photographs of the battle in the ardennes - history in photographs. Battle of the Bulge: how it was
By the end of 1944 Nazi Germany was on the brink of disaster. The last attempt to turn the tide of the war was the Ardennes operation, which ended in failure.
"Anything is possible"?
Once upon a time in the Middle Ages, the castles of feudal lords stood in the Ardennes forest and bands of robber knights hid. And no one, not even Walter Scott, could subsequently foresee that the scene of his novel "Quentin Dorward" would become the site of one of the bloody battles of the Second World War ...
And it happened that by the winter of 1944, fascist Germany, squeezed in the grip of the Allied offensive from the west and the Red Army from the east, was on the verge of disaster. One country cannot be at war with the whole world, it was clear. And everyone knew that the end was near. But Hitler entertained the illusion of a possible split among Germany's opponents. Therefore, in his opinion, it was necessary to hit the Anglo-Americans in the west. And there "everything is possible."
To this end, it was decided to conduct an offensive operation in the Ardennes, which was code-named "Watch on the Rhine", and try to defeat the allies on the outskirts of Germany in Belgium and the Netherlands, and free up forces for the Eastern Front, where Soviet troops were already standing at the gates of the Reich.
It is well known that the enemy is defeated, first of all, by those who are well aware of his plans. That is why one should not spare money either for spies or for the technical support of espionage at all levels. So American intelligence knew in advance about the plans of the German command as early as November 1944, since it could read German ciphers to the Ultra system, and besides, it knew about all the movements German troops and their concentration east of the Ardennes thanks to aerial reconnaissance data.
Preparation
Thus, the American command had the opportunity to prepare in advance to repel the enemy offensive by deploying large groupings of troops to the north and south of the Ardennes. In the Ardennes themselves, the defenses were deliberately weakened so that when the Germans broke through 100 km to the west, they would be surrounded by blows from the flanks. That is, the German command made a serious mistake by not calculating such consequences from the offensive in the Ardennes. However, in that situation, in any case, it would have been an “offensive of the desperate”, and the place ... the place did not even play a special role!
However, despite all the difficulties, the Germans prepared for the offensive quite well. They gathered everyone who knew English and dressed them in American uniform, creating from them assault detachments under the leadership of Otto Skorzeny, who were supposed to sow panic among the Americans in the rear and destroy headquarters and commanders.
Part of the Panther tanks were disguised as American: they hung other bulwarks, covered the towers with metal sheets, removed the muzzle brakes from the guns, and painted large white stars on the armor.
The time for the attack was chosen by weather conditions so that the Anglo-American aircraft could not fly. A large number of "King Tiger" tanks were involved, as well as jets. And I must say that when the offensive was launched, all this bore fruit!
The operation was commanded by Field Marshal V. Model, who ordered it to begin on the morning of December 16, 1944, and by December 25 the Germans had advanced 90 km deep into the enemy defenses. main goal, of course, there were bridges across the Meuse River, although the Germans could not help but understand that they were mined and would be blown up at the slightest threat! However, then they planned to attack Antwerp and the capital of Belgium - Brussels. The Germans expected to make up for the lack of fuel by capturing fuel depots in Liege and Namur.
As soon as the offensive began, the German commandos Otto Skorzeny and the "false panthers" rushed to the rear of the American troops, but as always happens in such cases, it was the case that decided everything. One of the Germans asked for refueling and instead of "gas", he asked to fill him with "petroleum". And from a literary point of view, it was right, but the Americans themselves don’t say that!
In a word, the saboteurs were uncovered, their cars were burned with bazookas, but the matter was not limited to this. An order was given to all suspicious Americans to ask about what only “one hundred percent Americans” could know, which in turn led to a lot of curious cases, up to the detention of senior officers, who naturally did not know much of what their subordinates knew.
However, the operation in the Ardennes went "wrong" from the very beginning, not only because of this. So, for example, the 101st US Airborne Division held the defense in the city of Bastogne and the German 5th Panzer Army could not take it. The American 7th Panzer Division held the town of Saint-Vith near the Belgian-German border for five days. According to the plan, the Germans were supposed to take it at 18:00 on December 17, but they did it only on the 21st. The defense of both cities has seriously slowed down German offensive, which allowed the Allies to transfer additional forces to the Ardennes.
Counter attack
On December 19, 1944, General Eisenhower decided that it was time to strike back, which was scheduled for December 22. And then the weather came to the aid of the allies! Now their aviation could provide effective support defending and advancing troops, and to bomb the supply lines of the German troops, who were experiencing an acute shortage of fuel, as they could not capture the depots in Liège and Namur. They also failed to capture the bridges across the river Meuse, although they were only 6 km from the bridge in the city of Dinant - the last settlement on the way to the Meuse! So, by December 25, 1944, the German offensive in the Ardennes ended in complete failure.
Despite Hitler's orders to keep attacking, the German troops began to retreat. The "Last Blitzkrieg" is over.
On January 1, 1945, as a result of German air strikes, including Me.262 jet fighters, at least 260 Allied aircraft were destroyed there. However, the Luftwaffe also lost more than 300 aircraft, which drastically reduced their combat power. On the same day, the Germans again went on the offensive in Alsace in the Strasbourg region in order to pull the Allied forces away from the Ardennes, but this strike did not give any results.
Fight to the death
The bloodless and embittered German troops fought with extreme bitterness. Executions of American prisoners of war became more frequent. In particular, the shooting during the “Massacre at Malmedy” is known, after which orders were issued in the American army prohibiting the capture of paratroopers and SS soldiers.
On January 1, 1945, in the village of Chenon, American troops also shot about 60 German prisoners of war in retaliation for the massacre at Malmedy. So there were enough violations of the rules of warfare during the fighting in the Ardennes on both sides!
By January 29, the Allies completely eliminated the Ardennes "ledge" (which is why in American historiography this operation is called the "Battle of the Bulge" - "Battle for the Bulge"), and began the invasion of Germany. The Wehrmacht lost more than a third of its armored vehicles in battles and almost all the aircraft (including jets) participating in the operation used up fuel and ammunition, which it already lacked.
True, the Ardennes operation delayed the Allied offensive on the Rhine for six weeks: since it had to be postponed to January 29, 1945. But on the other hand, the Allies suffered fewer losses, since the German troops were defeated on the ground, where it was easier for the Allied mobile troops to operate, then as if the Germans had remained on the fortifications of the Siegfried Line, then a victory over them would have cost significantly more losses. So here, too, the benefit was entirely on the side of the Allies, and not the German command!
gossip
It is interesting that the theme of the battle in the Ardennes did not escape the close interest of conspiracy theorists, who are convinced of the widespread existence of conspiracies of "dark forces". However, the idea of a "conspiracy" in this case was thrown to them by the Soviet film "Secret Mission", filmed in 1950.
There, the initial retreat of the Allies in the Ardennes is presented as a general flight, and their subsequent successful counter-offensive as the result of a secret collusion between the American and German ruling circles: they say that the Germans should not resist in the West, but throw all their forces on the Eastern Front, that is, all of them were "bad". However, the fact that some behind-the-scenes negotiations were held somewhere and by someone about this can neither be confirmed nor denied today, since a lot of documents on the war were classified until 2045!
Offensive in the Ardennes(German code name Wacht am Rhein - "Watch on the Rhine") - the operation of German troops on the Western Front during the Second World War. Held on December 16 - January 29 in the Ardennes (southwest of Belgium) with the aim of changing the situation on the Western Front, defeating the Anglo-American armed forces in Belgium and the Netherlands, if possible, induce the United States and England to separate negotiations on peace and cessation of hostilities in the West , thereby freeing up forces for the Eastern Front.
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✪ The famous German offensive in the Ardennes, 1944, Many parts of the USA are utterly defeated, newsreel
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✪ Ardennes breakthrough 1
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background
In June 1944, the Allies opened a second front in Europe by landing their troops in Normandy ... By December 1944, the 1st american army took up positions in the northern part of the Ardennes between the cities of Saint-Vith and Liège. Some of its units and units of the 9th Army fought in the Hurtgen Forest and on the Ruhr River, on this sector of the front, where they wedged into German territory and created a bridgehead 50 km wide and 40 km deep. In the Ardennes, on the Belgian-German border, the 8th American Corps from the 3rd Army was located. South of the Ardennes, other units of the 3rd Army wedged themselves into the Siegfried Line, creating a bridgehead on the east bank of the Saar River. Here there was a concentration of troops to resume the offensive on the Saar region. To the right of the 3rd Army, the 7th Army occupied the front, which stretched from the Saar River to eastbound, resting on the Rhine in the Karlsruhe region. Parts of the 7th Army in late November - early December liberated the northern regions of Alsace and Lorraine and reached the borders of Germany and the Upper Rhine. The French 1st Army liberated Strasbourg on November 22, and west of the Rhine in Alsace, the Germans had troops only in the area of the city of Colmar. The allies were preparing for a new offensive.
American intelligence a lot was known about the plans of the German offensive as early as November 1944, since she used the “Ultra” decryption system for German radio messages, besides, due to air reconnaissance, they knew about the movements of German troops and their concentration east of the Ardennes [ ] . Army intelligence of the 3rd Army informed the higher command, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, Dwight Eisenhower, who in his memoirs noted the following:
Thus, the American command prepared in advance to repel the enemy offensive, placing large mobile groupings of its troops north and south of the Ardennes, and in the Ardennes themselves they deliberately weakened the defense, leaving the 28th and 106th infantry divisions there. Everything happened exactly as the American commanders expected - the German troops went on the offensive in the Ardennes, where the allies deliberately weakened the defense, and when the Germans broke through almost 100 km to the west, the American troops attacked them with their mobile groups of the 1st and 3rd armies from the flanks - from the north and south, putting the Germans at risk of encirclement. For the Germans, such an offensive in the form of a "wedge", when they are simultaneously attacked from the north and south by the enemy's mobile forces, will end in a "boiler". On December 16, 1944, at the beginning of the operation, German troops managed to break through the front of the Anglo-American troops in a sector of 80 km and capture 30,000 American soldiers and officers.
By December 26, 1944, the Wehrmacht offensive in the Ardennes was stopped due to increased enemy resistance, shortages of fuel and ammunition, and increased activity of allied aviation. A few days later, American troops, reinforced by redeployment from other sectors of the front, launched a counterattack by the 3rd American Army in the direction of the city of Bastogne. The German command transferred two SS tank corps from the 6th SS Panzer Army (comprising three divisions) to this sector. During the week, bloody battles were fought outside the city with no visible result for both sides. On January 8, 1945, seeing the futility of a further offensive in the Ardennes and in view of the sharply aggravated situation in the Budapest region, Hitler ordered the withdrawal of the 6th Panzer Army to the deep rear and ordered to ensure the accelerated completion of its formations with personnel and military equipment (for example, only 1 SS Panzer Division lost about 45% of tanks and self-propelled guns in three weeks of fighting). The offensive of the Wehrmacht in the Ardennes eventually ended in defeat.
This is clearly shown on two maps of the Ardennes operation (see below), the first map shows the offensive of the Wehrmacht from December 16 to 25, and the second map shows the Allied counteroffensive from December 25, 1944 to the end of January 1945, partial encirclement, retreat and defeat of German troops. According to Eisenhower: "the German command made a serious mistake by launching an offensive in the Ardennes - it was an offensive of the desperate".
balance of power
Allies
Troops involved in the Battle of the Ardennes:
- 21st Army Group (B. Montgomery) - located in the Ardennes (Belgium)
- 1st American Army (K. Hodges) - temporarily subordinate to the 21st Army Group
- British 30th Corps (B. Horrocks) from British 2nd Army (M. Dempsey)
- 12th Army Group (O. Bradley) - located in the Ardennes (Belgium and Luxembourg)
and partly in Lorraine
- US 3rd Army (J. Patton)
The Allied Command had significant reserves with which they could stop any German attempts to break through in the Ardennes, and in any other place. The rest of the allied troops were located on the Western Front as follows: North of the Ardennes were:
- 2nd British Army
- 1st Canadian Army
- US 9th Army
South of the Ardennes were:
- 6th Army Group (J. Davers) - located in Alsace and Lorraine and participated in the Alsace-Lorraine and later Colmar operations
- US 7th Army (A. Patch)
- 1st French Army (J. de Lattre de Tassigny)
In France, newly arrived American divisions formed
- The 15th American Army, which was formed in early 1945 and sent to the front.
The border between the 21st and 12th Army Groups ran along the 50th parallel of northern latitude. The border between the 12th and 6th Army Groups about 15 km west of the city of Saarbrücken. The 1st American Army was temporarily subordinated to Field Marshal Montgomery's 21st Army Group, as it turned out to be north of the Ardennes ledge and its communication with the 21st Army Group turned out to be much better than with the 12th Army Group, which turned out to be south. Thus, General Eisenhower decided that operational command of the 1st Army would pass to Montgomery.
Germany
- Army Group "B" (V. Model) - directly opposite the Ardennes.
- 7th Army (E. Brandenberger)
- 5th Panzer Army (H. Manteuffel)
- 6th Panzer Army SS (J. Dietrich)
- Army Group G (P. Hausser) - south of the Ardennes.
- Army Group "H" (J. Blaskowitz) - north of the Ardennes.
- 1st Parachute Army (Germany)
The balance of forces of the parties
| Allies | Germany | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | December | January | December | January | ||||
| date | 16 | 24 | 2 | 16 | 16 | 24 | 2 | 16 |
| Personnel (people) | 228,741 | ~541,000 | ~705,000 | 700,520 | 406,342 | ~449,000 | ~401,000 | 383,016 |
| tanks | 483 | 1,616 | 2,409 | 2,428 | 557 | 423 | 287 | 216 |
| tank destroyers | 499 | 1,713 | 1,970 | 1,912 | 667 | 608 | 462 | 414 |
| Other armored | 1,921 | 5,352 | 7,769 | 7,079 | 1,261 | 1,496 | 1,090 | 907 |
| Anti-tank and artillery pieces |
971 | 2,408 | 3,305 | 3,181 | 4,224 | 4,131 | 3,396 | 3,256 |
| Panzer divisions | 2 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| tank brigades | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||
| Infantry divisions | 6 | 15 | 22 | 22 | 13 | 16 | 15 | 16 |
| Infantry brigades | 2 | 2 | 2 | |||||
Beginning of the German offensive: December 16 - 25, 1944
The offensive of the German troops (6th SS Panzer Army, 5th Panzer Army and 7th Field Army, united in Army Group "B" under the command of Field Marshal V. Model) began in the morning of December 16, and by December 25 the Germans advanced 90 km deep into the defense. The first target of the Germans, of course, were the bridges across the river Meuse, which separated the Ardennes from the rest of Belgium and without the capture of which a further offensive was impossible due to the geographical features of the terrain. They then planned to advance on Antwerp, through whose port the supplies of the 21st Army Group passed, and on the capital of Belgium, Brussels. The German command most of all relied on its heavy armored vehicles (Tiger and King Tiger tanks) and non-flying weather - due to constant snowfalls and heavy cloud cover, the Allied aircraft could not operate for several days and this temporarily nullified the Allied air superiority. The Germans hoped to make up for the lack of fuel by capturing captured fuel from the allies in warehouses in the cities of Liege and Namur. The bridges over the Meuse were defended by parts of the 30th British Corps and were mined by sappers and ready to be blown up in case there was a threat of their capture by the Germans. The Ardennes operation was to be supported by a secret sabotage operation codenamed "Vulture". Here is how the American journalist Ralph Ingersoll, who was in the army and personally participated in repelling the Ardennes offensive, describes the beginning of the German offensive:
« The Germans seemed to have everything - surprise, speed, firepower and high morale. Looking at the map on the morning of December 17, it seemed impossible to stop them - they broke through our line of defense on a front of fifty miles and poured into this gap like water into a blown dam. And from them, along all roads leading to the west, the Americans ran headlong ...»
At the same time, Guderian, Chief of the German General Staff of the Ground Forces, noted:
“So, on December 16, the offensive began, the 5th Panzer Army deeply wedged into the enemy’s defenses. The advanced tank formations of the ground forces - the 116th and 2nd tank divisions - went directly to the river. Maas. Separate units of the 2nd Panzer Division even reached the river. Rhine. The 6th Panzer Army was not so successful. Congestion of troops on narrow, icy mountain roads, delays in bringing the second echelon into battle in the sector of the 5th Panzer Army, insufficiently quick use of the initial success - all this led to the fact that the army lost the momentum of the offensive - the most necessary condition for conducting any major operation. In addition, the 7th Army ran into difficulties, as a result of which it was necessary to turn the armored units of Manteuffel to the south in order to prevent the threat from the flank. After that, there could be no question of a major breakthrough. Already on December 22, it was necessary to recognize the need to limit the purpose of the operation. On this day, a large-minded command should have remembered the expected offensive on the Eastern Front, the position of which depended on the timely completion of the already largely failed offensive on the Western Front. However, not only Hitler, but also the high command of the armed forces, and especially the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces, in these fateful days thought only of the Western Front. The tragedy of our military command became even more obvious after the failure of the offensive in the Ardennes, before the end of the war. On December 24, it was clear to every sane soldier that the offensive had finally failed. It was necessary to switch all our efforts to the east immediately, if it was not already too late. From my headquarters, which had been transferred to the Maybachlager near Zossen, I followed closely the course of the offensive in the west. In the interest of my people, I wished it to be a complete success. But when already on December 23 it became clear that it was impossible to achieve a major success, I decided to go to the Fuhrer's main headquarters and demand an end to the dangerous tension and the immediate transfer of all forces to the Eastern Front ... "
The reaction of the Allied command and their actions
Among those Allied reserves that could be used almost immediately was the 18th Airborne Corps, under the command of General Ridgway, stationed near Reims. The corps included the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions, units already tested in battle. Shortly before this, they had fought heavy battles in Holland and had not yet fully recovered. By order of Eisenhower, the 18th Corps was immediately redeployed to the Ardennes.
« The American 11th Armored Division had recently arrived in theater and the 17th Airborne Division was in the UK ready to go to the Continent, the 87th Infantry Division could also be brought into the threatened area within a reasonable timeframe. In the English sector, far to the north, Montgomery was preparing for a new offensive. By this time, he had one full-strength corps not involved in operations. We were confident that, with such reserves, for any offensive undertaken by the Germans, we could eventually respond effectively.» .
“On the 4th, the Germans kicked one place of the 17th airborne, which, according to reports, lost up to forty percent of its personnel during the attack in one of the battalions. Whoever and whenever reports such losses, it is clear that he knows nothing about military affairs. Even reports of 10% casualties are seldom verified, reports can only be true if troops have fled or abandoned their weapons. I found Miley, commander of the 17th Airborne, in Bastogne. While I was there, the cannonade came from both sides, the enemy shells exploded in the air, the fire of the muzzles of our cannons spewed fire, and in the darkness gathering over the snow-covered fields it all seemed beautiful, although not very encouraging. On January 4, 1945, I made one important note in my diary before the date - a statement that I had never made before, writing: "We still have a chance to lose this war" ... ".
At the same time, despite the Allied offensive that had begun, British Prime Minister W. Churchill was also concerned about the heavy fighting on the Western Front and sent telegrams to Stalin regarding the plans of the Soviet army to attack on the Eastern Front.
“I have just returned from visiting General Eisenhower's headquarters and Field Marshal Montgomery's headquarters separately. The battle in Belgium is very difficult, but I believe that we are the masters of the situation. The diversionary offensive that the Germans are undertaking in Alsace also causes difficulties in relations with the French and tends to pin down American forces. I still remain of the opinion that the strength and equipment of the allied armies, including the air force, will make von Rundstedt regret his bold and well-organized attempt to split our front and, if possible, capture the port of Antwerp, which is now of vital importance.».
« There is very heavy fighting going on in the West, and at any time big decisions may be required from the High Command. You yourselves know from your own experience how troubling the situation is when one has to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of initiative. It is highly desirable and necessary for General Eisenhower to know in general terms what you intend to do, since this, of course, will affect all of his and our most important decisions. According to the message received, our emissary Air Chief Marshal Tedder was in Cairo last night, weather-bound. His trip was greatly delayed through no fault of yours. If he has not yet arrived to you, I will be grateful if you can let me know if we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or somewhere else during January and at any other points that you may you wish to mention. I will not pass on this highly classified information to anyone, with the exception of Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only on condition that it is kept in the strictest confidence. I consider the matter urgent."
“We are preparing for the offensive, but the weather is not favorable for our offensive. However, taking into account the position of our allies on the Western Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to finish the preparations at an accelerated pace and, regardless of the weather, open wide offensive operations against the Germans along the entire central front no later than the second half of January. You can be sure that we will do everything that is possible to do in order to assist our glorious allied forces.
"1. I am very grateful to you for your exciting message. I forwarded it to General Eisenhower for his personal information only. May your noble undertaking be full of good fortune. 2. The battle in the West is not going so badly. It is very possible that the Huns will be driven out of their salient with very heavy losses. We and the Americans throw everything we can into the fight. The news you have given me will greatly encourage General Eisenhower, as it will give him confidence that the Germans will have to divide their reserves between our two flaming fronts.
However, the fact of the deliberate destruction of prisoners at Malmedy was not confirmed by convincing evidence: in particular, the death sentence of Joachim Peiper, who took the blame for the actions of his subordinates, was canceled on the basis of evidence of his torture and perjury during the investigation.
Losses
Estimates of losses as a result of the Battle of the Bulge are very different. According to the US Department of Defense, American forces lost 89,500 casualties, including 19,000 killed, 47,500 wounded, and 23,000 captured and missing. The official report of the US State Department of the US Army contains lists of 108,347 victims, including 19,246 killed, 62,489 wounded and 26,612 captured and missing. The Battle of the Bulge was the bloodiest battle fought by American forces in both World War II and US history. At the same time, the losses of the British amounted to only 1,408 people, incl. 200 killed, 969 wounded and 239 missing.
This ratio of losses caused serious disagreement in the leadership of the Allied armies. For example, US Army Generals Bradley and Patton threatened to resign if Montgomery continued to lead. Especially criticism of the US generals intensified after Montgomery's press conference on January 7, 1945, at which Montgomery appropriated the success of the entire operation and added that it was the British troops who saved the Americans from the threat of encirclement. Eisenhower took great pains to extinguish this conflict, which could end in a conflict between the leaders of the armies of all the Allies. Montgomery noted: “so great were the feelings against me on the part of the American generals that everything I said should have been misinterpreted”. Eisenhower also commented on the conflict in his memoirs: “American commanders are offended by Montgomery. They believe that he belittles them, and they were not slow to openly express mutual ridicule and contempt to him..
German losses on the Western Front for the period December 16, 1944 - January 25, 1945, according to various sources, range from 60,000 to 125,000 total human losses (killed, wounded, captured and missing).
For a better understanding of the scale of losses for the US Army in the Battle of the Bulge, it is enough to cite data from other battles. Losses of the US Army in the entire North African campaign - 2,715 dead, 15,506 wounded; Landing in Normandy - 6,603 total losses (including 2,500 dead); Normandy operation - 124,394 total losses (including 20,668 dead); the epic Battle of Iwo Jima - 6,821 dead, 19,217 wounded; attack on Pearl Harbor - 2,341 dead, 1,143 wounded; Battle of Gettysburg - 46,286 total losses on both sides (including 7,863 dead). Also, the losses suffered by the Americans in the Battle of the Bulge are generally comparable to the total losses of the US Army in entire wars: the Korean War - 37,904 servicemen dead, captured and missing, and 80,000 wounded; War in Vietnam - 58,220 servicemen dead, captured and missing, and 153,000 wounded.
results
By January 29, the Allies completely eliminated the Ardennes "ledge" and launched an invasion in Germany. The German counter-offensive ended in failure, failing to complete its assigned tasks. The Wehrmacht lost in battles more than a third of armored vehicles and almost all of the aircraft that participated in offensive operation, a large amount of resources, used up fuel and ammunition, which the Wehrmacht lacked at the end of the war. All this could be needed to defend the western borders of Germany, or could be used by the German command on other fronts.
Despite the fact that the German command did not achieve the desired results, the Ardennes operation delayed the offensive of the Anglo-American troops on the Rhine for 6 weeks: the Allies planned the offensive for December 18, 1944, but had to postpone it to January 29, 1945.
Memory
On December 29, 1944, the Luxembourg American cemetery was opened, where most of the American soldiers who died during the operation are buried [ ] .
On July 16, 1950, the grand opening of the memorial complex dedicated to the fallen American soldiers took place in Bastogne. The first stone of the memorial was laid on July 4, 1946. In the competition for architectural projects, announced in the autumn of 1946, the Liege architect Georges Dedoyar won.
They say that once at a time it is not necessary and history speaks of the correctness of this expression. In the winter of 1944, Dolph Hitler decided to repeat the "feat" of the German armed forces that hit the Allies in 1940 from the Ardennes direction.
Operation preparation
On September 16, 1944, Hitler issued an order demanding "fanatical determination" from all troops in the West. The Americans approached the German border, and south of Aachen even crossed it. “From our side, any large-scale operations cannot be carried out. The only thing left for us is to hold our positions or die.”
It seemed that the Fuhrer was calling only for the defense of the fatherland, but this was a ploy to mislead the enemy, who, as Hitler feared, had a spy in his headquarters. After the meeting, the Fuhrer invited Keitel, Jodl and the Luftwaffe representative, General Kreipe, to his office.
While they were wondering what surprise the Fuhrer was preparing for them, the owner of the office came in - stooped, pale, visibly passed after the third mini-heart attack. His eyes were watery and cloudy, his jaw dropped.
Jodl briefly reported on the situation: Germany has no reliable allies - some have defected, others are going to do it. Although there are over 9 million under arms in the Wehrmacht, over the past three months the losses have amounted to 1.2 million, almost half of them on the Western Front. There was a relative calm in the East.
The Soviet offensive appears to have fizzled out. " But in the West we are going through a serious test in the Ardennes,” Jodl concluded. It was a hilly region in Belgium and Luxembourg, the path taken by German troops to victory in the First World War.
At the word "Ardennes" Hitler started up, raised his hand and shouted: "Stop!" There was silence. Finally he spoke:
“I have made an important decision. I'm going on the offensive. Here in the Ardennes!” The Fuhrer struck the map with his fist. "Across the river Meuse and further - to Antwerp!"
Everyone stared at him in amazement. Hitler's shoulders straightened, his eyes sparkled, signs of anxiety and illness disappeared. It was the dynamic Hitler of 1940.
In the next few days, he was a model of the former energy, insisted on preparing a plan for a decisive counteroffensive. He issued orders for the creation of a new tank army and outlined ways to deliver 250,000 troops and a thousand tanks to the Ardennes in absolute secrecy.
On October 8, a new meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters. The conversation was about how to force the Western allies to conclude a separate peace with Germany.
The successes of the Russians, Hitler declared, alarmed the British and Americans, for it was not in their interests to rejoice at these successes. Consequently, their potential desire for a separate peace with the Reich is not in doubt - it only needs to be strengthened. When asked how to do this, Hitler replied that a successful counter-offensive of German troops in the West could solve this problem ...
On October 11, Hitler demanded from the chief of staff of the operational leadership, Jodl, to ensure, above all, the suddenness of the planned actions. On October 12, Rundstedt (since September 1944 he again commanded the Wehrmacht troops in the West) was ordered to concentrate new reserves to repel the Allied offensive in the direction of the Rhine. And the secret plan was attached to the order under the code name "Watch on the Rhine."
It specifically emphasized the defensive nature of the planned actions, allegedly aimed at preventing the Allies from advancing towards the Rhine in the Ruhr direction. Why "supposedly"? D
but because the plan "Watch on the Rhine" was intended to strategically deceive the Allies. Giving Allied intelligence the opportunity to get acquainted with the "secret plan", Hitler hoped to mislead the Allied command about his real intentions.
On November 10, Hitler signed the directive for the offensive. It said:
"Achieving the goal of the operation - the destruction of enemy forces north of the line Antwerp, Brussels, Luxembourg - would mark a turning point in the war in the West, and thus, perhaps, in the war as a whole."
In early December, at a meeting of the commanders of the troops that were part of the shock group, Hitler drew attention to the special significance of the offensive: success should be tantamount to the events at Dunkirk.
And he expressed his confidence in the implementation of a new and this time fatal for the allies of Dunkirk. The stake was placed on turning the course of the war in favor of Germany.
A well-known German specialist in sabotage, Otto Skorzeny, was called to Hitler.
In the presence of Keitel and Jodl, he gave Skorzeny a special task: to lead a special detachment of saboteurs from the personnel of the 150th SS Panzer Brigade, dressed in the uniform of the Allied troops (2 thousand people), and in the course of the offensive, penetrate behind enemy lines in captured vehicles, call there panic, destroy headquarters and communication centers, capture and hold bridges across the Meuse River until the main forces approach.
On the prepared plan of the counteroffensive, Hitler wrote: "Unchangeable".
What was the situation on the Western Front at that time?
By mid-December 1944, German troops occupied the "Siegfried Line" with three army groups. On the right wing of the front, Army Group X was defending: (25th field and 1st parachute armies). Army Group B deployed in the center of the front: the 15th and 7th field armies, the 6th SS Panzer Army and the 5th Panzer Army.
On the left wing of the front, Army Group G (1st Army) and Army Group Upper Rhine (19th Army) were on the defensive. In total, the Wehrmacht had 73 divisions on the Western Front, including 11 tank divisions, 29 Volkssturm divisions - militia and 3 tank brigades.
The Anglo-American troops at the "Siegfried Line" were located in the following order. On the right wing of the front, in a strip 280 km wide, the 6th Army Group operated: the American 7th and the French 1st armies. The troops of the French 1st Army north of Strasbourg were the first to reach the Rhine on November 19. At the end of November, 75 thousand members of the French Resistance fought as part of this army.
In the center of the front, in a strip 370 km wide, the American 12th Army Group defended: 3rd, 1st and 9th armies. In the Ardennes, in a strip 115 km wide, the 8th Army Corps of the American 1st Army (three infantry divisions) was on the defensive. There was an armored division in the reserve of the corps.
On the left wing of the front, in a strip 220 km wide, the British 21st Army Group deployed: the Canadian 1st and the British 2nd armies.
In total, the British and Americans had 63 divisions in Western Europe: 40 American, 15 Canadian and British, and 8 French, including 15 armored divisions and 10 armored brigades (4,000 tanks) and almost 8,000 aircraft.
Of the German divisions, "many had no combat experience or were understrength." In terms of the number of personnel, the German infantry division was no less than two times inferior to the allied divisions.
Subsequently, assessing the combat effectiveness of the strike force created by the command of the Wehrmacht, Rundstadt said:
"With a high proportion of tank divisions, there were few tanks in them - they existed mainly on paper."
General Manteuffel, who commanded the 5th Panzer Army, which was part of the shock group, claimed after the war that in reality there were no more than 800 tanks in both tank armies.
The idea of the German high command was as follows: taking advantage of the lull on the Western Front, deliver a crushing blow in the direction of Liege, at the junction of the Anglo-American armies, defeat the American 1st Army, cross the Meuse, reach the Antwerp area, press the American 9th Army to the sea. 1st, British 2nd and Canadian 1st armies - to arrange a second Dunkirk for the Anglo-American allies, but unlike in 1940, do not give them the opportunity to evacuate to England, and in the end - force the allies to conclude a separate peace with Germany.
“If several strong blows follow, then at any moment it may happen that this artificially supported front will collapse with a tremendous crash.”
The main blow was planned to be delivered in the Ardennes region - at the weakest point in the defense of the American troops. This direction led to the dismemberment of the Anglo-American troops and their defeat in parts. Confidence in success was based on the fact that the Allied command clearly underestimated the enemy, believing that “the German army is in a state of complete decline.
Walter Model
The following should be kept in mind.
Never in the history of the world has there been a coalition of such alien elements pursuing such various purposes which our opponents have created... Anyone who closely follows the development of events cannot but see that the contradictions between our enemies are growing stronger every day.
If we now inflict several powerful blows on them, then at any moment it may happen that this "single", artificially supported front will suddenly collapse with a deafening roar, like thunder.
balance of power
The surprise of the attack often compensates for the lack of forces and means. This happened in the West in December 1944.
It was the carelessness of the allies that helped the German high command achieve surprise.
They did not expect that the Germans would conduct an offensive in the Ardennes in the winter. It is believed that Eisenhower least of all feared for the Ardennes sector, believing that advancing through difficult terrain is extremely difficult, especially in winter.
But he himself recalled something else:
“Although when comparing the forces involved on both sides in the Battle of the Ardennes and Kasserine, the latter seems to be just a skirmish, nevertheless, there are some similarities between them.
Here and there it was the advance of the desperate; here and there the enemy took advantage of heavily fortified defensive positions to concentrate forces to strike at the Allied communications in the hope of forcing them to abandon their plans for continuous offensive operations.
No matter how sudden the time and force of this blow were for us, we were not mistaken either about the place of its delivery, or about the inevitability of such a step on the part of the enemy. Moreover, with regard to the overall response to these actions of the enemy, then in this case, Bradley and I had a long agreed plan of response.
Therefore, the security of this site was much lower, General Omar Bradley wrote:
"If someone goes on the offensive, he does it with the aim of either destroying the enemy troops or capturing the area. In last case he either wants to use the advantageous terrain himself, or to prevent the enemy from using it.
None of these goals could be achieved in the Ardennes. Nowhere were our troops so stretched out as on this wooded sector of the front; nowhere on the Allied front was there another area devoid of industrial resources, communications and natural boundaries worthy of attention to the extent of the Ardennes ... "
The puncture was that the Anglo-American generals underestimated the German impudence.
For an offensive with limited goals, which Bradley is talking about, the Ardennes section was completely unsuitable, but the Germans’ idea was grander - Rundstedt planned to split the Allied strategic front in the Ardennes region and go to the Belgian port of Antwerp, hoping thereby to catch two birds with one stone - cut off and encircle the troops of the 21st British Army Group and deprive the allies of the port through which the main flows of cargo went.
In the highest headquarters, they did not believe at all in the possibility of any German offensive. Therefore, there was no prepared defense in the Ardennes.
This was used by the command of the Wehrmacht.
German intelligence established that the Anglo-American allies did not have large reserves in the Ardennes direction. The wooded rugged terrain of the Ardennes region made it possible to covertly concentrate the strike force.
All orders were given only through liaison officers. False regroupings were made in order to create the impression that troops were being concentrated north of the Ardennes to cover the Ruhr.
This goal has been achieved. Throughout November, Eisenhower's staff "stubbornly held the erroneous view that the Germans were preparing to repel an Allied attack in the direction of the Ruhr."
American reconnaissance maps showed only 4 German infantry and 2 panzer divisions in the Ardennes, and they were also marked as moving north. In reality, in the Ardennes, by the beginning of the offensive, a strike force consisting of 21 divisions, up to 970 tanks and assault guns and 800 aircraft, was concentrated
The combat composition as a whole looked like this
On December 16, 1944, the German armies participating in the offensive had the following composition (from north to south):
6.SS-Panzerarmee (total 9 divisions, including 4 tank divisions)
LXVII.AK (272.VD, 326.VD)
I.SS-PzK (277.VD, 12.SS-PzD, 1.SS-PzD, 3.FjD, 12.VD)
II.SS-PzK (2.SS-PzD, 9.SS-PzD)
5.Panzerarmee (total 7 divisions, including 3 tank divisions)
LXVI.AK (18.VD, 62.VD)
LVIII.PzK (116.PzD, 560.VD)
XXXXVII.PzK (2.PzD, 26.VD, PzLehr-D)
7.Armee (four divisions in total; LII Corps did not participate in the offensive)
LXXXV.AK (5.FjD, 352.VD)
LXXX.AK (276.VD, 212.VD)
A total of 20 divisions, including 7 tank divisions. From December 16, 1944 to January 2, 1945, the following were transferred from the OKW Reserve and from the neighboring 15th Army to the advancing group:
December 16 Führer-Begleit-Brig.
December 20-22 15.PzGrD, 79.VD, F?hrer-Gren-Brig.
December 24 9.PzD
by December 27 9.VD, 167.VD, 3.PzGrD
Total - six divisions and two brigades. In total, from December 16 to January 2, the Germans used 27 calculated divisions in the offensive, including 10 tank and motorized divisions.
On December 15, the 12th American Army Group had the following composition (the corps and divisions involved in repelling the German attack were highlighted):
94th ID, 11th ArmD
9th Army (total 7 divisions, including 2 armored)
30th ID
XIII Corps (84th ID, 102nd ID, 7th ArmD)
XIX Corps (29th ID, 2nd ArmD)
XVI Corps (75th ID)
1st Army (total 14 divisions, including 3 armored)
VII Corps (1st ID, 9th ID, 83rd ID, 104th ID, 3rd ArmD, 5th ArmD)
V Corps (2nd ID, 8th ID, 78th ID, 99th ID)
VIII Corps (4th ID, 28th ID, 106th ID, 9th ArmD)
3rd Army (total 11 divisions, including 3 armored)
42nd ID
III Corps (26th ID, 6th ArmD)
XX Corps (5th ID, 90th ID, 95th ID, 10th ArmD)
XII Corps (35th ID, 80th ID, 87thID, 4th ArmD)
Total 34 divisions, including 9 armored.
On the American side, the sector of the German offensive was defended by the VIII Army Corps as part of the 106th ID, 28th ID, 9th ArmD, 4th ID. During the fighting, the Americans reinforced their grouping with seven tank divisions (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th), thirteen infantry divisions (1st, 2nd, 5th, 9th, 26th, 30th, 35th, 75th, 80th, 83rd, 84th, 87th, 99th) and two airborne divisions (82nd & 101st).
In total, 26 divisions, including eight armored ones, took part in repulsing the German offensive. True, some of the American divisions during the fighting were withdrawn to the rear or transferred to inactive sectors of the front. On December 26, the 10th Panzer was transferred to the XX Corps, in the Saar region, on December 31, the 9th Panzer was withdrawn to the reserve of the main command.
Explanation of abbreviated names of compounds:
ID Infantry Division
ArmD Armored Division armored division
PzD Panzer-Division tank division
PzGrenD Panzer-Grenadier-Division tank-grenadier (=motorized) division
FjD Fallschirmj?ger-Division parachute division
VD Volksgrenadier-Division Volksgrenadier Division
PzLehrD Panzer-Lehr-Division "training" tank division
Führer-Begleit-Brigade Führer Escort Brigade (Panzer)
F?hrer-Grenadier-Brigade Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade (tanks and I)
Arden offensive of the Wehrmacht
The German offensive began on December 16 with the forces of the 6th SS Panzer Army, the 5th Panzer Army and the 7th Field Army, united in Army Group B (commanded by Field Marshal V. Model).
Caught by surprise, the American troops were completely confused and could not put up serious resistance in the first days. A disorderly retreat began, turning into a stampede in a number of sectors.
Eisenhower wrote:
"General Bradley arrived at my headquarters on December 16, 1944, to discuss the possibilities of overcoming the severe shortage of infantry replacements.
As soon as he entered my office, a staff officer appeared to report a slight penetration of the enemy into our defenses on the front of the 8th Corps of General Middleton and on the right flank of the 5th Corps of General Gerow in the Ardennes. The officer plotted these areas on my operational map, and Bradley and I began to analyze the possible consequences of enemy activity.
I was convinced that this offensive was not of a local nature; it would be illogical for the enemy to attempt a small offensive in the Ardennes, unless, of course, it was his diversion to draw our attention to this area while he would strike a strong blow somewhere else.
We ruled out such a possibility. In other sectors of the front, either we were so strong that the Germans could not hope for the success of their offensive, or there were not enough important objects that he would want to take possession of.
In addition, we have learned that in recent days the number of German troops in the Ardennes has been gradually increasing. It was through this area that the Germans launched a major offensive in 1940, as a result of which the British troops were expelled from the continent, and France was withdrawn from the war. Then the offensive was led by the same von Rundstedt, who this time was the commander here.
It is possible that he hoped to repeat the success he had achieved here more than four years earlier. We always thought that before admitting their final defeat in the West, the Germans would try to launch a desperate counter-offensive there. It seemed entirely possible to me and Bradley that this was the kind of operation they had started here."
" On the morning of December 17, 1944, it became clear that the Germans had launched a major offensive.
They broke through our defenses on the front of the 106th and 28th divisions. Contradictory reports began to arrive at the headquarters, but it was obvious that the enemy, using a significant number of tank formations, was rapidly advancing westward. All our intelligence services continued to work tirelessly, and we soon had a fairly complete picture of the strength of the German strike.
For the offensive, von Rundstedt concentrated three armies - the 5th and 6th tank and 7th combined arms - they included ten tank and motorized infantry divisions, and in general the enemy group consisted of twenty-four divisions with support.
We received some of this information a little later in the course of the battle, but by the evening of December 17, our reconnaissance discovered seventeen divisions. Thus, it is likely that at least twenty divisions participated in the operation.
In two important respects, the enemy achieved a certain amount of surprise. The first of these was the timing of the offensive. Considering the heavy defeats we inflicted on the enemy in the late summer and autumn of 1944, and the extraordinary measures he had to take to form new formations, we believed that he could not prepare for a major offensive in such a short time.
The second surprise for us was the strength with which he launched the offensive. The mobile reserve was the 6th Panzer Army, a fresh and powerful formation recently arrived at the front from Germany, the trace of which we had lost some time ago; however, we have already pretty battered the 7th and 5th tank armies in previous battles.
The Allies decided to immediately pull up their reserves. Among those Allied reserves that could be used almost immediately was the 18th Airborne Corps, under the command of General Ridgway, stationed near Reims.
American tankers are watching from their M4 Sherman tank for flying transport aircraft C-47 Skytrain.
The corps included the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions, units already tested in battle.
Shortly before this, they had fought heavy battles in Holland and had not yet fully recovered. By order of Eisenhower, the 18th Corps was immediately redeployed to the Ardennes.
Eisenhower wrote:
“Recently, the US 11th Armored Division had arrived in theater and the 17th Airborne Division was in the United Kingdom ready to go to the continent, the 87th Infantry Division could also be delivered to the threatened area within an acceptable time frame. In the English sector, far to the north, Montgomery was preparing for a new offensive.
By this time, he had one full-strength corps not involved in operations. We were confident that with such reserves, any offensive undertaken by the Germans, we could eventually respond effectively.
The 101st Airborne Division held the defense in the city of Bastogne - the German 5th Panzer Army repeatedly attacked from different directions, but could not take Bastogne. The defense of this city seriously hampered the advance of the Germans, since seven main roads in the Ardennes, which were necessary for the supply of the Germans, intersected there.
The 7th American Panzer Division held the city of Saint-Vith for 5 days near the Belgian-German border on the northern section of the Ardennes salient. This Small town It was also a crossroads for important roads in the Ardennes - according to the plan, the Germans expected to take it at 18:00 on the evening of December 17, but this was only possible on December 21.
Such delays for the Germans were unacceptable. The American troops retreated and left the city, but the defense of the city of Saint-Vith also greatly slowed down the German advance. But the allies held Bastogne. The defense of both cities slowed down the pace of the German offensive, and made it possible for the Allies to transfer additional troops to the Ardennes.
Eisenhower wrote:
"Particularly noteworthy are the courageous actions of the 7th Armored Division near Saint-Vit. When this division moved into southbound the situation was still far from clear. She moved to support the left flank of the VIII Corps and eventually ended up in a semi-circle of encirclement at Saint-Vit, about fifteen miles south of Monschau.
St. Vith was an important nodal point in this area, and the enemy advanced units, trying to break out to the west, sought to capture it at any cost. Here, the remnants of the 106th and 28th divisions joined the 7th armored division, and together they stubbornly repelled the incessant enemy attacks. The actions of this division not only frustrated the German efforts in the north, but also prevented a quick encirclement of our positions at Monschau.
As a result, the continuous and strong pressure of the Germans on the 7th division began to threaten it with complete encirclement. The German offensive by several divisions forced her to retreat west on December 20, to the area north of Saint-Vit. The next day, the 7th Armored Division was ordered to withdraw some further distance, in order, together with other units, to take up defensive positions, which were now erected on the north side of the resulting salient.
However, the stubborn defense of this division in the previous days not only seriously disrupted the advance plan of the enemy advance units, but also provided exceptional assistance to the 2nd division in an important sector at Monschau, until the 1st division under the command of Brigadier General Clift Addrus and Major General Louis Craig's 9th Division. When these three battle-tested divisions took up the defense there, the security of our troops on the north side of the salient was practically assured.
View of the ruins of the Belgian town of St. Vith during the Ardennes operation.
On December 19, 1944, General Eisenhower called a meeting at Verdun to discuss the circumstances resulting from the German counteroffensive.
A week before these events, on December 12, General Patton discussed the possibility of a German breakthrough from the left flank of his army in the sector of the First Army, as a result of which a plan was developed for the counteroffensive of the 3rd Army in case of such an enemy action.
But the Germans did not have enough resources.
Otto Skorzeny wrote:
"Unusual chaos reigned on the roads. I Panzer Corps, which was in front, received no support, and by December 18 it ran out of fuel. There was no question of reaching the bridges across the Meuse."
“In order that we all may receive information important for coordinating our efforts, I want to instruct General Eisenhower to send a fully competent officer from his headquarters to Moscow to discuss with you the state of affairs with Eisenhower on the western front and the question of interaction with the eastern front.
We will maintain complete secrecy. I hope that you will meet with this officer on General Eisenhower's staff and arrange for an exchange of information with him that will be mutually beneficial. The situation in Belgium is not bad, but we have entered a period where we need to talk about the next phase.
Please respond promptly to this proposal due to the extreme urgency of the matter."
"Churchill-Stalin
I do not consider the situation in the West to be bad, but it is quite obvious that Eisenhower cannot solve his problem without knowing what your plans are. President Roosevelt, with whom I have already exchanged opinions, has made a proposal to send you a fully competent staff officer to get acquainted with your considerations, which we need for guidance.
Of course, it is very important for us to know the main outlines and terms of your operations. Our confidence in the offensives to be undertaken by the Russian army is such that we have never asked you a single question before, and we are now convinced that the answer will be reassuring; but we think, for reasons of secrecy, that you will be more inclined to inform a completely reliable officer than to report it in any other way."
The German offensive began to stall.
The offensive of the Wehrmacht bogged down near the Belgian city of Celles on the morning of December 25, 1944, just 6 km from the Meuse River and the bridge in the city of Dinan. Ironically, this was the last settlement on the way to the Meuse. Here was the "point" of the Ardennes ledge, that is, the westernmost point of the German offensive in the Ardennes.
Here the German 2nd Panzer Division, advancing in the vanguard of the 5th Panzer Army, was surrounded near the town of Sell. The 2nd German Panzer Division was surrounded by the 2nd American and 11th British Panzer Divisions.
It was a rare case in history that two enemy divisions with the same numbers clashed in battle.
By December 25, 1944 as strategic operation the offensive of the German troops in the Ardennes ended in complete failure. They did not even fulfill tactical tasks - they could not capture the bridges over the Meuse River, and did not even reach the river itself. This was mainly due to the problems of supplying German troops with fuel and ammunition.
Despite Hitler's orders to continue the offensive, the German troops began to withdraw.
Eisenhower wrote:
"The scope of the fighting did not decrease until December 26, and from all the intelligence reports that came in it was clear that the Germans were going to make at least one more major effort to break through our defenses in this area.
In the south, Bradley launched his counteroffensive on the morning of 22 December. His troops advanced extremely slowly, and their maneuver was hampered by heavy snowdrifts. The initial strike was carried out by the forces of the 3rd Corps, consisting of the 4th Armored, 80th and 26th Infantry Divisions. The fighting took on a protracted character, which was clearly not to the liking of General Patton.
The slow pace of advance did not give any chance of a sudden breakthrough of the enemy defenses. General Patton called me several times to express his disappointment with the course of the fighting. At a meeting at Verdun on the morning of December 19, he hinted at a quick success and even predicted that he would enter Bastogne on the move. I answered him that as long as his troops were advancing, I was quite satisfied. I expected that because of bad weather fighting will turn out that way and that Patton will meet only with the defending divisions of the German 7th Army.
On December 23, the weather suddenly improved, and we had the opportunity to use aircraft over the areas [of hostilities. From that day on, the battle-tested aircraft crews of our tactical air force began again bombing the most vulnerable places in the German system of lines of communication, striking enemy columns on the roads, seeking out and reporting to us every significant movement of enemy forces.
The Germans, taken prisoner after the beginning of the air action, spoke with horror of the destruction caused by the Allied bombing, and invariably complained bitterly about the helplessness of the Luftwaffe.
On December 26, Patton finally managed to break through to Bastogne, but he did it in a narrow area with the forces of the left flank, which provided us with a very unreliable connection with the besieged garrison. However, after December 26, really heavy fighting unfolded around this city both for the garrison itself and for the troops that broke through to his rescue.
On December 26, not reaching six kilometers to the place of Rommel's historic crossing over the Meuse, the last advancing division of the Wehrmacht, the 2nd Panzer, was stopped in a fierce tank battle.
In case it had not stopped, the western coast of Mass was defended by four divisions of the 30th English Corps, transferred here shortly before. After the 26th, the Germans began to slowly evacuate the Ardennes salient. The crisis of the operation is over. 
Already on December 22, the Americans were conducting private offensive operations in the south of the salient, and on January 3, a general offensive of the allies began from the north and from the south in the general direction of Houffalize. The Germans defended stubbornly. It took the Anglo-Americans three weeks to finally push them back to their original positions. The losses of both sides were, in terms of the scale of the second front, quite noticeable.
Third offensive and dispute at Allied headquarters
On the night of January 1, 1945, the forces of the 1st and 19th armies launched the third German offensive, the North Wind operation, but now - in order to regain the factor of surprise - already in Northern Alsace. During the three days of the offensive, the shock group of the 1st Army advanced up to 30 km.
On January 1, 1945, more than 900 German bombers made a massive raid on Allied airfields in Western Europe (Northern France, Belgium and Holland). 200 aircraft were destroyed on the ground. The Germans lost 93 aircraft in the process.
In addition, their aircraft from the fire of their own anti-aircraft artillery lost another 200 aircraft when they mistakenly flew over the V-2 launch pads.
This raid further complicated the strategic situation for the allied forces. On the same day, Eisenhower ordered the troops to leave Northern Alsace and Strasbourg. The commander of the French 1st Army learned about this important decision only after 30 hours, since the withdrawal was kept secret even from the French signal group.
The commander of the 1st French Army, de Lattre de Tassigny, decided, contrary to the order, not to withdraw the left flank of his army and take over the defense of Strasbourg. The head of the provisional government of France, de Gaulle, approved this initiative and on January 2 sent him an appropriate order. At a meeting at Versailles on January 3, Eisenhower was forced to yield to French pressure.
While a fierce battle was taking place in the Ardennes, no less heated battles were going on in the highest headquarters of the combined expeditionary forces. The tension between Eisenhower and Montgomery since the start of Operation Overlord had been growing ever stronger and now reached its climax. Eisenhower believed that the German divisions that had broken through the Allied front and were advancing in the emerging salient suffered considerable losses, and their communications were stretched out. He intended to deal them a swift and powerful blow.
He believed that the simultaneous offensive of the American 3rd Army from the southern flank and the American 1st Army, which was then under the command of Montgomery, from the northern flank would create the possibility of encircling the German tank armies that had broken through and destroying them in the resulting Ardennes ledge.
However, Montgomery, at a meeting with Eisenhower on December 28, stated that the Germans were still able to carry out a fairly strong counteroffensive on the northern border of the salient.
He proposed "to meet this possible blow with a prepared defense, to weaken the advancing enemy grouping, and then to defeat it with the counteroffensive of the American 1st Army."
His idea was to push the enemy back behind the Siegfried Line, while Eisenhower was in favor of encircling the German divisions that had broken through and destroying them.
Montgomery promised to launch an offensive with the American 1st Army on January 1. However, on December 30, Montgomery's chief of staff, General Guinan, arrived at Eisenhower's headquarters at Versailles. He said that his boss decided to start the offensive no earlier than January 3. This frustrated all the plans of the Supreme Commander.
Eisenhower promptly wrote a scathing letter to Montgomery.
It stated that if the commander of the 21st Army Group did not comply with the decision agreed on December 28, he would be fired. But Monty persisted. On New Year's Eve, Guinan flew back to Versailles. He reported that Montgomery would not launch an offensive until he had repulsed the German attack he expected against the northern flank of the Allies.
Upon receiving this letter, Montgomery arrogantly asked: "And who will replace me?" “This has already been discussed,” General Guinan replied. They want Alex.
He was referring to the English Field Marshal Alexander, commander of the allied forces in Italy. Montgomery turned pale; he had forgotten about Alexander.
"What should I do?" - he asked. In response, the general handed him the text of the telegram: "Sign this."
Montgomery read the text and signed it. In this telegram to Eisenhower, he asked him to tear up his previous letter. Following the telegram, he sent a letter to Versailles. He wrote: “You can rely not on me and on all the forces entrusted to me one hundred percent. We will carry out your plan."
General Bradley, in accordance with Eisenhower's orders, had already launched the 3rd Army offensive in the zone of the 12th Army Group. Montgomery was inactive.
Moreover, he wrote a letter to Eisenhower, in which he demanded that the leadership of all ground operations be handed over to him, and that all efforts of the combined Allied forces be concentrated in the northern direction. He even prepared a draft directive for Eisenhower to sign.
On January 3, 1945, the Anglo-American troops moved from small counter-attacks to a full-scale offensive against German positions. Nevertheless, by the end of the German offensive in the Ardennes, the Allied forces continued to be in a critical situation.
German soldiers fire a 20mm Flak 30 anti-aircraft gun at a ground target. Western front, Ardennes operation.
American pilot Captain Lowell Smith (Lowell Smith) thanks the anti-aircraft gun crew during the Ardennes operation.
"Churchill-Stalin
I still remain of the opinion that the strength and equipment of the allied armies, including the air force, will make von Rundstedt regret his bold and well-organized attempt to split our front and, if possible, capture the port of Antwerp, which is now of vital importance ...
“Very heavy fighting is going on in the West, and at any time big decisions may be required from the High Command. You yourself know from your own experience how disturbing the situation is when a very wide front has to be defended after a temporary loss of initiative.
It is highly desirable and necessary for General Eisenhower to know in general terms what you intend to do, since this, of course, will affect all of his and our most important decisions. According to the message received, our emissary Air Chief Marshal Tedder was in Cairo last night, weather-bound.
I consider the matter urgent."
Help from the USSR
As early as December 21, the commander of the allied forces, General D. Eisenhower, insistently asked the governments of the United States and Britain to turn to Soviet Union for military assistance.
January 6, 1945 Winston Churchill addressed the Supreme Commander of the USSR Armed Forces Joseph Stalin
"Churchill-Stalin
…3. I have just returned from visiting General Eisenhower's headquarters and Field Marshal Montgomery's headquarters separately. The battle in Belgium is very difficult, but they believe that we are masters of the situation. The diversionary offensive that the Germans are undertaking in Alsace also causes difficulties in relations with the French and tends to pin down American forces.
I still remain of the opinion that the size and equipment of the allied armies, including the air force, will make von Rundstedt regret his bold and well-organized attempt to split our front and, if possible, capture the port of Antwerp, which is now of vital importance ... "
“Very heavy fighting is going on in the West, and at any time big decisions may be required from the High Command. You yourself know from your own experience how disturbing it is to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of initiative. General Eisenhower is very desirable and necessary know in general terms what you intend to do, as this will of course affect all his and our most important decisions According to the message received, our emissary, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was in Cairo last night, being weather-bound.
His trip was greatly delayed through no fault of yours. If he has not yet arrived to you, I shall be grateful if you can let me know if we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or somewhere else during January and at any other points that you may you wish to mention. I will not pass on this highly classified information to anyone, with the exception of Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only if it is kept in the strictest confidence.
I consider the matter urgent."
"Stalin-Churchill
Received on the evening of January 7 your message of January 6, 1945. Unfortunately, Air Chief Marshal Tedder has not yet arrived in Moscow.
It is very important to use our superiority against the Germans in artillery and aviation. In these types, clear weather is required for aviation and the absence of low fogs that prevent artillery from conducting aimed fire. We are preparing to advance, but the weather is not favorable for our advance. However, taking into account the situation of our allies on the western front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to complete the preparations at an accelerated pace and, regardless of the weather, open wide offensive operations against the Germans along the entire central front no later than the second half of January. You can be sure that we will do everything possible to do in order to assist our glorious allied forces.
"Churchill-Stalin
1. I am very grateful to you for your exciting message. I forwarded it to General Eisenhower for his personal information only. May your noble undertaking be full of good luck!
2. The battle in the West is not going so badly. It is quite possible that the Huns will be driven out of their salient with very heavy losses. This is a battle primarily fought by the Americans; and their troops fought splendidly, suffering heavy losses in the process.
We and the Americans are throwing everything we can into the fight. The news you have given me will greatly encourage General Eisenhower, as it will give him the confidence that the Germans will have to divide their reserves between our two flaming fronts. There will be no break in the battle in the West, according to the statements of the generals leading it."
January 12, 1945, 8 days ahead of schedule, the Soviet troops went on the offensive on the entire Soviet-German front.
The German command was forced to finally abandon further attempts to attack in the West and begin the transfer of forces from there to the Soviet-German front. In the second half of January - early February 1945, 13 of the most combat-ready divisions were transferred to the Soviet-German front, including 6 tank and motorized (6th SS Panzer Army), 800 tanks and assault guns and other military equipment.
“Today I had a conversation with Marshal Tedder and the generals accompanying him. It seems to me that the mutual information turned out to be quite complete, which Marshal Tedder will probably report to you about. good impression. Despite unfavorable weather, the offensive Soviet troops develops according to plan. The troops of the entire central front, from the Carpathians to the Baltic Sea, have been set in motion. The Germans resist furiously, but are forced to retreat. I hope that this circumstance will facilitate and accelerate the offensive planned by General Eisenhower on the western front.
And Roosevelt:
“Today, January 15, I had a conversation with Marshal Tedder and the generals accompanying him. It seems to me that mutual information turned out to be quite complete. Comprehensive answers were given on both sides to the questions posed. I must say that Marshal Tedder makes the most favorable impression.
After four days of offensive operations on the Soviet-German front, I now have the opportunity to inform you that, despite the unfavorable weather, the offensive of the Soviet troops is developing satisfactorily. \
The entire central front, from the Carpathians to the Baltic Sea, is in motion to the west. Although the Germans resist fiercely, they are still forced to retreat. I have no doubt that the Germans will have to scatter their reserves between the two fronts, as a result of which they will be forced to abandon the offensive on the western front. I am glad that this circumstance will ease the position of the Allied forces in the west and speed up preparations for the offensive planned by General Eisenhower.
As for the Soviet troops, you can be sure that, despite the existing difficulties, they will do everything possible to ensure that the blow they have taken against the Germans is as effective as possible.
"I am very grateful to you for your message, and I am very glad that Air Marshal Tedder made such a favorable impression on you. On behalf of His Majesty's Government and from the bottom of my heart, I want to express our gratitude and congratulations to you on the occasion of that gigantic offensive that You started on the eastern front.
You no doubt now know General Eisenhower's plans and to what extent they were delayed by Rundstedt's preventive offensive. I am sure that on our entire front the battles will go on uninterruptedly. The British 21st Army Group under Field Marshal Montgomery launched an offensive today in the area south of Roermond."
Roosevelt-Stalin
“I am very grateful for your encouraging message of January 15 about your conversation with Air Marshal Tedder and about the offensive of your troops on the Soviet-German front. The exploits performed by your heroic soldiers before, and the effectiveness they have already demonstrated in this offensive, give every reason hope for the speedy success of our troops on both fronts.The time needed to force the capitulation of our barbaric opponents will be sharply reduced by the skillful coordination of our joint efforts.
America, as you know, is making great efforts in the Pacific Ocean, seven thousand miles away, and I hope that the early collapse of Germany will allow sufficient forces to be transferred to the Pacific Ocean to quickly eliminate the Japanese threat to all our allies.
New Allied offensive
By January 15, 1945, parts of the 1st and 3rd American armies joined north of Bastogne in the area of the cities of Houffalize and Noville, thereby eliminating more than half of the Ardennes ledge. The 12th Corps of the 3rd Army made a breakthrough across the Syur River at 03.30 am on January 18 without artillery preparation and caught the enemy by surprise. The 101st Airborne Division was transferred to the 6th Army Group.
They were needed to continue the attack on the Colmar pocket.
On January 23, the 1st Army liberated the city of Saint-Vith. The further offensive plan of the 12th Army Group assumed the assault on the Siegfried Line. On January 24, the remaining German units, totaling about 300,000 people, were completely surrounded in Belgium, but continued to resist.
Operation results
By January 29, the Allies completely eliminated the Ardennes "ledge" and began the invasion of Germany. German counteroffensive ended in failure
The Wehrmacht lost in battles more than a third of armored vehicles and almost all of the aircraft involved in the offensive operation, a large amount of resources, used up fuel and ammunition, which the Wehrmacht lacked at the end of the war. All this could be needed to defend the western borders of Germany, or could be used by the German command on other fronts.
Despite the fact that the German command did not achieve the set results, the Ardennes operation delayed the offensive of the Anglo-American troops on the Rhine for 6 weeks: the Allies planned the offensive for December 18, 1944, but had to postpone it to January 29, 1945.
The Ardennes Offensive (German codename Wacht am Rhein - “Watch on the Rhine”) was an operation by German troops on the Western Front during World War II. Carried out December 16, 1944 - January 29, 1945 in the Ardennes (southwest of Belgium) with the aim of changing the situation on the Western Front, defeating the Anglo-American armed forces in Belgium and the Netherlands, to persuade the United States and Britain, if possible, to separate peace talks and a cessation of hostilities in the West, thereby freeing up forces for the Eastern Front.
In June 1944, the Allies opened a second front in Europe with the landing of their troops in Normandy. By December 1944, the 1st American Army took up positions in the northern part of the Ardennes between the cities of Saint-Vith and Liège. Some of its units and units of the 9th Army fought in the Hürtgen Forest and on the Ruhr River, in this sector of the front, where they wedged into German territory and created a bridgehead 50 km wide and 40 km deep. In the Ardennes, on the Belgian-German border, the 8th American Corps from the 3rd Army was located. South of the Ardennes, other elements of the 3rd Army wedged into the "Siegfried Line", creating a bridgehead on the east bank of the Saar River. Here there was a concentration of troops to resume the offensive on the Saar region. To the right of the 3rd Army, the 7th Army occupied the front, which stretched from the Saar River in an easterly direction, resting on the Rhine in the Karlsruhe region. Parts of the 7th Army in late November - early December liberated the northern regions of Alsace and Lorraine and reached the borders of Germany and the Upper Rhine. The French 1st Army liberated Strasbourg on November 22, and to the west of the Rhine in Alsace, the Germans had troops only in the area of the city of Colmar. The allies were preparing for a new offensive.
“... we were not mistaken either about the place of its application, or about the inevitability of such a step on the part of the enemy. Moreover, with regard to the general response to these actions of the enemy, in this case, Bradley and I had a long agreed plan of response. »
Thus, the American command prepared in advance to repel the enemy offensive, placing large mobile groupings of its troops north and south of the Ardennes, and in the Ardennes themselves, they deliberately weakened the defense, leaving the 28th and 106th infantry divisions there. Everything happened exactly as the American commanders expected - the German troops went on the offensive in the Ardennes, where the allies deliberately weakened the defense, and when the Germans broke through almost 100 km to the west, the American troops attacked them with their mobile groups of the 1st and 3rd armies from the flanks - from the north and south, putting the Germans at risk of encirclement. For the Germans, such an offensive in the form of a "wedge", when they are simultaneously attacked from the north and south by the enemy's mobile forces, will end in a "boiler". On December 16, 1944, at the beginning of the operation, German troops managed to break through the front of the Anglo-American troops in a sector of 80 km and capture 30,000 American soldiers and officers.
By December 26, 1944, the Wehrmacht offensive in the Ardennes was stopped due to increased enemy resistance, shortages of fuel and ammunition, and increased activity of allied aviation. A few days later, American troops, reinforced by redeployment from other sectors of the front, launched a counterattack by the 3rd American Army in the direction of the city of Bastogne. The German command transferred two SS tank corps from the 6th SS Panzer Army (comprising three divisions) to this sector. During the week, bloody battles were fought outside the city with no visible result for both sides. On January 8, 1945, seeing the futility of a further offensive in the Ardennes and in view of the sharply aggravated situation in the Budapest region, Hitler ordered the withdrawal of the 6th Panzer Army to the deep rear and ordered to ensure the accelerated completion of its formations with personnel and military equipment (for example, only 1 SS Panzer Division lost about 45% of tanks and self-propelled guns in three weeks of fighting). The offensive of the Wehrmacht in the Ardennes eventually ended in defeat.
This is clearly shown on two maps of the Ardennes operation, the first map shows the offensive of the Wehrmacht from December 16 to 25, and the second map shows the Allied counteroffensive from December 25, 1944 to the end of January 1945, partial encirclement, retreat and defeat of German troops. According to Eisenhower: "The German command made a serious mistake by launching an offensive in the Ardennes - it was an offensive of the desperate."
Allies
Troops involved in the Battle of the Ardennes:
21st Army Group (B. Montgomery) - located in the Ardennes (Belgium)
1st American Army (C. Hodges) - temporarily subordinate to the 21st Army Group
British 30th Corps (B. Horrocks) from British 2nd Army (M. Dempsey)
12th Army Group (O. Bradley) - located in the Ardennes (Belgium and Luxembourg)
and partly in Lorraine
US 3rd Army (J. Patton)
The Allied Command had significant reserves with which they could stop any German attempts to break through in the Ardennes, and in any other place. The rest of the allied troops were located on the Western Front as follows: North of the Ardennes were:
2nd British Army
1st Canadian Army
US 9th Army
6th Army Group (J. Davers) - located in Alsace and Lorraine and participated in the Alsace-Lorraine and later Colmar operations
US 7th Army (A. Patch)
1st French Army (J. de Lattre de Tassigny)
In France, newly arrived American divisions formed
The 15th American Army, which was formed in early 1945 and sent to the front.
The border between the 21st and 12th Army Groups ran along the 50th parallel of northern latitude. The border between the 12th and 6th Army Groups is about 15 km west of the city of Saarbrücken. The 1st American Army was temporarily subordinated to the 21st Army Group of Field Marshal Montgomery, since it turned out to be north of the Ardennes salient and its communication with the 21st Army Group turned out to be much better than with the 12th Army Group, which turned out to be south. Thus, General Eisenhower decided that operational command of the 1st Army would pass to Montgomery.
Germany
Army Group "B" (B. Model) - directly opposite the Ardennes.
7th Army (E. Brandenberger)
5th Panzer Army (H. Manteuffel)
6th SS Panzer Army (J. Dietrich)
Army Group "G" (P. Hausser) - south of the Ardennes.
19th Army
Army Group "H" (J. Blaskowitz) - north of the Ardennes.
1st Parachute Army (Germany)
15th Army
70 years ago, in December 1944, Nazi Germany made a last radical attempt to turn the tide of the war. Offensive in the Ardennes. I must say, the Western Front turned out to be quite peculiar. After the landings in Normandy and on the Mediterranean coast, British and American troops advanced rapidly, freeing all of France, Holland, and Belgium. But in September 1944, having reached the German borders, they suddenly stalled. At Eisenhower's headquarters, this was explained by extended communications, the need to replenish ammunition and fuel. But the "respite" dragged on for three months! And why not take it easy? The Allies fulfilled their promise to open a "second front", but it was still left to the Russians to finish off the Nazis and shed blood. They themselves took a comfortable position - to stand still and be ready to intervene later. When it gets easier.
In the West, the fighting was limited to air strikes. However, such operations began much earlier, long before the landing in France. Since the spring of 1943, the American "flying fortresses" B-17 bombarded German cities with bombs. And the Germans were not able to respond adequately. They also had bombers, but the lion's share of the air forces of the Third Reich was desperately needed on the Eastern Front. However, at the same time, in 1943, under the leadership of Wernher von Braun, V-1 aircraft shells (cruise missiles) were created. Hitler liked the new very much, let the unmanned vehicles with explosives fall on the British!
Serial production of the V-1 began, they flew to London. The British called them "buzz bombs". But the aircraft shells were very imperfect. Some of them broke or exploded at launch positions, in flight. Of the 10,000 V-1s launched, only 3,200 reached England and 2,400 reached London. But even half of them were shot down by fighters and anti-aircraft guns. About 6,000 Englishmen died from shelling by aircraft shells, 18,000 were wounded. And the flight range remained low - 250 km. Therefore, the launchers were located in France. When the Allies occupied this country, the V-1 strikes on England ceased. The Germans began to launch cruise missiles at ports and other facilities in Belgium and Holland.
But for the allies from French or Belgian airfields, it became even more convenient to bomb Germany. The technique of "shuttle raids" was also developed. Having flown over the Germans and bombed, British and American planes landed on Soviet airfields. Refueled, rested and flew back. True, the researchers drew attention to a pattern - large military factories did not fall under the bombing. Because the shareholders of the main German enterprises were still American concerns and banks! Of course, the pilots and navigators of the "flying fortresses" did not know such subtleties. But someone knew. Someone in the higher headquarters regulated which goals to set in orders for the pilots, and which ones to pass over in silence.
Sirens howled and residential buildings collapsed in Berlin, Hamburg, Kiel. But Hitler, shaking his fists in front of the public, has long been frightening the enemy with some unprecedented "weapon of retaliation." September 8, 1944 in London in the Chiswick area there was a strong explosion. There was no air raid, and it was believed that a gas main had exploded. No, the explosions began to repeat. Finally, near the funnel, they found a part of the rocket engine nozzle. This was the "weapon of retaliation", V-2 missiles. By the way, they raised a considerable panic among the British - death falls suddenly, without any air raid warning, at any time of the day or night. Although, upon closer examination, the "retribution" turned out to be largely symbolic.
During the period of the most intensive use of the V-2, the Germans launched 30 rockets per day on England - 24 tons of explosives. And allied aviation dumped 300 tons of explosives on them per day. And the effectiveness of missiles left much to be desired. Half of them failed at launch or in flight. The guidance accuracy was low, 50% fell into a circle with a diameter of 10 km. And the Allies quickly discovered and bombed the stationary starting positions. The Germans had only mobile installations for launching the V-2. In total, 4,300 missiles were launched into England, about 2,000 flew, and 2,700 people died from them. Much more lives were claimed by the manufacture of the V-2. At the factory where they were collected, slaves from the Dora concentration camp worked, and subsequently they found 25 thousand corpses of people who died from exhaustion, unsanitary conditions. Another 5,000 SS men shot before abandoning the factory.
As for the active advance of the allied forces, in the fall of 1944 it was only in the Balkans. In Greece, the partisan movement in its scope almost caught up with Yugoslavia. The ELAS People's Liberation Army numbered 120,000 fighters and controlled vast areas. Neither the German divisions nor the puppet government of Rallis with the collaborationist "security battalions" and the Greek SS formations could cope with them. And the offensive of the Soviet troops in Yugoslavia completely turned the local situation upside down. Railways and highways from Greece to Austria and Germany passed through Belgrade. The Russians intercepted them, and the German group "E", stationed in Greece, rushed to get out of the mountain paths, through Albania and Montenegro, until they were completely cut off from their own. The invaders abandoned the cities, and they were occupied by partisans. And on October 4, small British airborne assault forces landed.
They landed without fighting at all and did not chase the Germans. At a personal meeting between Churchill and Stalin, an agreement was reached that Greece would remain in the British zone of influence. Therefore, landings were thrown out only in order to stake out "our own". Larger contingents began to arrive by sea, brought with them the emigrant government of King Georges II, brought Greek units formed under British command. They arrived ready-made, the country had already been liberated. But they were met on a wave of general enthusiasm, the Communists and the leaders of ELAS agreed to enter the coalition provisional government.
However, in Athens, a solemn entry into the capital of the British and the Greek units controlled by them was suddenly played out - and the partisans were not allowed to participate in the parade. These tensions were growing rapidly. The British command and the royal ministers began to restore the administrative structures and for this ... widely attracted collaborators. Police officers and officials who served under the Germans. Only the leaders of the traitorous government Rallis, Tsolagoklu, Logofetupolos were arrested. Under their control, tens of thousands of people were executed, 80,000 were taken to Germany for forced labor, and at least 300,000 died of starvation. But in justification they declared that they were fighting the "communist danger"! And the king and his Western patrons found this explanation to be satisfactory!
They themselves began to act in the same direction. The British commander in Greece, General Scobie, issued an order to disarm and disband ELAS. On December 2, the communists and partisan commanders announced that they would not sign the law dissolving ELAS and were withdrawing from the government in protest. The next day, a massive demonstration took place in Athens. It was quite peaceful, but Scobie and the royal government ordered their troops and police to open fire on unarmed crowds. Outrage exploded. The police were still Hitlerite! She worked with the Gestapo, and now she was shooting at people! The rebels poured into the police stations, exterminating everyone they caught. The English troops in Athens were surrounded.
Churchill personally undertook to lead the suppression of the rebellious country. From the Italian front, he transferred two fresh divisions to Greece. In addition, the British began to rearm the same "security battalions" and Greek SS men who had previously acted against the partisans. Now they are again released against ELAS, only in a different form and under different banners. And in the air, British aviation operated undividedly and with impunity. For a month and a half, she made 1665 sorties against the Greeks, bombed and shot rebellious villages, columns of partisans. But Stalin honestly withstood the agreement with the Western powers, and did not interfere in Greek affairs. The British and their supporters began to prevail. Although the Greek events in December involuntarily faded into the background.
A grand surprise to the Western powers was presented by Hitler. Of course, he was also aware that Germany had almost no chance. Almost… He came up with an unexpected way out. The situation on the Western Front was too reminiscent of the "strange war" in 1939-1940. The Americans and the British stood quietly. Even too calm! Defiantly did not take any active action. As if for show, offering the Germans to take troops from the West and transfer them against the Russians. However, the Fuhrer became convinced that the weak link in the coalition was by no means the Russians. The weak link is the Americans with the British! So it was necessary to crush them in the same way as during the period of the “strange war”. Get out of the game at least for a while, and this will turn all forces against the Russians. Such a maneuver would provide Germany with a reprieve. And the delay, you see, will reveal some new winning move ...
In the west, Hitler and his generals secretly concentrated a fist of the best troops. A million soldiers and 900 tanks. The concept of the operation was by no means new. In fact, he repeated the same winning plan that made it possible to defeat the French and British in 1940. It was supposed to break through the front in the Ardennes, push the enemy to the sea and arrange a "second Dunkirk" for him. Force them to evacuate the encircled troops, abandon their equipment, and themselves seize the main ports and bases through which the allied front was supplied. All factors seemed to favor the Germans. The Americans and the British spent three months lounging in positions, relaxed. From the Atlantic, snowfalls and fogs pulled in, paralyzing the superiority of the Allies in aviation. They were also deprived of aerial reconnaissance. And besides, the Germans for the only time during the war guessed to introduce a regime of complete radio silence! The Anglo-American command had at its disposal the top-secret Enigma decryption system, which provided the most accurate information from the intercepted radio traffic. This time Enigma didn't warn of danger...
On December 16, 1944, two armored and one combined arms armies, under the overall command of Field Marshal Model, suddenly poured into a breakthrough in a narrow sector, which was defended by two American infantry divisions. Of course, they were crushed and pressed into the mud. German plans provided for a swift breakthrough to capture the bridges across the Meuse and drive the enemy further, to the ports of Holland and Belgium. The main thing is to drive quickly and decisively, not allowing you to come to your senses. In order not to lose the pace of the offensive, fuel supplies had to be replenished in warehouses captured from the Americans - the Germans knew that they were located in Liège and Namur.
At first, these hopes seemed to be justified. In a few days, the Model avalanche deepened by 90 km. In the governments and headquarters of the Western coalition, if not panic, then at least extremely nervous moods leaped up. Churchill appealed to Stalin, begged him to help out, to start an offensive in the east early. Although the scenario of the defeat of Dunkirk still did not repeat itself. The ratio of German and allied forces was very different from 1940. Once upon a time, the French and British lost their heads from one crushing blow and fled to escape. Now the Americans overcame their confusion and put forward reserves to meet the enemy. The 7th American Panzer Division held the town of Saint-Vith for five days. Still, she did not hold back, but significantly slowed down the enemy. The 101st Airborne Division settled in the town of Bastogne, the German 5th Panzer Army twitched in fruitless attacks, but never took it. And in Bastogne the seven main roads in the Ardennes crossed!
And if in 1940 individual shortcomings did not prevent the Nazis from winning, now delays and failures turned out to be absolutely unacceptable for them. The weather began to improve. True, the Germans organized a brilliant raid on enemy airfields, setting fire to 260 aircraft. But with the overwhelming advantage of the air forces of the United States and Britain, such losses did not play a serious role. In the sky over the Ardennes, flocks of planes roared, bombarded all the roads. The supply of fuel and ammunition to the front line was stopped. And the Germans never reached the warehouses in Liege and Namur. They also did not reach the bridges over the Meuse. At 6 km from the river, their tanks stopped without fuel.
The German command began to receive alarming reports from the east. Initially Soviet armies planned an offensive in Poland on January 20, and in Prussia on February 8. But after the allies pleaded for help, Stalin asked the front commanders if they could start early? However, he stipulated that the postponement should not violate our plans and lead to unjustified losses. After weighing all the factors, the Soviet command found it possible to reduce preparations somewhat, to strike on January 12-15. But even before the Soviet guns and Katyushas rumbled, the Germans guessed that they were about to get hot. The reserves intended for the development of a breakthrough in the Ardennes, they had to deploy in the opposite direction.
Time turned out to be lost, the offensive impulse dried up, and meanwhile the Western allies acted competently. They gathered strong fists on the flanks for counterattacks. The German tank division, which broke out to the Meuse, was encircled by two tank divisions and completely destroyed. And the 3rd American Army made its way from the south to the besieged Bastogne. Thus, the entire wedge of the Hitlerite breakthrough turned out to be "cut". Model's group began to hurriedly get back until it was completely surrounded. The width of the corridor remained only 40 km, it was shot through with heavy artillery from two sides, and the Germans rolled away under the shells, in a hurry to slip through the neck. They lost and abandoned 600 tanks, a lot of guns and other equipment in the emerging "bag".
In January, Hitler struck again, in Alsace. But this operation was only auxiliary. The Germans tried to distract the enemy from their grouping in the Ardennes so that it could break away from the British and Americans who had piled on it, and put itself in order. However, radio silence was not observed in Alsace. The 19th German Army went on the attack. It seems that the Americans began to retreat. The Nazis triumphed, bravo reported - they advanced 30 km. But after all, the allied command knew in advance the time and place of the offensive! german army she went into the trap herself. Under Kolmar, superior forces were waiting for her, swept from several sides and defeated. In pursuit of the defeated Germans, the Western Allies entered German territory.
And for the fears and losses they suffered, they took revenge with "carpet" bombing - the masses of aircraft scattered bombs evenly, covering the city completely. For three days, American and British air squadrons worked on one of the most beautiful German cities - Dresden. It had no military value. In addition to high-explosive, napalm bombs were used, a sea of flames spilled. More than half of the buildings were destroyed, about 130 thousand people died. Leipzig, Chemnitz, Essen, Cologne, Munich were also massively bombed. Don't forget Nuremberg. Already here, and even more so, there were no military installations. Ancient castles, monuments of the German Middle Ages. But once the Nazi Party congresses were held here, racial laws were adopted. The Americans took revenge on the city. On January 2, 1945, they bombed so much that in one day 90% of the buildings in the central part of Nuremberg were destroyed.
Well, in the meantime, the British were completing the pacification of Greece. Probably, they would not have been pacified by military operations alone. But there was confusion in the minds. The British were hiding behind the "legitimate" government of the king, reminding people that the war with the Germans continues. And if ELAS is fighting against the British, then it turns out to be on the side of Hitler? The communists were drawn into negotiations. They argued that the main thing was internal reconciliation, and then they promised to hold general elections, and then it would be determined what the majority of the Greeks wanted. ELAS leaders agreed. On February 12, an agreement was signed in Varkiza to terminate civil war. From February 28, the ELAS army was declared disbanded, handed over 100 guns, 200 mortars, 2 thousand machine guns, 50 thousand rifles. The fighters went home, but ... the royal government with the British began to arrest them. Thousands of partisans were shot without trial. The rest realized it, again flowed into the mountains. But the unarmed were already easier to smash and push into deserted areas.
Thus, the situation in South East Europe changed drastically. And on the Western Front, the Allies returned to their former positions, restored the old front line. But here, too, the situation is fundamentally different. With massive blows in the Ardennes and Alsace, Hitler himself disheveled his selected, best troops. And he was forced to take the remaining units to the east - to Poland, Hungary. In the west, the Germans had excellent defensive positions. There was a powerful "Siegfried Line", which Germany built along its borders back in the 30s. There were enough concrete pillboxes, caponiers, batteries, the approaches to them were covered by continuous fields of anti-tank gouges. Natural obstacles were added to these fortifications - the full-flowing rivers Ruhr, Rhine.
If these lines were occupied by reliable, personnel divisions, it would not be easy to overcome them! I would have to gnaw through every meter, breaking through the fortifications with bombs and shells, pouring soldier's blood. In Italy, the Americans and the British were stuck for half a year on much weaker lines. But the fact of the matter is that the personnel of the German units have thinned too much. Instead of a solid defense, they made up a loose muslin. She was darned with a living thread by militia, security, police battalions. Boys from the Hitler Youth were put in pillboxes. They were ready to fight selflessly. But could youthful impulse replace skill? The failure of the offensive in the Ardennes actually undermined the defense of Germany on the Western Front. There was no one to defend the Siegfried Line.
