The first years after the death of Stalin. Who was the president of the USSR and the Russian Federation. reference
I have long wanted to write. The attitude towards Stalin in our country is largely polar. Some hate him, others praise him. I always liked to look at things soberly and try to understand their essence.
So Stalin was never a dictator. Moreover, he was never the leader of the USSR. Do not rush to snort skeptically. Although let's do it easier. I will now ask you two questions. If you know the answers to them, you can close this page. What follows will seem uninteresting to you.
1. Who was the leader of the Soviet state after Lenin's death?
2. When exactly did Stalin become dictators, at least a year?
Let's start from afar. In each country there is a position, occupying which, a person becomes the head of this state. This is not always the case, but exceptions only prove the rule. And in general, it doesn’t matter what this position is called, the president, the prime minister, the chairman of the great khural, or just the leader and beloved leader, the main thing is that it always exists. Due to certain changes in the political formation of a given country, it can also change its name. But one thing remains unchanged, after the person occupying it leaves his place (for one reason or another), another always takes his place, who automatically becomes the next first person of the state.
So now the next question - what was the name of this position in the USSR? General Secretary? Are you sure?
Well let's look. So Stalin became the General Secretary of the CPSU(b) in 1922. Then Lenin was still alive and even tried to work. But Lenin was never General Secretary. He only held the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. After him, this place was taken by Rykov. Those. what does it mean that Rykov became the leader of the Soviet state after Lenin? I'm sure some of you have never even heard of this name. At the same time, Stalin did not yet have any special powers of authority. Moreover, purely legally, the CPSU (b) was at that time just one of the departments in the Comintern, on a par with the parties of other countries. It is clear that the Bolsheviks gave money for all this anyway, but formally everything was exactly like that. The Comintern was then led by Zinoviev. Maybe he was at that time the first person of the state? It is unlikely that, in terms of his influence on the party, he was far inferior, for example, to the same Trotsky.
Then who then was the first person and leader? The next one is even funnier. Do you think Stalin was already a dictator in 1934? I think you now answer in the affirmative. So this year's post Secretary General canceled altogether. Why how? Well, like this. Formally, Stalin remained a simple secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. By the way, he signed it in all documents later. And in the charter of the party there was no position of general secretary at all.
In 1938, the so-called "Stalinist" constitution was adopted. According to it, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was called the supreme executive body of our country. Which was headed by Kalinin. Foreigners called him the "president" of the USSR. What kind of power he actually had, you all know very well.
Well, think about it, you say. There is also a decorative president in Germany, and the Chancellor rules everything. Yes it's true. But only so it was before Hitler and after him. In the summer of 1934, Hitler was elected Fuhrer (leader) of the nation in a referendum. Incidentally received 84.6% percent of the vote. And only then did he become, in essence, a dictator, i. a person with unlimited power. As you understand, Stalin legally did not have such powers at all. And this greatly limits the possibilities of power.
Well, it's not important, you say. On the contrary, such a position was very advantageous. He, as it were, stood above the fight, did not formally answer for anything and was the referee. Okay, let's move on. On May 6, 1941, he suddenly became Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. On the one hand, this is generally understandable. War is coming soon and we need to have real levers of power. But, the bottom line is that during the war, military power comes to the fore. And the civilian becomes just a part military structure, simply speaking the rear. And just during the war, the military was led by the same Stalin as Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Well, that's okay. The next one is even funnier. On July 19, 1941, Stalin also became the People's Commissar for Defense. This already goes beyond any idea of the dictatorship of one particular person. To make it clearer to you, it’s as if the General Director (and owner) of the enterprise part-time became even more commercial director and head of supply. Nonsense.
People's Commissar of Defense during the war is a very secondary position. For this period, the General Staff takes the main power and, in our case, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by the same Stalin. And the People's Commissar of Defense becomes something like a company foreman, who is responsible for the supply, weapons and other everyday issues of the unit. A very secondary position.
This can at least somehow be understood for the period of hostilities, but Stalin remained People's Commissar until February 1947.
Okay, let's move on. Stalin dies in 1953. Who became the leader of the USSR after him? What are you saying Khrushchev? Since when is a simple secretary of the Central Committee in our country in charge of the whole country?
Formally, it turns out that Malenko. It was he who became the next, after Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. I saw somewhere on the net where this was clearly hinted at. But for some reason, no one in our country later considered him to be the leader of the country.
In 1953, the post of party leader was revived. They named her First Secretary. And he became them in September 1953, Khrushchev. But somehow it is very unclear. At the very end of what seemed to be a plenum, Malenkov stood up and asked how the audience looked at electing the First Secretary. The audience answered in the affirmative (by the way, this is a characteristic feature of all the transcripts of those years, remarks, comments and other reactions to certain speeches in the presidium are constantly coming from the audience. Even negative ones. Sleep with open eyes at such events will be already under Brezhnev. Malenkov proposed to vote for Khrushchev. Which they did. Somehow this bears little resemblance to the election of the country's first person.
So when did Khrushchev become the de facto leader of the USSR? Well, probably in 1958, when he threw out all the old people and also became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Those. can we assume that, in fact, occupying this position and leading the party, a person began to lead the country?
But here's the problem. Brezhnev, after Khrushev was removed from all posts, became only the First Secretary. Then, in 1966, the post of General Secretary was revived. It seems like you can consider what it was then that it actually began to mean complete guide country. But again there are rough edges. Brezhnev became the leader of the party after the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Which. as we all know very well, it was generally quite decorative. Why, then, in 1977, Leonid Ilyich returned to it again and became both the General Secretary and the Chairman? Did he lack power?
But Andropov got enough. He became only Gensekov.
And that's not really all. I took all these facts from Wikipedia. If you go deeper, then the devil will break his leg in all these ranks, positions and powers of the highest echelon of power in the 20-50s.
Well, now the most important thing. In the USSR, the supreme power was collective. And all the main decisions, on one or another significant issue, were made by the Politburo (under Stalin it was a little different, but essentially true). In fact, there was no single leader. There were people (like the same Stalin) who, for various reasons, were considered the first among equals. But not more. You can't talk about any dictatorship. It never existed in the USSR and could not exist. The same Stalin simply did not have legal leverage to make serious decisions on his own. Everything has always been taken collectively. On which there are many documents.
If you think that I came up with all this myself, then you are mistaken. This is the official position of the Communist Party Soviet Union represented by the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU.
Don't believe? Well, let's move on to the documents.
Transcript of the July 1953 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Just after the arrest of Beria.
From Malenkov's speech:
First of all, we must openly admit, and we propose to write this down in the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee, that in our propaganda for last years there was a retreat from the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the question of the role of the individual in history. It is no secret that party propaganda, instead of correctly explaining the role of the Communist Party as the guiding force in the construction of communism in our country, strayed into a cult of personality.
But, comrades, it is not only a matter of propaganda. The question of the cult of personality is directly and immediately connected with the question of collective leadership.
We have no right to hide from you that such an ugly cult of personality has led to peremptory individual decisions and in recent years began to cause serious damage to the leadership of the party and the country.
This must be said in order to resolutely correct the mistakes made on this score, to draw the necessary lessons and in the future to ensure in practice collective leadership on the principle basis of the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine.
We must say this so as not to repeat the mistakes associated with lack of collective leadership and with a wrong understanding of the question of the personality cult, for these mistakes, in the absence of Comrade Stalin, will be thrice dangerous. (Voices. Right).
No one alone dares, cannot, should not, and does not want to claim the role of successor. (Voices. That's right. Applause).
The successor to the great Stalin is a tightly knit, monolithic team of party leaders ....
Those. in fact, the question of the cult of personality is not connected with the fact that someone made mistakes there (in this case Beria, the plenum was devoted to his arrest) and with the fact that taking serious decisions on his own is a retreat from the very foundation of party democracy as the principle of governing the country.
By the way, since my childhood as a pioneer, I remember such words as Democratic centralism, election from the bottom to the top. It was purely legal in the Party. Everyone was always elected, from the petty secretary of a party cell to the general secretary. Another thing is that under Brezhnev it became largely a fiction. But under Stalin it was just that.
And of course the most important document is ".
At the beginning, Khrushchev says what the report will actually be about:
Due to the fact that not everyone still imagines what the cult of personality led to in practice, what enormous damage was caused violation of the principle of collective leadership in the Party and the concentration of immense, unlimited power in the hands of one person, the Central Committee of the Party considers it necessary to report materials on this issue to the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union .
Then he scolds Stalin for a long time for deviations from the principles of collective leadership and attempts to subdue everything for himself.
And at the end he concludes with a policy statement:
Secondly, consistently and persistently continue the work carried out in recent years by the Central Committee of the Party on the strictest observance in all Party organizations, from top to bottom, Leninist principles of party leadership and above all the highest principle - collective leadership, to observe the norms of Party life, enshrined in the Rules of our Party, to develop criticism and self-criticism.
Third, fully restore the Leninist principles Soviet socialist democracy expressed in the Constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight against the arbitrariness of persons who abuse power. It is necessary to completely correct the violations of revolutionary socialist legality that have accumulated over a long period as a result of the negative consequences of the cult of personality.
And you say dictatorship. The dictatorship of the party, yes, but not one person. And those are two big differences.
The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU is the highest position in the hierarchy of the Communist Party and, by and large, the leader of the Soviet Union. In the history of the party, there were four more positions of the head of its central apparatus: Technical Secretary (1917-1918), Chairman of the Secretariat (1918-1919), Executive Secretary (1919-1922) and First Secretary (1953-1966).
The persons who filled the first two positions were mainly engaged in paper secretarial work. The position of Responsible Secretary was introduced in 1919 to fulfill administrative activities. The post of general secretary, established in 1922, was also created purely for administrative and personnel internal work. However, the first general secretary Joseph Stalin, using the principles of democratic centralism, managed to become not only the leader of the party, but of the entire Soviet Union.
At the 17th Party Congress, Stalin was not formally re-elected to the post of General Secretary. However, his influence was already enough to maintain leadership in the party and the country as a whole. After Stalin's death in 1953, Georgy Malenkov was considered the most influential member of the Secretariat. After his appointment as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, he left the Secretariat and Nikita Khrushchev, who was soon elected First Secretary of the Central Committee, entered the leading positions in the party.
Not limitless rulers
In 1964, opposition within the Politburo and the Central Committee removed Nikita Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary, electing Leonid Brezhnev to take his place. Since 1966, the position of the leader of the party has again become known as the General Secretary. In the Brezhnev era, the power of the General Secretary was not unlimited, since members of the Politburo could limit his powers. The leadership of the country was carried out collectively.
According to the same principle as the late Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko ruled the country. Both were elected to the highest party post when their health was deteriorating, and worked as General Secretary a short time. Until 1990, when the Communist Party's monopoly on power was eliminated, Mikhail Gorbachev led the state as General Secretary of the CPSU. Especially for him, in order to maintain leadership in the country, the post of President of the Soviet Union was established in the same year.
After the August 1991 coup, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary. He was replaced by Deputy Vladimir Ivashko, who served as Acting General Secretary for only five calendar days, until that moment Russian President Boris Yeltsin suspended the activities of the CPSU.
Who ruled after Stalin in the USSR? It was Georgy Malenkov. His political biography was a truly phenomenal combination of ups and downs. At one time, he was considered the successor to the leader of the peoples and was even the de facto leader of the Soviet state. He was one of the most experienced apparatchiks and was famous for his ability to calculate many moves ahead. In addition, those who were in power after Stalin had a unique memory. On the other hand, he was expelled from the party during the Khrushchev era. They say he has not been rehabilitated so far, unlike his associates. However, the one who ruled after Stalin was able to endure all this and remain faithful to his cause until death. Although, they say, in old age he overestimated a lot ...
Career start
Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov was born in 1901 in Orenburg. His father worked on the railroad. Despite the fact that noble blood flowed in his veins, he was considered a rather petty employee. His ancestors were from Macedonia. The grandfather of the Soviet leader chose the army path, was a colonel, and his brother was a rear admiral. The mother of a party leader was the daughter of a blacksmith.
In 1919, after graduating from the classical gymnasium, George was drafted into the Red Army. The following year, he joined the Bolshevik Party, becoming a political worker for an entire squadron.
After the Civil War, he studied at the Bauman School, but, having dropped out of school, began working in the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee. It was 1925.
Five years later, under the patronage of L. Kaganovich, he began to head the organizational department of the capital's city committee of the CPSU (b). Note that Stalin really liked this young official. He was intelligent and devoted to the general secretary...
Selection Malenkov
In the second half of the 1930s, there were purges of the opposition in the capital's party organization, which became the prelude to future political repressions. It was Malenkov who then led this "selection" of the party nomenklatura. Later, with the sanction of the functionary, almost all the old communist cadres were repressed. He himself came to the regions in order to intensify the fight against "enemies of the people." He used to be a witness to interrogations. True, the functionary, in fact, was only an executor of the direct instructions of the leader of the peoples.
Roads of war
When the Great Patriotic War broke out, Malenkov managed to show his organizational talent. He had to professionally and fairly quickly solve many economic and personnel issues. He has always supported developments in the tank and rocket industries. In addition, it was he who made it possible for Marshal Zhukov to stop the seemingly inevitable collapse of the Leningrad Front.
In 1942, this party leader ended up in Stalingrad and was engaged, among other things, in organizing the defense of the city. On his orders, the urban population began to evacuate.
In the same year, thanks to his efforts, the Astrakhan defensive region was strengthened. So, modern boats and other watercraft appeared in the Volga and Caspian flotilla.
Later, he took an active part in the preparations for the battle on Kursk Bulge, after which he focused on the restoration of the liberated territories, heading the appropriate committee.
post-war period
Malenkov Georgy Maximilianovich began to turn into the second figure in the country and the party.
When the war ended, he dealt with issues related to the dismantling of German industry. By and large, this work has been constantly criticized. The fact is that many of the influential departments tried to get this equipment. As a result, an appropriate commission was created, which made an unexpected decision. German industry was no longer dismantled, and enterprises that were based in the territories of East Germany began to produce goods for the Soviet Union as reparations.
Rise of a functionary
In mid-autumn 1952, the Soviet leader instructed Malenkov to make a report at the next congress of the Communist Party. Thus, the party functionary, in fact, was presented as Stalin's successor.
Apparently, the leader put forward him as a compromise figure. She suited both the party elite and the security forces.
A few months later, Stalin was gone. And Malenkov, in turn, became the head Soviet government. Of course, before him this post was held by the deceased general secretary.
Malenkov's reforms
Malenkov's reforms began literally immediately. Historians also call them "perestroika" and believe that this reform could greatly change the entire structure of the national economy.
The head of government in the period after Stalin's death announced to the people a completely new life. He promised that the two systems - capitalism and socialism - would coexist peacefully. He was the first leader of the Soviet Union to warn against atomic weapons. In addition, he was determined to put an end to the politics of the cult of personality by moving to the collective leadership of the state. He recalled that the late leader criticized the members of the Central Committee for the cult planted around him. True, there was no significant reaction to this proposal of the new prime minister at all.
In addition, the one who ruled after Stalin and before Khrushchev decided to lift a number of bans - on crossing borders, foreign press, customs transit. Unfortunately, the new head tried to present this policy as a natural continuation of the previous course. That is why Soviet citizens, in fact, not only did not pay attention to "perestroika", but also did not remember it.
Career decline
By the way, it was Malenkov, as the head of government, who came up with the idea to halve the remuneration of party officials, that is, the so-called. "envelopes". By the way, before him, Stalin offered the same thing shortly before his death. Now, thanks to the relevant resolution, this initiative has been implemented, but it has caused even greater irritation on the part of the party nomenklatura, including N. Khrushchev. As a result, Malenkov was removed from his post. And all his "perestroika" was practically curtailed. At the same time, "ration" bonuses to officials were restored.
Nevertheless, the ex-head of government remained in the cabinet. He directed all Soviet power plants, which began to work much more successfully and more efficiently. Malenkov also promptly resolved issues related to the social arrangement of employees, workers and their families. Accordingly, all this increased his popularity. Even though she was already tall. But in the middle of the summer of 1957 he was "exiled" to the hydroelectric power station in Ust-Kamenogorsk, in Kazakhstan. When he arrived there, the whole city rose to meet him.
Three years later, the former minister headed the thermal power plant in Ekibastuz. And also on arrival, a lot of people appeared who carried his portraits ...
Many did not like his well-deserved fame. And the very next year, the one who was in power after Stalin was expelled from the party, sent to retire.
Last years
Once retired, Malenkov returned to Moscow. He retained some privileges. In any case, he bought food in a special store for party officials. But, despite this, he periodically went to his dacha in Kratovo by train.
And in the 80s, the one who ruled after Stalin suddenly turned to Orthodox faith. This was, perhaps, his last "turn" of fate. Many saw him in the temple. In addition, he periodically listened to radio programs about Christianity. He also became a reader in churches. By the way, in these years he lost a lot of weight. Perhaps that is why no one touched him and did not recognize him.
He died at the very beginning of January 1988. He was buried at the Novokuntsevsky churchyard in the capital. Note that he was buried according to the Christian rite. In the Soviet media of those times there were no reports of his death. But there were obituaries in Western periodicals. And very extensive...
Lavrenty Pylych Beria
Didn't justify the trust.
Remained from Beria
Only down and feathers.
(folk ditty 1953)
How the country said goodbye to Stalin.
Stalin, during his lifetime, appeared in the Soviet state, where atheism denied any religion - an "earthly god." Hence, his “sudden” death was perceived by millions of people as a tragedy of universal proportions. Or, in any case, the collapse of all life until this Judgment Day - March 5, 1953.
“I wanted to think: what will happen to all of us now?” the front-line writer I. Ehrenburg recalled his feelings of that day. “But I could not think. I experienced what many of my compatriots probably experienced then: numbness. Then there was a nationwide funeral, a nationwide mourning for millions of Soviet citizens, unprecedented in its scale in world history. How did the country deal with this death? This was best told in poetry by the poetess O. Bergholz, who lost her husband during the repressions, who served time on false charges:
"Heart bleeds...
Our beloved, our dear!
Grabbing your head,
The Motherland is crying over You.
A 4-day mourning was declared in the country. The coffin with the body of Stalin was brought into the Mausoleum, above the entrance to which two names were inscribed: LENIN and STALIN. The end of Stalin's funeral was heralded by lingering beeps at factories across the country, from Brest to Vladivostok and Chukotka. Later, the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko said about this: “They say that this many-pipe howl, from which the blood ran cold, resembled the hellish cry of a dying mythical monster ...”. The atmosphere of general shock, the expectation that life could suddenly change for the worse, hovered in the public atmosphere.
However, there were other moods caused by the death of the seemingly immortal Leader. “Well, this one is dead ... - the legless disabled order-bearer Uncle Vanya turned to a 13-year-old neighbor who brought her felt boots to be repaired and then seriously pondered for two days: should she go to the police or not” (Quoted by Alekseevich. S. Charmed by death .).
Millions of prisoners and exiles, languishing in camps and living in settlements, took this news with joy. “Oh joy and triumph!” the exiled Oleg Volkov later described his then feelings. “Finally, the long night will dissipate over Russia. Only God defend! To reveal one's feelings: who knows how else it will turn around?... When the exiles meet, they do not dare to express their hopes, but they no longer conceal a cheerful look. Thrice cheers!"
The palette of public sentiments in the country frozen by the Stalinist dictatorship was diverse, but on the whole, an atmosphere of general shock prevailed, the expectation that life could suddenly change for the worse. However, it became clear that with the death of the one who was considered a superman and an "earthly god", power was henceforth deprived of its divine halo. Since all the successors of Stalin were at the top, they looked like “mere mortals” (according to E.Yu. Zubkova).
New collective leadership headed by G. Malenkov
Stalin had not yet died, lying in an unconscious position, when his closest associates began an open and behind-the-scenes struggle for power at the very top. To some extent, the situation of the beginning of the 1920s was repeated in the party elite, when Lenin was hopelessly ill. But this time the bill was for days and hours.
When on the morning of March 4, 1953, “a government message about the illness of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR ... Comrade Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin” was transmitted on Moscow radio, it was, in particular, reported that “... the serious illness of Comrade Stalin will entail more or less prolonged non-participation in leadership activities ... ". And as it was further reported that the government circles (the party and the government) "... seriously take into account all the circumstances related to the temporary departure of Comrade Stalin from the leading state and party activities." So the party-state elite explained to the population the convening of an urgent Plenum of the Central Committee, on the distribution of power in the country and the party at the time of the incapacity of the leader who was in a coma.
According to a great specialist in this matter, historian Yuri Zhukov, already on the evening of March 3, some agreement was reached among Stalin's associates regarding the occupation of key posts in the party and government of the country. Moreover, Stalin's comrades-in-arms began to divide power among themselves, then when Stalin himself was still alive, but could not stop them in any way. Having received news from the doctors about the hopelessness of the sick leader, the comrades-in-arms began to divide the portfolios as if he were no longer alive.
The joint session of the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet began its work on the evening of March 5, again when Stalin was still alive. In the same place, the power roles were redistributed as follows: the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which Stalin had previously held, was transferred to G. M. Malenkov, who, in fact, from now on acted as the No. 1 figure in the country and represented it abroad.
Malenkov's first deputies were L.P. Beria, V.M. Molotov, N.I. Bulganin, L.M. Kaganovich. However, Malenkov, for a number of reasons, did not become the new sole leader of the party and state. The politically "dexterous" and most educated Malenkov, due to his personal qualities, was not able to become a new dictator, which cannot be said about his political "ally" - Beria.
But the power pyramid itself, which developed under Stalin, has now undergone decisive changes by his associates, who no longer reckoned with the will of the leader who departed to another world late in the evening (at 21.50 Moscow time) on March 5. The distribution of key roles in power structures was carried out in private, with Beria and Malenkov playing the main role in this. According to the historian R. Pikhoi (who worked well with archival documents), on March 4, Beria sent Malenkov a note in which the most important government posts were distributed in advance, which were approved at a meeting the next day on March 5.
The Stalinist secretariat, elected at the congress, was abolished XIX Congress. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, consisting of 25 members and 10 candidates, was reduced to 10 members (consisting of Malenkov, Beria, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Saburov, Pervukhin, Molotov and Mikoyan) and 4 candidates; most of them entered the government.
The younger Stalinist nominees were immediately relegated to the background. This, like the very fact of the return of Molotov, previously disgraced, to the political Olympus under Stalin (he was returned to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR) was a kind of sign of the beginning of the rejection of Stalin's latest political reshuffles. According to Yuri Zhukov, the inclusion of Molotov required the growth of a new narrow leadership to the "five" - Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich. Such an organization of power was subsequently presented as a "collective leadership", which was largely temporary in nature, formed on the basis of a balance of conflicting views and interests of the top leadership of that time.
L. Beria received enormous power, who headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs, united after the merger of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security, which became a kind of super-ministry that also carried out whole line national economic tasks. Famous political figure O. Troyanovsky in his memoirs gives the following characterization of the Soviet era: “Although immediately after the death of Stalin, Malenkov was considered the number one figure as chairman of the Council of Ministers, Beria actually played the leading role. I never came across him directly, but I knew from eyewitness accounts that he was an immoral man who did not disdain any means to achieve his goals, but possessed an outstanding mind and great organizational skills. Relying on Malenkov, and sometimes on some other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, he consistently led the matter to consolidate his leadership.
N.S. began to play the third key figure in the collective leadership, after Malenkov and Beria. Khrushchev, who already in the last years of Stalin's rule had great political influence.
In fact, already in March 1953, 3 main centers were formed in the highest echelons of the party, headed by Stalin's associates - Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev. In this struggle, each one relied on and exploited his own nomenklatura possibilities, connected with the peculiarities of the position in the party-state system. The base of Malenkov was the government of the country, the support of Beria was the law enforcement agencies, Khrushchev was the party apparatus (Pyzhikov A.V.).
In the established triumvirate (Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev), Beria became the second person in the state. Beria is now heading all the almighty punitive bodies in the country, at the same time he had all the necessary information - a dossier on all his associates, which could be used in the fight against his political competitors (Zhilenkov M.). The triumvirators from the very beginning began to cautiously revise Stalin's policy, starting with the refusal to single-handedly make key decisions. Moreover, Malenkov and Beria played a key role in this, and not Khrushchev, as is commonly believed.
Already in Malenkov’s mourning speech at Stalin’s funeral on March 9, 1953, where foreign policy problems were discussed, an “unconventional” for Stalin era the idea of "the possibility of long-term coexistence and peaceful competition between the two various systems- capitalist and socialist. In domestic politics the main task was seen by Malenkov as "steady to achieve further improvement in the material well-being of workers, collective farmers, the intelligentsia, all Soviet people" (cited by Aksyutin Yu.V.).
The day after Stalin's funeral (March 10), Malenkov invited the ideological secretaries of the Central Committee M. A. Suslov and P. N. Pospelov, as well as the editor-in-chief of Pravda D.T. Shepilova. Malenkov at this meeting declared to all those present about the need to “stop the policy of the cult of personality and move on to the collective leadership of the country”, reminding the members of the Central Committee how Stalin himself strongly criticized them for the cult planted around him (quoted by Openkin L.A.). This was the very first stone thrown by Malenkov to debunk Stalin's personality cult, followed by others. As early as March 20, 1953, the name of Stalin ceased to be mentioned in the headlines of newspaper articles, and his citation was sharply reduced.
Malenkov himself voluntarily withdrew some of his powers when, on March 14, 1953, he resigned from the post of secretary of the Central Committee, transferring this post to Khrushchev. This to some extent divided the party and state power, and, of course, strengthened the position of Khrushchev, who gained control of the party apparatus. However, at that time the center of gravity was more in the government apparatus of the Council of Ministers than in the party Central Committee, which of course did not please Khrushchev.
The socio-economic program of the triumvirate was received in the first official report by G.M. Malenkov at a meeting of the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 15, 1953. From Malenkov’s speech: “The law for our government is the obligation to unremittingly care for the welfare of the people, to maximize the satisfaction of their material and cultural needs ...” (“Izvestia”, 1953).
This was so far the first test of strength in the further correction of the Stalinist model economic development, with its traditional priority in favor of heavy and military industries. In 1953, the mandatory minimum of workdays on collective farms, introduced in May 1939, was abolished.
Beria is a mysterious reformer
Even greater reformist fervor began to show Lavrenty Beria. He, being a power-hungry and cynical person, at the same time, of course, had a great organizational talent, probably one of the best in the post-war USSR. On March 27 of this year, on his initiative (Beria wrote a note on amnesty to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on March 26), an amnesty was announced for prisoners whose term did not exceed 5 years, as well as minors, women with children and pregnant women. In total, 1.2 million prisoners were released (except for political prisoners convicted of "counter-revolutionary crimes"), although this immediately had a negative impact on the level of crime, which literally jumped in the cities.
Due to the increasing crimes, units of the internal troops were brought into Moscow, horse patrols appeared (Geller M.Ya. Nekrich A.M.). faked, and he himself was killed. In the note, in fact, Stalin, Abakumov, Abakumov's deputy Ogoltsov and the former minister of the Ministry of State Security of Belarus Tsanava were called the organizers of his murder. This was the first serious accusation against the divine idol Stalin.
On April 4, the “case of poisoning doctors” was terminated, and a week later the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a resolution “On Violation of Laws by Organs state security”, thus opening up the possibility of reviewing many cases. On April 10, 1953, again at the initiative of Beria, the Central Committee of the CPSU cancels earlier decisions to justify the repressed and completely closes the so-called "Mingrelian case" (Decrees of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 9, 1951, and March 27, 1952). It was on the initiative of Beria that the dismantling of the Stalinist Gulag began. The largest “great construction projects” erected by the hands of prisoners, such as Railway Salekhard-Igarka in the tundra, the Karakum Canal and underwater tunnel(13 km) to Sakhalin. The Special Meeting under the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor's Office of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were liquidated, Supreme Court received the right to review resolutions on cases of special jurisdiction (“troikas”, the Special Meeting and the Boards of the OGPU).
On April 4, Beria signed an order prohibiting the use, as it was written in this document, “savage “interrogation methods” - brutal beatings of those arrested, around-the-clock use of handcuffs on hands turned behind their backs, prolonged sleep deprivation, confinement of those arrested in a naked state in a cold punishment cell” . As a result of these tortures, the defendants were brought to moral depression, and "sometimes even to the loss of human appearance." “Using such a state of the arrested,” the order said, “the falsifying investigators slipped them fabricated “confessions” in advance about anti-Soviet and espionage-terrorist activities” (cited by R. Pikhoy).
Another part of Beria's mass amnesty policy was a decree of May 20, 1953, which removed passport restrictions for citizens released from prison, which allowed them to find work in large cities. These restrictions, according to various estimates, concerned three million people (Zhilenkov M.).
The April revelations of illegal methods of state security, multiplied by the death of the chief architect of repression, Stalin, caused a lively protest response in the camps and exiles, as well as among the relatives of the prisoners. The editorial offices of the newspapers, the prosecutor's office and party organs literally rained down from all over the country complaints and petitions for a review of cases. It was restless in the camps themselves. On May 26, 1953, an uprising broke out in the Norilsk Gorlag, which was brutally suppressed by the troops, and the number of those killed was estimated at several hundred people.
Beria knew firsthand about the nationalist underground in the western republics of the USSR, as he mercilessly suppressed it for many years. Now he proposed more flexible methods in national policy, such as indigenization, partial decentralization of the union republics, some assumption of national and cultural characteristics. Here his innovation was expressed in proposals for a wider replacement of Russians in leading positions in the Union republics by national cadres; the establishment of national orders and even the ability to create national military formations. In the context of an acute political struggle for power in the Kremlin, Beria, thus, also expected to receive support and support from the national elites in the union republics of the USSR. Subsequently, such Beria's undertakings in the national question were regarded as "bourgeois-nationalist", as inciting "enmity and discord" between the peoples of the USSR.
The ubiquitous Beria tried to carry out transformations in foreign policy. He was clearly trying to stop what had begun cold war"with the West, the fault of unleashing which, in his opinion, lay with the adamant Stalin. The most daring was his proposal - to unite Germany from its two parts - eastern (under the control Soviet troops) and Western-controlled by the Anglo-Americans, allowing the unified German state to be non-socialist! Such a radical proposal by Beria met with an objection only from Molotov. Beria also believed that in other countries of Eastern Europe, socialism should not be accelerated along the Soviet model.
He also tried to restore relations with Yugoslavia spoiled under Stalin. Beria believed that the break with Tito was a mistake, and planned to correct it. “Let the Yugoslavs build what they want” (according to S. Kremlev).
The fact that the partial dismantling of the punitive system began to be actively carried out by Beria with the support of Malenkov and other high-ranking members of the party and Soviet leadership, today no one doubts. Disputes are based on Beria's "liberal" reformism. Why exactly the main "punisher of the country" recent decades turned out to be the most "liberal" of all Stalin's associates? Traditionally, many authors and biographers (mostly of the liberal camp) Beria were inclined to consider his reform undertakings solely as a desire from the outset "vicious villain and intriguer" to wash off the image of the main "Stalinist executioner".
Such motives in the real, and not the "mythological-demonic" Beria (as he was represented in the 90s), of course, were present. However, it would be wrong to explain all of Beria's reformism in the short period of 1953 with these motives. Even during the life of Stalin, he repeatedly expressed the great danger to the country in continuing the course of "tightening the screws" and especially the super-exploitation of the collective farm peasantry. However, being a cautious and executive person, Beria carried out all Stalin's orders as energetically and efficiently as possible, which earned him the respect of the "master".
But with the death of the charismatic Stalin, Beria, being the person most aware of the moods of Soviet citizens, well understood the need to abandon many of the most odious repressive features of the Stalinist system. The country is compressed like a spring, long time living under the laws of wartime was in dire need of a respite and, finally, in making life easier.
At the same time, as a strong power-hungry personality, he certainly claimed the role of Stalin's main successor. But to do this, he had to get around his many rivals in the collective leadership, especially such political heavyweights as Malenkov (to whom he was formally subordinate). And it was possible to circumvent them only by intercepting the initiative of reform reforms in the country. And Beria did it well at first.
In fact, under the weak-willed Malenkov, Beria became the shadow ruler of the country, which, of course, could not but cause deaf discontent among many of his “comrades-in-arms”. The very logic of the struggle, unfolding in the highest echelons of power, spoke of the need to eliminate a dangerous rival who could turn into a “new Stalin”. It is not surprising that even yesterday's political comrades-in-arms of Beria (especially Malenkov) are joining forces to topple the most dangerous political figure, Beria, with the help of a conspiracy.
Neither ideological disputes, nor possibly different opinions on further development USSR or his foreign policy were not the motive of this game, the fear of Beria and the secret police belonging to him played a decisive role here (Prudnikova E.A.). The leaders from the collective leadership were very worried about Beria's plans to curtail the influence of the party and subordinate the party structures to government bodies, and those, in turn, to the all-powerful Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
As documents of that time testify, Khrushchev and Malenkov played a leading role in the conspiracy against Beria, relying on party activists and all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. It was they who brought into action the most significant political component - the army, or rather the military leadership, and, above all, marshals N.A. Bulganin and G.K. Zhukov (Pozharov Alexey). June 26, 1953 during a meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which then turned into a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, as all its members were present.
At this meeting, Khrushchev voiced accusations against Beria: revisionism, an "anti-socialist approach" to the situation in the GDR, and even spying for Great Britain in the 20s. When Beria tried to protest the accusations, he was arrested by a group of generals led by Marshal Zhukov.
In hot pursuit, the investigation and trial of the all-powerful marshal from Lubyanka began. Along with the real crimes of Beria in organizing “illegal repressions” (which, by the way, were organized by all his “accusers”), Beria was charged with a whole set of standard charges for that time: espionage in favor of foreign states, his enemy activities aimed at eliminating the Soviet worker the peasant system, the desire for the restoration of capitalism and the restoration of the rule of the bourgeoisie, as well as in moral decay, in the abuse of power (the Politburo and the Beria case. Collection of documents).
His closest associates from the security agencies got into the “Beria gang”: Merkulov V.N., Kobulov B.Z. Goglidze S.A., Meshik P.Ya., Dekanozov V.G., Vlodzimirsky L.E. They were also repressed.
From the last word of Beria at the trial on December 23, 1953: “I have already shown the court that I plead guilty. For a long time I hid my service in the Musavatist counter-revolutionary intelligence service. However, I declare that, even while serving there, I did nothing harmful. I fully acknowledge my moral decay. Numerous connections with women, which have been mentioned here, are a disgrace to me as a citizen and a former member of the party. ... Recognizing that I am responsible for the excesses and perversions of socialist legality in 1937-1938, I ask the court to take into account that I did not have selfish and hostile goals. The reason for my crimes is the situation of that time. ... I do not consider myself guilty of an attempt to disorganize the defense of the Caucasus during the Great Patriotic War. When sentencing me, I ask you to carefully analyze my actions, not to consider me as a counter-revolutionary, but to apply to me only those articles of the Criminal Code that I really deserve. (Quoted by Dzhanibekyan V.G.).
Beria was shot on the same day, December 23, in the bunker of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District in the presence of the USSR Prosecutor General R. A. Rudenko. The first shot, on his own initiative, was fired from a personal weapon by Colonel-General (later Marshal of the Soviet Union) P.F. Batitsky (according to the memoirs of the prosecutor A. Antonov-Ovseenko). As in the recent past, the massive demonization of the image of Beria in the Soviet press caused outrage among Soviet citizens, who literally began to compete with each other in sophistication to brand the "fierce enemy" more strongly. Here's how gr. Alekseev (Dnepropetrovsk region) poetically expressed his righteous anger at Beria:
"I do not ask, I demand by right
Wipe you snake off the face of the earth.
You raised a sword for my honor and glory,
Let it fall on your head." (TsKhSD. F.5. Op. 30. D.4.).
Beria turned out to be a convenient "scapegoat" for everyone, especially for his associates, who also had their hands "elbow-deep in blood." It was on Beria that almost all the crimes of the Stalin era were hanged. Especially the destruction of the leading cadres of the party. Like, it was he who, having rubbed himself into the confidence of Stalin, deceived the “great leader”. Acting through Stalin, Beria killed many innocent people.
It is significant that at that moment Stalin was beyond criticism. According to A. Mikoyan, who commented on the time before the XX Congress of the CPSU (1956): “We did not immediately give a correct assessment of Stalin. Stalin died, we did not criticize him for two years ... We psychologically did not reach such criticism then.
Khrushchev vs. Malenkov
The fall of Beria was the end of the first triumvirate. The prestige and influence of Khrushchev, the main organizer of the anti-Beria plot, increased significantly. Malenkov lost his support in party circles and was now increasingly dependent on Khrushchev, who relied on the party apparatus. Khrushchev could not yet dictate his decisions, but Malenkov could no longer act without Khrushchev's consent. Both still needed each other (Geller M.Ya., Nekrich A.M.).
The struggle between the two political heavyweights took place over socio-economic programs. The initiator of the new course was initially G. Malenkov. In August 1953, Malenkov formulated a new course that provided for the social reorientation of the economy and the priority development of light industry (Group B).
On August 8, 1953, Malenkov delivered a speech at the 6th session of the USSR Supreme Council, in which he noted the unfavorable situation in agriculture and urged: “The urgent task is to sharply increase the provision of the population with food and industrial fish, oil, sugar, confectionery, clothes, shoes, dishes, furniture. In his speech, Malenkov proposed to halve the agricultural tax for collective farmers, to write off the arrears of previous years, and also to change the principle of taxation of the villagers.
The new premier also called for a change in the attitude towards the personal farming of collective farmers, to expand housing construction, to develop trade and retail. In addition, to significantly increase investment in the development of the light, food, and fishing industries.
Fateful for millions populace Malenkov's proposals were accepted. The plan of the fifth five-year plan, which began in 1951, was as a result revised in favor of light industry. In the course of the reforms, the size of household plots of collective farmers increased by 5 times, and the tax on them was halved. All old debts from collective farmers were written off. As a result, in 5 years the village began to produce 1.5 times more food. This made Malenkov among the people the most popular politician of that time. And the peasants even had such a tale that Malenkov is “Lenin's nephew” (Yuri Borisenok). At the same time, the economic course of Malenkov was perceived with caution by the party and economic elite, brought up on the Stalinist approach of "heavy industry at any cost." Malenkov's opponent was Khrushchev, who at that time defended the slightly corrected old Stalinist policy, but in favor of the predominant development of the "A" group. "Narodnik" Khrushchev (as Stalin once called him) was at that time much more conservative in his political programs than Beria and Malenkov.
But Malenkov, finally, called for a fight against the privileges and bureaucracy of the party and state apparatus, noting "the complete disregard for the needs of the people", "bribery and the decay of the moral character of the communist" (Zhukov Yu. N.). Back in May 1953, on the initiative of Malenkov, a government decree was adopted that halved the remuneration of party officials and eliminated the so-called. "envelopes" - additional remuneration that is not subject to accounting (Zhukov Yu.N.).
It was a serious challenge to the main owner of the country - the party apparatus. Malenkov literally played "with fire", it is not surprising that he immediately turned against himself the mass of the party elite, who were accustomed to considering themselves the main manager of state property. And this, in turn, gave N. S. Khrushchev a chance, acting as a defender of the interests of this party and economic elite and relying on it, to neutralize another competitor in the struggle for power.
Historian Yuri Zhukov cites evidence that party apparatchiks literally bombarded Khrushchev with requests for the return of surcharges for them in envelopes and an increase in their amounts. As in the 1920s, the rivalry between the leaders was only masked by political programs, but most of all it took place between the leaders headed by two political forces: the government and economic apparatus represented by Malenkov and the party represented by Khrushchev. Obviously, the second force was more powerful and more consolidated.
Already in August 1953, Khrushchev made a "knight's move", he was able to return the previously canceled "envelopes" to the party workers and returned the unpaid amounts to the party apparatchiks for 3 months. The support of bureaucrats from the Central Committee, regional committees and city committees elevated Khrushchev to the pinnacle of power. As a result, the September Plenum of the Central Committee, having restored the post of first secretary of the Central Committee, immediately gave it to Khrushchev, his "defender". As Khrushchev's son-in-law Adjubey pointed out, "he only seemed to be a simple-minded person and even wanted to look like that" (Boris Sokolov).
From that time on, Khrushchev, relying on the powerful support of the party apparatus, began to confidently bypass his main rival, Malenkov. Khrushchev was now catching up, trying to win the approval of the masses as well. That is why at the September (1953) Plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev spoke, in essence, with a repetition of Malenkov's proposals - to support the development of the countryside and stimulate the development of light industry, but on his own behalf.
The fact that the party bureaucracy was on the side of Khrushchev and fully supported him is evidenced by this fact. In November 1953, a meeting was held in the Central Committee, in which G. Malenkov once again delivered a speech condemning bribery among the workers of the apparatus. According to the memoirs of F. Burlatsky, there was a painful silence in the hall, "bewilderment was mixed with fear." It was broken only by Khrushchev's voice: “All this, of course, is true, Georgy Maximilianovich. But the apparatus is our backbone.” The hall responded to this remark with stormy and enthusiastic applause.
By the end of 1953, the situation in party and government circles had developed in such a way that there was no longer a triumvirate, but not even a duumvirate (Malenkov and Khrushchev). Khrushchev outplayed Malenkov on the very “main field”, becoming the head of the party, the backbone of Soviet statehood. However, Khrushchev's leadership throughout the country was not yet so obvious. The form of collective leadership was preserved, and Malenkov, as prime minister, had even more weight in government circles. But his power and influence in the state was much inferior to the authority of Khrushchev, a more ambitious and powerful man. Khrushchev became the new leader of the entire country, in which the processes of de-Stalinization were gaining momentum.
Image caption The royal family hid the illness of the heir to the throne
Disputes about the state of health of President Vladimir Putin make us recall the Russian tradition: the first person was considered as an earthly deity, which was not supposed to be remembered irreverently and in vain.
Possessing practically unlimited power for life, the rulers of Russia fell ill and died like mere mortals. It is said that in the 1950s, one of the liberal-minded young "stadium poets" once said: "Only they have no control over heart attacks!"
Discussion of the personal lives of the leaders, including their physical condition, was banned. Russia is not America, where the analysis data of presidents and presidential candidates and their blood pressure figures are published.
Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich, as you know, suffered from congenital hemophilia - a hereditary disease in which blood does not coagulate normally, and any injury can lead to death from internal hemorrhage.
The only person capable of improving his condition in some way still incomprehensible to science was Grigory Rasputin, who, in modern terms, was a strong psychic.
Nicholas II and his wife categorically did not want to make public the fact that their only son is actually a disabled person. Even ministers only in general terms knew that the Tsarevich had health problems. Simple people, seeing the heir during rare public appearances in the arms of a hefty sailor, they considered him a victim of an assassination attempt by terrorists.
Whether Alexei Nikolayevich could subsequently lead the country, or not, is unknown. His life at less than 14 years was cut short by a KGB bullet.
Vladimir Lenin
Image caption Lenin was the only Soviet leader whose health was not a secret.The founder of the Soviet state died unusually early, at the age of 54, from progressive atherosclerosis. An autopsy showed damage to the cerebral vessels incompatible with life. There were rumors that the development of the disease was provoked by untreated syphilis, but there is no evidence for this.
The first stroke, which resulted in partial paralysis and loss of speech, happened to Lenin on May 26, 1922. After that, for more than a year and a half he was at the dacha in Gorki in a helpless state, interrupted by short remissions.
Lenin is the only Soviet leader whose physical condition was not a secret. Medical bulletins were published regularly. However, associates last days assured that the leader would recover. Joseph Stalin, who visited Lenin in Gorki more often than other members of the leadership, posted optimistic reports in Pravda about how he and Ilyich joked merrily about reinsurer doctors.
Joseph Stalin
Image caption Stalin's illness was reported the day before his deathThe “Leader of the Peoples” in recent years suffered from severe damage to the cardiovascular system, probably aggravated by an unhealthy lifestyle: he worked hard, while turning night into day, ate fatty and spicy foods, smoked and drank, and did not like to be examined and treated.
According to some reports, the "doctors' case" began with the fact that professor-cardiologist Kogan advised a high-ranking patient to rest more. The suspicious dictator saw this as someone's attempt to remove him from business.
Having started the "doctors' case", Stalin was left without a qualified medical care. Even the closest people could not talk to him on this topic, and he intimidated the servants so much that after a stroke that happened on March 1, 1953 at the Near Dacha, he lay on the floor for several hours, as he had previously forbidden the guards to disturb him without calling.
Even after Stalin turned 70, public discussion of his health and forecasts of what would happen to the country after his departure were absolutely impossible in the USSR. The idea that we would ever be "without him" was considered blasphemous.
For the first time, the people were informed about Stalin's illness the day before his death, when he had long been unconscious.
Leonid Brezhnev
Image caption Brezhnev "ruled without regaining consciousness"Leonid Brezhnev in recent years, as the people joked, "ruled without regaining consciousness." The very possibility of such jokes confirmed that after Stalin the country had changed a lot.
The 75-year-old general secretary had enough senile illnesses. In particular, sluggish leukemia was mentioned. However, it is difficult to say from what, in fact, he died.
Doctors spoke of a general weakening of the body, caused by the abuse of sedatives and sleeping pills, which caused memory lapses, loss of coordination and speech disorder.
In 1979, Brezhnev lost consciousness during a meeting of the Politburo.
"You know, Mikhail," Yuri Andropov said to Mikhail Gorbachev, who had just been transferred to Moscow and was not accustomed to such scenes, "everything must be done to support Leonid Ilyich in this position as well. This is a matter of stability."
Brezhnev was politically killed by television. In the old days, his condition could have been hidden, but in the 1970s it was impossible to avoid regular appearances on the screen, including on the air.
The obvious inadequacy of the leader, combined with the complete absence of official information, caused an extremely negative reaction from society. Instead of pity for the sick person, the people responded with jokes and anecdotes.
Yuri Andropov
Image caption Andropov suffered from kidney damageYuri Andropov most of his life suffered from severe kidney damage, from which, in the end, he died.
The disease caused an increase in blood pressure. In the mid-1960s, Andropov was intensively treated for hypertension, but this did not give results, and there was a question about his retirement due to disability.
Kremlin doctor Yevgeny Chazov had a dazzling career thanks to the fact that he correctly diagnosed the head of the KGB and gave him about 15 years of active life.
In June 1982, at the plenum of the Central Committee, when the speaker called from the rostrum to "give a party assessment" to the spreaders of rumors, Andropov unexpectedly intervened and said in a harsh tone that he was "warning for the last time" those who talk too much in conversations with foreigners. According to the researchers, he meant, first of all, leaks of information about his health.
In September, Andropov went on vacation to the Crimea, where he caught a cold and never got out of bed again. In the Kremlin hospital, he regularly underwent hemodialysis, a blood purification procedure using equipment that replaces normal work kidneys.
Unlike Brezhnev, who once fell asleep and did not wake up, Andropov died a long and painful death.
Konstantin Chernenko
Image caption Chernenko rarely appeared in public, spoke breathlesslyAfter Andropov's death, the need to give the country a young dynamic leader was obvious to everyone. But the old members of the Politburo nominated 72-year-old Konstantin Chernenko, formally the No. 2 man, as general secretary.
As the former Minister of Health of the USSR Boris Petrovsky later recalled, they all thought exclusively about how to die in office, they had no time for the country, and even more so, no time for reforms.
Chernenko had suffered from emphysema for a long time, heading the state, almost did not work, rarely appeared in public, spoke, choking and swallowing words.
In August 1983, he suffered a severe poisoning after eating on vacation in the Crimea fish caught and smoked by his neighbor in the country, Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Vitaly Fedorchuk. Many were treated to the gift, but nothing bad happened to anyone else.
Konstantin Chernenko died on March 10, 1985. Three days earlier, elections were held in the USSR in The Supreme Council. Television showed the General Secretary, who unsteadily walked up to the ballot box, dropped the ballot into it, languidly waved his hand and slurred: "Good."
Boris Yeltsin
Image caption Yeltsin, as far as is known, suffered five heart attacksBoris Yeltsin suffered from severe heart disease and reportedly suffered five heart attacks.
The first president of Russia was always proud of the fact that nothing takes him, went in for sports, swam in ice water and built his image on this in many respects, and was used to enduring ailments on his feet.
Yeltsin's health deteriorated sharply in the summer of 1995, but elections were ahead, and he refused extensive treatment, although doctors warned of "irreparable harm to health." According to journalist Alexander Khinshtein, he said: "After the elections, at least cut, but now leave me alone."
On June 26, 1996, a week before the second round of elections, Yeltsin had a heart attack in Kaliningrad, which was concealed with great difficulty.
On August 15, immediately after taking office, the president went to the clinic, where he underwent coronary bypass surgery. This time he conscientiously followed all the instructions of the doctors.
In conditions of freedom of speech, it was difficult to hide the truth about the state of health of the head of state, but the entourage tried as best they could. It was admitted, in extreme cases, that he had ischemia and temporary colds. Press Secretary Sergei Yastrzhembsky said that the president rarely appears in public, because he is extremely busy working with documents, but his handshake is iron.
Separately, the question of Boris Yeltsin's relationship with alcohol should be mentioned. Political opponents constantly exaggerated this topic. One of the main slogans of the Communists during the 1996 campaign was: "Instead of the drunken El, let's choose Zyuganov!"
Meanwhile, Yeltsin appeared in public "under the fly" the only time - during the famous conducting of the orchestra in Berlin.
The former head of the presidential guard, Alexander Korzhakov, who had no reason to shield the former chief, wrote in his memoirs that in September 1994 in Shannon, Yeltsin did not get off the plane to meet with the Prime Minister of Ireland, not because of intoxication, but because of a heart attack. After a quick consultation, the advisers decided that people should believe the "alcoholic" version rather than admit that the leader was seriously ill.
Retirement, regime and peace had a beneficial effect on the health of Boris Yeltsin. He lived in retirement for almost eight years, although in 1999, according to doctors, he was in serious condition.
Is it worth hiding the truth?
According to experts, illness is certainly not a plus for a statesman, but in the era of the Internet it is pointless to hide the truth, and with skillful PR, one can even extract political dividends from it.
As an example, analysts point to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who made his struggle with cancer good advertising. Supporters got a reason to be proud that their idol does not burn in the fire and even in the face of illness thinks about the country, and rallied around him even stronger.
